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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents three essays on the effects of different institutions, technolo-
gies, and shocks on health, education, labor and information outcomes using experimental
and quasi-experimental research designs. Specifically, I consider the effects of social media,
vaccination, and natural resources.
In the first essay “The Economic Effects of Facebook”, joint work with Mofioluwasademi
Odunowo, Trent McNamara, Xiongfei Guo, and Ragan Petrie, we study the effects of Face-
book on news awareness, subjective well-being, and daily activities. We use a large field
experiment with a validated Facebook restriction to document the value of Facebook to users
and its causal effect on news consumption and awareness, well-being, and daily activities.
Those who are off Facebook for a week reduce news consumption, are less likely to rec-
ognize politically-skewed news stories, report being less depressed and engage in healthier
activities. One week of Facebook is worth $67, and this increases by 19.6 percent after
experiencing a Facebook restriction.
In the second essay “Vaccines at Work”, joint work with Manuel Hoffmann and Adrian
Chadi, we study how behavioral factors can affect the effectiveness of flu vaccination. Flu
vaccination could be a cost-effective way to handle the costs of this disease, but low take-
up rates, particularly of working adults, and vaccination unintendingly causing moral hazard
may decrease its benefits. We ran a natural field experiment with employees of a large bank in
Ecuador where we experimentally manipulated incentives to participate in a flu vaccination
campaign. We find that reducing the opportunity costs of vaccination increased take-up by
112 percent. Also, we find that the effect of vaccination on health outcomes is a precise zero
with no measurable health externalities from coworkers. Using administrative records on
sickness diagnoses and surveys, we find evidence consistent with vaccination causing moral
hazard.
In the third essay “A Blessing or a Curse? The Long-term Effect of Resource Booms
ii
on Human Capital and Living Conditions”, I study if resource booms can reduce human
capital accumulation. These booms can increase the opportunity costs of education by favor-
ing low-skill jobs, which makes it optimal for some cohorts to interrupt their education. If
these individuals do not resume their education, they may lose pecuniary and non-pecuniary
benefits of education in their lifetime. For a country, lower human capital may constrain its
long-term growth. I use proprietary individual-level data to study the long-term effects of
exposure to the 1970s oil boom on human capital in a developing country. I exploit variation
in the timing of the shock and geographic differences in the cost of college attendance and
find that exposure to the boom decreased college completion and increased low-skill occu-
pations - consistent with the idea that individuals shift into highly remunerative low skilled
employment because the boom decreased college education returns. In line with this, I find
no effects on wealth accumulation.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
The efficient design of public policy requires knowing how institutions, technologies,
and resource shocks affect outcomes of interest to society. In many cases, policymakers,
academics, and society, in general, are not aware of how institutions affect daily life and how
technologies or discoveries could have unintended consequences that affect living conditions
and welfare in countries. With this general objective in mind, in this dissertation, I use both
experimental and quasi-experimental methods from economics to study three issues that
directly affect living conditions in many countries across the world.
In Section 2, together with Mofioluwasademi Odunowo, Trent McNamara, Xiongfei
Guo, and Ragan Petrie, we study the causal effect of Facebook on daily life, captured by news
awareness, subjective wellbeing, daily activities related to mood, and Facebook’s value to its
users. Social media usage has increased dramatically over the last 15 years, and Facebook
has dominated the market. Facebook impacts components that go beyond building social
networks and providing various forms of information. Some of these impacts are beneficial
while others are harmful. Importantly, we do not know how people perceive and balance
these costs and benefits. Because of this, Facebook’s monetary value is critical to understand
the total utility an individual receives from the platform. In this sense, knowing how much
individuals value Facebook would be an essential measure for policymakers to address un-
intended negative consequences of Facebook use throughout many different aspects of daily
life. Therefore, Facebook’s monetary value along with its effects on news awareness and
well-being is an important but under-researched aspect of the 21st century.
We used a field experiment with a randomized and validated Facebook restriction to
investigate how Facebook may affect daily activities and news exposure and quantified how
much users value access to it. Using an incentive-compatible procedure, we find that that
one week of Facebook is worth about $67 to users, with a median value of $40. Regarding
news, we find that Facebook is a major source of news exposure. Individuals restricted
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from Facebook are less aware of politically-skewed sources, and this is stronger for men
than women. We show that a reduction in news consumption drives this result and that
participants do not substitute towards other news sources or social media platforms when
being off Facebook for a short period. Finally, regarding subjective well-being, we show
no significant effect of using Facebook on overall life satisfaction. However, we do find
a sizeable short-term reduction in feelings of depression when restricted from Facebook,
especially for men. We build on existing research by studying the effect of Facebook on
behaviors correlated with mood. We find that individuals restricted from using Facebook
engage in healthier activities.
In Section 3, together with Manuel Hoffmann and Adrian Chadi, we study how economic
factors affect working adults’ decision to vaccinate, the effects of vaccination on health and
whether flu vaccination can cause moral hazard. Seasonal influenza causes substantial mor-
bidity and mortality every year around the world, and the flu vaccine can potentially be a
cost-effective way to reduce its costs. However, individual behavior can counter the poten-
tial benefits of vaccination in two ways. First, vaccination rates in most countries of the
world are substantially below the levels that could prevent epidemics. Second, vaccinated
individuals may overestimate the protection that the vaccine grants and engage in risky be-
haviors. Thus, moral hazard could counter the benefits of adopting a preventive medical
technology like the flu vaccine.
We ran a natural field experiment in cooperation with a major bank in Ecuador using a
random encouragement design. We find that randomly assigning employees to get vaccinated
during the workweek, which decreases the opportunity costs of vaccination, increased take-
up by 112 percent of an eight percent baseline. Then we use the random assignment to
the workweek to identify both the effects of vaccination on health and potential peer effects
within units. First, we find that if the proportion of peers that get vaccinated increases by ten
percentage points, take-up increases by 7.9 percentage points, and find evidence that suggests
that employees react to social norms. Next, we study if flu vaccination is effective to improve
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working adults’ health. We find no evidence that vaccination decreased the probability of
getting sick due to the flu. While we cannot rule out that the vaccine did not match the
prevailing strands of the flu virus, we explore if getting vaccinated can unintendingly cause
moral hazard, which might independently decrease the effectiveness of the vaccine. We find
that vaccinated individuals are less likely to go to the doctor when they feel the symptoms of
the flu and that they forgo measures believed to protect against the flu. These results suggest
that getting vaccinated can create a moral hazard problem that could reduce the effectiveness
of flu vaccination.
In Section 4, I study if resource booms can reduce human capital accumulation in the
context of developing countries. While we would expect that natural resources boost eco-
nomic development, there is ample suggestive evidence that resource-rich countries tend to
underperform in several dimensions. Of particular concern is the possibility that resource
booms reduce human capital accumulation. These booms may affect labor market condi-
tions favoring low-skill occupations. Standard human capital accumulation models show
that an increase in productivity in low-skill occupations increases the opportunity cost of go-
ing to college and decreases the returns of education. Thus, during a resource boom, it might
be optimal for some individuals to drop out of high school/college and enter the workforce.
However, economic theory does not predict whether these effects are temporary or perma-
nent. A permanent decrease in education could constraint wealth accumulation, decrease
positive externalities of education, and limit a country’s growth potential.
I use proprietary individual-level data to causally estimate the long-term effect of the
1970s’ oil boom on educational attainment in the context of a developing country. In 1973,
Ecuador started major oil production, and its price skyrocketed due to the Arab embargo.
This boom increased productivity in low-skill occupations. I estimate the reduced form ef-
fects of exposure to this shock on college completion measured 40 years after the oil boom
using an intensity difference-in-differences design. This design compares changes in out-
comes across cohorts of individuals who turned 18 before and after 1973, to changes in
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outcomes across geographic regions with different costs of college attendance. I find that
in the most affected cities, exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 decreased college
completion by 2.9 percentage points, which represents 12.2 percent of baseline college com-
pletion for those who turned 18 just before the oil boom. Also, there is no effect in terms
of wealth accumulation, which suggests that the long-term reduction of college completion
is consistent with a model of rational individuals who reduce their educational attainment
in response to lower returns of education in the long-run. While the results suggest that it
was optimal for the exposed cohorts to interrupt their educational attainment, this does not
necessarily imply that the boom was a blessing because it does not account the positive ex-
ternalities of education. In particular, I find that exposure to the oil boom before turning
18 increased the number of children in the largest cities by 0.04 (1.7 percent of the base-
line). This estimate, together with no apparent effect on wealth, suggests fewer resources
per children that together with less educated parents may have affected their development.
From the country’s perspective, lower human capital levels may constrain the development
of high-skill industries, which may hamper the country’s long-term growth potential.
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2. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FACEBOOK
2.1 Introduction
Social media usage has increased dramatically over the past decade, and Facebook has
dominated the market. Almost 2.2 billion individuals worldwide have an active Facebook
account, and nearly 1.4 billion log on daily (Facebook, 2017) for an average of 50 minutes
per day (Facebook, 2016). Facebook not only provides means to connect with friends and
build social networks and capital (Bailey et al., 2018b; Mayer and Puller, 2008; Cramer and
Inkster, 2017), but it is also exposes users to a vast amount of information and news. Despite
the potential influence of Facebook on an individual’s behavior via information and content
provision, there is surprisingly little known about its direct and comprehensive effects on
news exposure and awareness, subjective well-being and day-to-day activities.
Facebook’s platform has several characteristics that lend well to investigating its effects
on an individual’s exposure to news content as well as its impact on well-being. The platform
consolidates information from many sources, making it an important and compelling place
to go on the internet to keep up with news. People tap into Facebook for local, national
and international news. Indeed, roughly two-thirds of Americans get at least some of their
news from social media sources (Pew Research Center, 2017). While there is a concern that
news transmitted through social media could be fake or skewed and affect political outcomes
(Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017), these type of platforms could also serve to uncover corruption
(Enikolopov et al., 2016). As individuals rely more on social media and news aggregators
as a primary source of information, segregation may increase (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011)
and voting behavior can be affected (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Bond et al., 2012; Martin
and Yurukoglu, 2017). The consequences of this in terms of news awareness and biases -
highlighted by political investigations regarding Facebook’s involvement in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential Election - are largely unknown.
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More broadly, there is little consensus on Facebook’s impact on well-being, especially in
the context of daily behaviors and activities. Facebook is often used to connect with friends
and family, organize events and share information and photos (Laroche et al., 2012; De Vries
et al., 2012; Ashley and Tuten, 2015; Lee and Ma, 2012; Bailey et al., 2018a). Being able
to seamlessly keep in touch with others might improve mood and happiness, but it might
also induce negative emotions and habits from social comparison (Tromholt, 2016; Deters
and Mehl, 2013). How Facebook directly affects well-being and mood in general and the
correlation with daily activities is unclear.
Facebook’s platform is provided for free to users and paid for by advertising, so the
monetary value to users, as reflected in a market price, is untested. The platform facilitates
building social networks and seamless access to relevant information. Usage rates, both in
frequency and intensity, suggest this provides benefits to users. While the economic impact
of Facebook on advertising has been estimated, the benefits to users and impact on behav-
ior have been given more limited study.1 Knowing the value of Facebook would inform
an understanding of welfare effects and provide a monetary measure of the importance of
Facebook to users.
We run a field experiment in the Spring of 2017 with a randomized, and validated, Face-
book restriction to investigate how Facebook may affect daily activities and news exposure
and quantify how much users value access. In total, 1,769 individuals from a large U.S.
university participated in the study. Using an incentive-compatible procedure (Becker et al.,
1964), we asked participants how much they would need to be paid to not use Facebook for
one week. Qualified participants were then randomly assigned to either a one-week Face-
book restriction group or a control group that faced no restriction.
Our design has several important and unique features worth noting. First, we can exploit
the rich data collected on the distribution of Facebook’s value to check for possible selection
effects in our results. Second, we enforced and validated the restriction by logging partici-
1It is estimated that the impact of Facebook through advertising is $77.6 billion in the U.S. (Deloitte, 2015).
Evidence on the value of Facebook is given in Brynjolfsson et al. (2018).
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pants off Facebook and verified treatment compliance using an unobtrusive online monitor-
ing procedure throughout the week. Our procedure was undetectable to the participant and
did not involve direct contact which could potentially impact behavior. Finally, participants
completed two surveys, the first prior to random assignment and a second survey one week
later. These surveys were designed to provide a comprehensive view of behavior and mea-
sure the short-term effects of Facebook on news awareness and consumption, well-being,
time allocation of daily activities and daily activities.
We have several key results. First, our study reveals that one week of Facebook is worth
about $67 to users, with a median value of $40. This value is in line with other studies
(Brynjolfsson et al., 2018; Corrigan et al., 2018; Allcott et al., 2019; Sunstein, 2018; Herzog,
2018), and represents a significant portion of a typical university student’s weekly budget
and expenses (roughly 30 percent according to Flood et al. (2017)).2 Individuals place a
nontrivial value on Facebook usage, and consistent with addiction or the compounding loss
of information, the value increases 19.6 percent after not being able to use it for one week.
Second, our data document that Facebook is an important source of news exposure. In-
dividuals restricted from Facebook are less aware of politically-skewed sources, and this is
stronger for men than women. We show that this result is driven by a reduction in news con-
sumption, and that participants do not substitute towards other news sources or social media
platforms when being off Facebook for a short period of time. The causal estimates show
that Facebook is an important conduit for news from non-mainstream outlets, and this echoes
the findings of Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) who show that social media is correlated to the
distribution of “fake news.” Our results provide additional evidence that Facebook plays
an important role in the acquisition of information by affecting what news is available to
consume and thus an individual’s ability to assess its veracity.
Third, our findings contribute to the literature that focuses on Facebook’s effect on hap-
piness and well-being. Early studies found mostly positive effects of social media on subjec-
2Participants in our study face a one in two chance of experiencing a Facebook restriction, and this may
reduce bias in value estimates when using elicitation mechanisms coupled with implementation uncertainty.
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tive well-being, perhaps through enhanced engagement, in cross-sectional studies (Ellison
et al., 2007; Valenzuela et al., 2009; Gonzales and Hancock, 2011; Kim and Lee, 2011)
and laboratory experiments (Sagioglou and Greitemeyer, 2014; Vogel et al., 2015; Verduyn
et al., 2015). More recent studies have found mixed results using panel data (Shakya and
Christakis, 2017) and Facebook use limitations (Tromholt, 2016).3 Cross-sectional evidence
on the effect of Facebook on depression is mixed. Feinstein et al. (2013) finds depressive
feelings are driven by negative outcomes from social comparison, but other studies find no
relationship between Facebook and depression (Steers et al., 2014; Jelenchick et al., 2013;
Tandoc et al., 2015). We contribute to this literature by using a randomized and verified
Facebook restriction and show no significant effect of using Facebook on overall life satis-
faction. However, we do find a large short-term reduction in feelings of depression when
restricted from Facebook, especially for men.
Finally, we build on existing research by studying the effect of Facebook on behaviors
largely found to be correlated with mood. We find that individuals restricted from using
Facebook engage in healthier activities. While our design does not allows us to recover
the underlying mechanism, this finding is consistent with research in psychology (Salovey
et al., 2000; Ostir et al., 2000; Fredrickson and Joiner, 2002; Blake et al., 2009; Kettunen,
2015; Newman et al., 2014; Sonnentag, 2001) that better mood is positively correlated with
engagement in healthier behaviors.
Overall, the effects our study finds on news awareness, feelings of depression and daily
activities show that Facebook has significant effects on important aspects of life not directly
related to building and supporting social networks. Furthermore, almost two years after our
experiment, Allcott et al. (2019) find similar results for news awareness and subjective well-
being for a different population, which supports our findings. The effects of Facebook are
far reaching, and our results provide a more comprehensive documentation of these impacts
on the daily life of users. They seem to understand this and place a substantial value on the
3Tromholt (2016) uses a one-week, self-enforced Facebook restriction and finds a positive effect on overall
life satisfaction.
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experience that Facebook provides.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study design and implemen-
tation. Section 3 reports results on the value of Facebook to users and the effect of the
Facebook restriction on news awareness, subjective well-being and activities. Section 4 con-
tinues with robustness checks on our main findings. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Study Design
A direct approach to analyze the causal effects of Facebook on daily life would be to
take the population of Facebook users, randomly restrict usage for some and not others and
then examine behavior across the restricted and not restricted groups. This is difficult to
achieve, however, absent a random event that blocks some comparable users from accessing
Facebook for period of time and not others and then identifying those users to examine
behavior. As an alternative, we adopt an approach where we recruit volunteers and then
randomize a Facebook restriction among them. While feasible to implement, a challenge
is the representativeness of the generated sample. Simply asking for volunteers willing to
give up Facebook would likely result in a sample of low-value individuals. To address this
issue, we collect additional information from our volunteers that allows us to account for this
type of selection. Rather than merely asking for volunteers, we elicit an individual’s value
of Facebook for one week and then use the distribution of stated values to test if selection
affects the results.
Our study occurs in three major phases, as outlined in Figure 2.1. In Phase 1, we elicit an
individual’s value of using Facebook for one week and recruit qualified participants into the
Facebook restriction. In Phase 2, we administer a pre-treatment survey and then randomly
assign participants into two groups – a group that experiences one week without Facebook
and a group with no restriction. In Phase 3, participants return to complete a second survey
and collect payments. In a surprise, we also re-elicit an individual’s value of Facebook for
one week. We ran this intervention between April and May 2017.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Study Phases
2.2.1 Phase 1 - Recruitment and value of Facebook
We sent an invitation email to recruit participants. The email contained a short descrip-
tion of the study and a link to an online survey that asked basic demographic information,
determined if the participant had a Facebook account (95 percent did) and elicited the par-
ticipant’s value for not using Facebook for one week.4
An individual’s value of Facebook is revealed with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)
mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) and determines eligibility for participation in subsequent
phases of the study. The participant is asked to submit her value of one week of Facebook
usage. A random counter offer is drawn and shown to the participant. If the participant’s
value is less than the counter offer, then the participant is eligible for the next phases of the
study and would be paid the counter offer upon study completion. If the participant’s value
is higher than the random offer, then she is not eligible to participate in any of the subsequent
phases of the study and does not receive payment. Several examples of how the procedure
works were included in the instructions to make sure that participants understood the proce-
4The email text and online survey questions are in the Appendix, Sections A.1 & A.2.
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dure prior to submitting a value.5 To assure that reported values are not biased upwards, we
follow the suggestion of Bohm et al. (1997) and leave the upper limit of the random offer
unclear because that increases the validity of the BDM mechanism. This is implemented by
informing participants that the minimum counter offer is $5 and the maximum is “our most
reasonable estimate of the value of the time spent on Facebook.”6
All eligible participants were invited by email to attend the next phase (Phase 2) on
Monday of the following week.7 The email explained that the next phase involves completing
a comprehensive survey and being randomly assigned to log off Facebook for one week. In
addition, the participants were informed that they would need to come back a second time
(one week later) to complete another survey and receive cash payments of the counter offer
they received. The time and location of the session is indicated in the email, and participants
confirm their attendance.
2.2.2 Phase 2 - Pre-survey and Facebook restriction assignment
Participants were required to show up in person to complete a short survey that collects
information on social media usage, news awareness, consumption behavior, time allocation,
and subjective well being (Appendix Sections A.3 and A.4). The questions on social media
usage included time spent, frequency of postings and emotions felt while using the platform.
To capture news awareness, we tapped into a variety of news sources. In the week prior to
the survey, we collected headlines from the front page of the eleven most popular newspapers
as ranked by the Pew Research Center, including The New York Times, Washington Post,
USA Today, Wall Street Journal, LA Times, New York Daily News, New York Post, Boston
Globe, San Francisco Chronicle, The Chicago Tribune and The British Daily Mail. We used
Breitbart as the source of skewed news.8 There were no extraordinary news events during
5Our procedures made clear to participants that they would be paid the random offer upon study completion
to mitigate any uncertainty bias (Horowitz, 2006).
6For budgetary reasons and expected participation rates, the random counter offers were drawn with the
following probabilities: (5, 15.14%; 7, 15.14%; 9, 11.14%; 10, 11.14%; 12, 11.14%; 14, 11.14%; 16, 7.14%;
18, 6.14%; 20, 5.14%; 21, 5.14%; 24, 0.64%; 25, 0.64%; 28, 0.14%; 30, 0.14%). The expected offer is $11.58.
7Those who are ineligible for subsequent phases are not contacted.
8We chose Breitbart given that its internet traffic as of March 2017 surpassed other major skewed news
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this period, like a mass shooting or major natural disaster, that might bias news knowledge.
The participant is shown six headlines randomly chosen from the pool of mainstream sources
and one randomly chosen from the skewed source and asked to identify if the event occurred
or not. From the six mainstream sources, two headlines are changed slightly so as to make
the headline false. All other headlines did appear on the front page of a newspaper or on
Breitbart.9
Daily behavior is measured by presenting participants with a series of statements (e.g. “I
save more money than I normally do”, etc.) and asking them to identify on a scale of 1-5
whether they agree/disagree with the statement. Time allocation is measured with estimates
for average time spent doing a variety of activities, such as working and exercising. Finally,
our subjective well-being questions are constructed following the OECD Guidelines used to
characterize the affective state of the respondent (OECD Better Life Initiative, 2013). These
questions ask participants to respond on a 0-10 scale how frequently they feel a certain
emotion (e.g. depression, happiness, etc.).
Upon completion of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to either a one-week
Facebook restriction or no restriction based on the last digit of the participant’s university-
assigned ID number.10 All participants complied with their assigned treatment and associated
protocols.
The no restriction group is dismissed and asked to return the following Monday (one
week later) to complete another survey and receive payment. The restriction group is re-
quired to log off of Facebook, and all its associated features, including Messenger, for one
week. To validate compliance with the restriction, we created a Facebook account for the
study and had treated participants become friends with our study account. As friends, we
can monitor all access to their account through the “Last Active” feature in Facebook Mes-
senger. This feature automatically updates as soon as someone logs on to Facebook, thus we
sources and was similar in magnitude to that of mainstream news sources such as The Washington Post accord-
ing to data from alexa.com
9See the questionnaire in Appendix A.3
10The university randomly generates the last four digits of a student’s ID number.
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can validate if a participant complies or not with the restriction. A participant could go invis-
ible, block or un-friend our Facebook account, but they would have to log in and we would
observe this in our data. We saw no instances of this, and all participants complied with
the restriction. After becoming friends with our Facebook account, participants logged off
of all their active Facebook sessions on all their devices using Facebook’s security settings.
Finally, the restriction group was asked to return the following Monday (one week later) to
complete another survey and receive payment.
2.2.3 Phase 3 - Post-survey and re-elicited value of Facebook
All participants returned one week later to complete another survey and receive payment.
The survey is identical to the one given in Phase 2 and allows us to see how key indicators
– social media use, news awareness and subjective well-being – have changed over the pre-
vious week.11 After completing the survey, participants were instructed to go to a separate
room for payment.
In the separate room, before receiving payment, we again elicited each participant’s value
for one week of Facebook usage. Up to this point, participants did not know they would
again be asked their value of Facebook. This procedure gives us an unbiased measure of the
change in Facebook’s valuation following the restriction. We use the same BDM mechanism
procedures as in Phase 1.12 Afterwards, all participants receive a cash payment based on the
counter offer from Phase 1 before leaving the session.
2.2.4 Implementation
Participants were recruited via email from a random sample of the undergraduate popula-
tion at Texas A&M University during the Spring semester of 2017. Overall, 1,929 individuals
initiated the Phase 1 online survey and 1,769 completed it, thus producing the distribution of
11We updated the news pool to reflect headlines from the previous week.
12Participants are asked to write down their valuation and informed that their payment today is unaffected by
their response. Eligible participants from this second BDM go through the same process as in Phase 2, return
for a third and final survey in one week, and are paid their counteroffers from the second BDM. We do not
include this third survey in our estimates.
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stated values used to estimate the value of Facebook and to test if selection affects results.
When we compare the characteristics of the individuals who responded to the survey with the
entire undergraduate population (based on year in school, home state and declared major),
we find that our survey respondents are representative. Of those individuals who completed
the Phase 1 survey, 562 were eligible for Phase 2 of the study, and eligibility does not depend
on covariates.13 Also, we find no evidence that participants who ended up being eligible or
ineligible based on the randomly-drawn counter offer are different.14
All eligible participants were invited to Phase 2 of the study, and this session was held
on main campus where participants came to complete the survey and be randomized into the
Facebook restriction.15 For the Phase 2 sessions, 167 participants showed up and completed
the survey. Appendix Table A.1 shows the comparison between those who were eligible and
showed up and those who did not. The only meaningful difference is that those who did not
show up had a slightly lower value for Facebook.
Among the participants who completed the Phase 2 survey, fifty-four percent (n=90)
were randomly assigned to the no restriction control group, and 46 percent (n=77) were
assigned to the Facebook restriction treatment group. Comparing covariates of the control
and treatment groups, we find there are significantly more women in the control group (71
percent) compared to the treatment group (57 percent), but otherwise, the two groups are
balanced.16 To address covariate differences by treatment assignment, our analysis controls
for individual fixed effects so that treatment effects are identified through differences in
changes in behavior before and after the one-week Facebook restriction across the treatment
13Eligibility for Phase 2 means that the submitted value was less than a randomly-selected counter-offer of
no more than $30. This is by the design of the elicitation mechanism – so all those with submitted values higher
than $30 were ineligible. Descriptive statistics for these groups are in Appendix Table A.1. In Section 2.4.2 of
the paper, we test the robustness of the results to this design-induced selection.
14When we compare participants who submitted values less than or equal to $30, so they could have been
eligible to participate in Phase 2, there is no significant difference by age or gender between those who ended
up being eligible or ineligible based on the counteroffer. See Appendix Table A.1
15Participants were aware of this procedure prior to submitting their value of Facebook in the Phase 1 online
survey. Holding this session on main campus minimizes travel costs that might have affected valuations for
Facebook.
16Appendix Table A.2 shows the balance of covariates across the treatment and control groups.
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and control groups.
After one week of treatment, 90 percent (n=151) of the participants from Phase 2 returned
to complete the Phase 3 survey. There is no significant difference in covariates between the
participants who returned for Phase 3 and those who did not, and attrition is not correlated
with treatment status. Our monitoring process validates compliance with the restriction.17
Those in the treatment group reduced their use of Facebook by 1.7 hours per day. Given
a baseline Facebook usage of 1.9 hours per day, this illustrates that the treatment group
complied with the restriction.
All sessions were completed in April-May 2017. Time to complete the Phase 1 online
survey was approximately five minutes, and each subsequent in-person survey took about
10-15 minutes. Average payment to participants was $16.79 (s.d. $5.22) at the completion
of Phase 3.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Description of the sample
In the baseline survey (Phase 2), participants report spending a mean of 1.9 hours per day
on Facebook, including reading news feeds and news content (Figure 2.2, panel a). This is
consistent with other surveys with college students that report an average of 2.6 hours spent
on Facebook per day (EMarketeer, 2015), higher than the national average of 50 minutes per
day on Facebook (Neilsen Company, 2016). Engagement on Facebook is measured by how
often participants post pictures and comment. This activity was rated on a scale of 1 (never)
to 7 (several times per day). About 52 percent never or rarely post pictures, 28 percent once
or twice a month and the remainder post once a week or more (Figure 2.2, panel b). In terms
of posting comments, 48 percent never or rarely comment, 18 percent once or twice a month
and the remainder post once a week or more (Figure 2.2, panel c).
Other social media platforms are also used. On a daily basis, participants report spend-
ing close to two hours on Facebook, Snapchat and YouTube, over one hour on Instagram,
17Participants did not interact with the study account in any way.
15
Figure 2.2: Time Spent on Facebook and Facebook Usage
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Notes: This figure presents descriptive statistics on Facebook usage. The x-axis in panels (b) and (c)
represents: 1 never, 2 rarely, 3 1-2 times per month, 4 once a week, 5 2-4 times per week, 6 once a day, 7
several times per day.
less than one hour on Twitter, and very little on Tumblr and Vimeo.18 This is consistent
with the number of friends and followers reported across platforms. On average, there are
more friends and followers on Facebook (641) and Instagram (452) than on Tumblr (87) and
Twitter (182).
Information is also collected on where participants get their news and time spent acquir-
ing news. Roughly, 15-30 minutes a day is spent reading or watching news, and most news is
obtained from digital sources (e.g. online news, social media) as opposed to traditional out-
lets (e.g. cable tv, paper news, radio).19 Participants reported their preferred news sources,
18Appendix Table A.3.
19Appendix Table A.3. While we cannot say what proportion of news participants get from Facebook, 81
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and we rank each source’s political bias on a scale of 1 (Left) to 5 (Right).20 The average
preferred news source has a political bias of 2.8 - slightly left of Center.
We further asked a variety of subjective wellbeing questions. On a scale of 0 (Never) to
10 (Very/Always), participants are generally satisfied with life (mean of 7.2) and responded
with a mean of 3.4 to feelings of depression. These results are in line with the OECD’s Better
Life Initiative Survey for 2017 which reports an average overall life satisfaction score of 7.3.
Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (never) to 6 (all the time) how often they felt
certain negative emotions while using Facebook, such as envy/jealousy, loneliness, misery
and annoyance. To generate a general measure of experiencing negative emotions while on
Facebook, we take these four measures and combine them into a factor index that ranges from
-2.35 to 4.37 using principal component analysis. A higher index indicates a participant feels
more negative emotions (see Figure 2.2, panel d), and there is large variation in this index.21
2.3.2 Value of Facebook
According to the BDM lottery, participants report that one week of Facebook usage is
valued at $24.84 on average ([23.02, 26.65] 95 percent confidence interval), and the median
value is $15 ([12.70, 17.30] 95 percent confidence interval).22 We evaluate how sensitive
the mean is to outliers by trimming the distribution at $200, $100 and $50. With each cut,
the mean BDM value changes to $22, $21 and $18, respectively. The median BDM value
remains fixed at $15 with each cut of the distribution.23 There is no bunching at $5 which
percent report opening up Facebook every day or several times a day to check their news feed.
20We use the rankings on www.allsides.com. If a participant lists a news outlet that is not reported on
allsides.com, we treat their preferred news outlet as missing. The top five first choice sources are CNN (28.1
percent), FOX (12.6 percent), BBC (8.3 percent), NYT (4.7 percent), and ESPN (4.7 percent). Breitbart was
not listed as a first choice, however, news from this source could appear on a Facebook news feed.
21Appendix Figure A.1 shows the distribution of these emotions separately.
22We calculate the confidence intervals using bootstrap with 1000 replications.
23Our design also explored the willingness to pay (WTP) - willingness to accept (WTA) gap in the BDM
mechanism (see Knetsch et al. (2001), Plott and Zeiler (2005), Horowitz (2006), and Brynjolfsson et al. (2018)
for a discussion of this phenomenon). Half of the participants were asked the value in terms of selling par-
ticipation in the study (WTA), “How much money would you need to be given to stop using Facebook for a
week?” and half were asked in terms of purchasing participation (WTP), “What is the value of your weekly
time on Facebook?” We find no significant difference in the reported value of Facebook from either solicitation
method or by covariates across groups, so we pool the data in our analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the Value of Facebook (trimmed at $540)
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indicates that participants did not try to manipulate the BDM mechanism to be eligible for
the next stage of the study.
Our experiment introduces a lottery in which an individual has a 50 percent chance of
being restricted from Facebook. This means that the reported BDM is underestimates Face-
book’s value. To account for this lottery, we make adjustments to obtain valuations. Under
risk neutrality, the mean value of Facebook is $50 per week (median=$30) and $200 per
month (median=$120). If individuals are risk averse, then we assume a CRRA utility func-
tion with a risk aversion parameter within a reasonable range (0.1-0.3), then the mean value
of Facebook is $67 per week (median=$40) and $267 per month (median=$160). From here
on, we report values adjusted for risk aversion. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of these
values.24 By comparison, Brynjolfsson et al. (2018) and Corrigan et al. (2018) find lower
weekly median values ($3.92 and $15 respectively), and Allcott et al. (2019) find median
monthly values ($100-$180) similar to ours.25
24The distribution is trimmed at $540 because of a few outliers in the data – the maximum value is $2,153.
We use the nontrimmed, full sample in our analysis.
25There are differences in our studies. Brynjolfsson et al. (2018) use an online sample, one out of every 200
participants are randomized into the Facebook restriction, and respondents who do not use Facebook are not
screened out for their weekly estimate. Corrigan et al. (2018) use a series of second price auctions with a many
18
According to the Pew Research Center (2016), women are 8 percentage points more
likely to use Facebook than men. Hence, we might expect to see differences in the value
of Facebook across genders, however, we do not find a statistically significant difference.
On average, one week of Facebook is worth $69.35 for men (median=$43.07) and $65.18
for women (median=$40.38). We also test for difference in the distributions of the value by
gender and find no significant difference.
There is a positive correlation between the value of Facebook and age in our data. For
those aged 21 years or younger, one week of Facebook is worth $62.95 (median=$40.38),
while for those older than 21 years, Facebook is worth $78.37 (median=$53.84). This could
reflect differences in income or that younger participants are more likely to use other social
media. Indeed, those 21 years and younger spend more time on Twitter and Snapchat and
have more Instagram followers.26
The value of Facebook changes across user types, with those who are more active report-
ing higher values. Facebook is worth 20 percent more for participants who use it for more
than one hour a day and for those who post at least once per month. There is a positive,
but not significant, correlation between the value of Facebook and having a large number
of friends on Facebook, however, there is a positive and significant correlation between the
value and having a large number of friends on other social media platforms. Those with a
large number of friends on other social media also have a lot of friends on Facebook, so this
likely reflects the larger value that active Facebook users place on using the platform. There
is a negative correlation between feeling depressed or experiencing negative emotions while
on Facebook and the value of Facebook, but these correlations are not significant.27
To put some perspective on the magnitude of the stated values of Facebook in our sample,
populations, using differing compensation schemes. Allcott et al. (2019) similarly use a BDM mechanism but
on an online population.
26We did not ask questions on income but asked the zip code of where the participant lived at age 15. Using
income data from this zip code, we find no significant difference in mean income for younger participants
compared to older.
27Appendix Table A.4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the value of Facebook and sev-
eral measures that characterize Facebook users.
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we compare its value with college students’ mean income and some common expenses. The
weekly average income of a college student is $224.28 (Flood et al., 2017), so a week of
Facebook usage is worth 30 percent of income.28 In addition, university students spend
roughly $14 in clothing, $14 in personal care and $11.50 in technology (devices, plans and
subscriptions) per week. Facebook is worth more than each of these and more than the
average weekly expenditure of $20 on coffee (Tuttle, 2012). Facebook has a large value for
our participants relative to their income and other purchases.
2.3.3 Effects of the Facebook Restriction
We explore the effect of not using Facebook for one week on five outcomes: social
media usage, news consumption, news awareness, subjective well-being, daily activities and
the value of Facebook. Throughout the paper, indices are constructed using the procedure
of Anderson (2008). We demean each variable using the mean of the control group in Phase
2 and convert it into an effect size by dividing it by the standard deviation of the control
group in Phase 2. The index is the weighted average of the transformed outcomes, where the
weights are derived from the inverse of the covariance matrix of the transformed outcomes.
A key advantage of our design is that we can verify that participants assigned to the Facebook
restriction remained logged off without having to directly contact participants with reminders
and possibly affect their behavior. Our compliance rate is 95 percent, and throughout the
paper we report intent-to-treat effects.29
To examine the effects of Facebook on behavior, we exploit the fact that we ask the same
questions in the pre and post-treatment surveys (administered in Phase 2 and Phase 3) and
estimate the change in the outcome of interest and control for individual fixed effects. This
28In-state tuition at Texas A&M is $11,200 per year, or $350 per week, implying that participants value
Facebook as much as 19 percent of the weekly cost of studying at the university. According to the College
Board, the average university student in the U.S. spends $225 per week ($10,800 per year) on room and board.
Facebook is then worth 30 percent of these expenses.
29All but three treated participants stayed off of Facebook for the entire week. The three who did log
back into Facebook did so only once for less than an hour to communicate for a student organization via
the organization’s Facebook account. All three participants contacted the research team prior to logging in
to inform us why they were logging back on. These participants are included in our intent-to-treat analysis.
Instrumental variable estimates are 5 percent larger and slightly less precise.
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approach identifies treatment effects based on changes in individual behavior and controls
for any unbalancedness that might exist in covariates across the treatment and control groups.
By relying on within-individual variation to identify effects, the only difference across indi-
viduals is random assignment to treatment and control.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
yit = β0 + β1PostSurveyt + β2PostSurveyt · Treatmenti + αi + εit (2.1)
where PostSurveyt is a dummy variable for the survey given in Phase 3 after the one-week
Facebook restriction and Treatmenti indicates if individual i is randomly assigned to the
Facebook restriction group. β2 is our coefficient of interest. Individual fixed effects are
included and thus control for treatment assignment and fixed individual covariates. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. We estimate equation (2.1) for the full sample and
explore heterogeneous effects by gender and different classifications of Facebook users.
In addition to testing differences in means, we test whether Facebook usage has an effect
on the distribution of outcomes. We test for equality of the distributions, as well as first and
second order stochastic dominance.30
2.3.3.1 News Awareness
According to Gottfried and Shearer (2016), 64 percent of social media users access news
from just one site, and on Facebook, 66 percent of users report getting at least some news
while using the platform (Pew Research Center, 2016). This suggests that Facebook might
play an important role in the distribution of news. If this is true, we should expect that logging
individuals off Facebook for a week decreases awareness of current events. We use the news
headlines quiz described in Section 2.2.2 to define three indicators that measure the effect of
30It would be important to test for effects at different quantiles, but we do not have enough power to esti-
mate meaningful comparisons at the tails of the distribution. To test for distribution equality, let F(1) be the
distribution of outcome yit for the treated group and F(0) be the distribution of the control group. According to
Abadie (2002), we define F(1) first order stochastic dominates F(0) if
∫ x
0
dF(1)(y) ≤
∫ x
0
dF(0)(y) ∀x ≥ 0 and
F(1) second order stochastic dominates F(0) if
∫ x
0
(∫ z
0
dF(1)(y)
)
dz ≤ ∫ x
0
(∫ z
0
dF(0)(y)
)
dz ∀x ≥ 0
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Facebook usage on news awareness: the proportion of news headlines participants correctly
recognized as having occurred, the proportion they got wrong and the proportion for which
they were uncertain (i.e. they answered “I don’t know”). We calculate these measures for
the questions from mainstream sources (six questions) and for the skewed news source.
Figure 2.4 shows the effect of the Facebook restriction on these three measures for main-
stream and skewed sources. There is no significant effect of the restriction on news awareness
for headlines from mainstream sources.31 However, there is significant uncertainty of the ve-
racity of headlines from skewed news. Those who experienced a week off of Facebook are
22.1 percentage points more likely to be uncertain about whether or not a politically-skewed
news headline is true or not. And, they are 15.6 percentage points less likely to answer
correctly if the event actually occurred.32
2.3.3.2 Potential Mechanisms for the Reduction in News Awareness
The reduction in news awareness should be correlated with an overall decrease in access
and consumption of news. We analyze how being logged off Facebook for a week affects the
frequency with which individuals access different news media and whether consumption of
different types of news changes. Participants reported their answers for news consumption
and types of news using a Likert scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “all the time” (7).
Following the procedure described in Section 2.3.3, we aggregate access to “traditional”
news media (i.e. radio, newspapers, television and Internet sites) in one index (Traditional
Media) and access to social media and news feeds into a second index (Social Media). We
use the two indices to measure changes in access to news media.
The left panel in Figure 2.5 presents the effect of the Facebook restriction on access fre-
quency to news media. On average, access to news through social media decreases by 0.66
31We tested whether the Facebook restriction had different effects for true headlines and the false headlines
we created (by changing a few words) in the news quiz. For both types of headlines, the point estimates are
similar to the main results and statistically insignificant.
32Gender differences do emerge. While both men and women are less likely to be aware of the veracity of
skewed news when off of Facebook, the effect is much stronger for men than women. This suggest that men,
more than women, are exposed to politically skewed news when on Facebook.
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Figure 2.4: Effects on News Awareness
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Notes: This figure presents the intent to treat effects of the Facebook restriction on
news awareness. Prop. Right corresponds to the proportion of questions answered
correctly on the news headlines quiz, Prop. Wrong corresponds to the proportions
of questions answered incorrectly and Don’t Know corresponds to the proportion of
questions answered “I don’t know”. Estimates control for individual fixed effects.
Each estimate corresponds to the change in the proportions of answers in each
category. The figure displays the 95 percent confidence interval.
standard deviations (significant at the 5 percent level), while there is no statistically signifi-
cant change in access to “traditional” news media. These results are consistent with the fact
that participants in the restriction group reduced their Facebook usage to zero but they do
not substitute by increasing use of traditional media.33 We also find that the distribution of
33Our research design restricted usage of Facebook for those in the treatment group, but participants were
not restricted in their usage of other social media platforms. We validate that those in the treatment group did
reduce their use of Facebook – by 1.7 hours per day. Given a baseline Facebook usage of 1.9 hours per day,
this illustrates that the treatment group did comply with the restriction. While the treatment group refrained
from using Facebook, we find that they did not increase their usage of other social media (e.g. Instagram,
Snapchat, Tumblr, Twitter). This is consistent with studies finding low cross-platform usage for social media
and a significant cost to switch to alternatives for one week (Pew Research Center, 2016). Only one-third of
Facebook users are active on other social media platforms, yet about 90 percent of users of other platforms are
active on Facebook (Pew Research Center, 2016).
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Figure 2.5: Effects on News Media Access
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Notes: This figure presents the intent to treat effects of the Facebook restriction on
access to two types of news media. Traditional media is an index that measures
access to “traditional” news media (i.e. radio, newspapers, television and Internet
sites). Social media is an index that measures access to news through social media
and news feeds. Estimates control for individual fixed effects. Each estimate cor-
responds to the change in access frequency of a type of media. The figure displays
the 95 percent confidence interval.
the social media index for the restriction group first order stochastic dominates the distri-
bution of the non-restricted group. This indicates that access to news through social media
decreases not only at the mean, but throughout the distribution (see Appendix Table A.5).
We find no distribution differences for access to “traditional” media. These results indicate
that Facebook is an important source of news for our participants, and in the short term, they
do not substitute with other news sources.
The right panel in Figure 2.5 presents the effect of the Facebook restriction on news
consumption. We asked how frequently the participants read political, business, sports, in-
ternational, culture, science, local and weather news, and we aggregate these measures into
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an index (News Consumption) to capture overall news consumption. On average, partic-
ipants in the Facebook restriction group significantly decrease their consumption of news
by 0.64 standard deviations with respect to the baseline (p-value < 0.01), and this effect is
consistent across all news types. The reduction in consumption of news decreases not only
at the mean but also across the entire distribution (see Appendix Table A.5).
In summary, these results indicate that Facebook is an important conduit for news aware-
ness, specifically from skewed sources, for college students. This is driven by the fact that
news consumption decreases and there is no evidence of substitution to other news sources.
In the next section we study the effects of Facebook on subjective well-being.
2.3.3.3 Subjective Well-being
Previous studies have found mixed results on the effects of Facebook on happiness and
well-being. We build on previous research by applying a validated Facebook restriction that
does not interfere with participants during treatment, and by including a series of questions
on daily habits and activities potentially correlated with well-being (Salovey et al., 2000;
Ostir et al., 2000; Fredrickson and Joiner, 2002; Blake et al., 2009; Kettunen, 2015; Newman
et al., 2014; Sonnentag, 2001).
We asked participants five subjective well-being questions (taken from the OECD Better
Life Initiative) using a Likert scale (from 0-10). The questions assess overall life satisfaction,
how worthwhile life is, happiness, level of worry, and depression.34 Figure 2.6 presents the
effects of the Facebook restriction on these measures. Estimates for overall life satisfaction,
life is worthwhile, happiness and worry are small and statistically insignificant.35 However,
being off of Facebook does significantly reduce depression by 17 percent (0.57 points on
34The questions are: (i) Overall, how satisfied are you with life as a whole? (ii) Overall, to what extent
do you feel that things you do in your life are worthwhile? (iii) How happy are you? (iv) How often do
you worry? and (v) How often do you feel depressed? An alternative approach could have been to use the
Day Reconstruction Method (Kahneman et al., 2004 and Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), however, to keep the
survey short, we opted for the five OECD questions.
35Our results on life satisfaction are smaller than Tromholt (2016) who finds a significant effect of 0.26
standard deviations. The study’s Danish sample is older (average age of 34 years) compared to our U.S. sample
(average age of 20 years), and participants were contacted daily by the researcher team to follow their assigned
treatment status.
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Figure 2.6: Effects on Subjective Wellbeing
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Notes: This figure presents the intent to treat effects of the Facebook restriction on
five different measures of subjective well-being. Estimates control for individual
fixed effects. The figure displays the 95 percent confidence interval.
the Likert scale). This result is consistent with findings from the social psychology litera-
ture using cross-sectional data that shows Facebook increases feelings of depression (Steers
et al., 2014 and Feinstein et al., 2013).36 We do not find evidence of distribution shifts (see
Appendix Table A.5).
Our results suggest that using Facebook induces feelings of depression, which plausibly
decreases an individual’s well-being.37 One concern might be the presence of experimenter
demand effects for this measure, however, this would imply that we should also observe an
increase in positive measures of well-being. Our estimates reject significant improvements
36Subjective well-being measures can be sensitive to temporary events (e.g. the weather, long lines at a coffee
shop, meeting somebody) (Krueger and Schkade, 2008), nonetheless, because our participants are randomly
assigned to treatment, random shocks should be evenly distributed and our panel estimation allows us to directly
control for events that affect both groups uniformly across time.
37Tromholt (2016) finds larger effects on life satisfaction for active users and for people who report feeling
envy while on Facebook. We find qualitatively similar results in terms of feeling depressed.
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Figure 2.7: Effects on Activities and Time Use
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Notes: This figure presents the intent to treat effects of the Facebook restriction
on four index measures of activities and time use. Healthy Daily Activities in-
dexes engagement in “healthier” consumption/savings practices in the past week.
Time Efficiency measures efficient time use. Time Productivity measure productive
time use. Expected Healthy Daily Activities indexes the expected engagement in
“healthier” consumption/savings practices the following week. Estimates control
for individual fixed effects. The figure displays the 95 percent confidence interval.
in well-being.38
The reduction in feelings of depression from being logged off of Facebook could be
driven by changes in behavior. To shed light on how people respond to losing Facebook
access, we asked participants to report on a variety of activities the week prior to completing
the pre and post-treatment surveys (Phases 2 and 3). Healthy behavior was measured by
asking whether participants ate out less than usual, did less impulse buying, saved more
money, ate healthier and exercised more.39 We also asked what they expected their behavior
38Evidence of a negative correlation between happiness and depression is weak (Rezaee et al., 2016), hence,
a significant decrease in depression is not inconsistent with no change in the positive measures of well-being.
39There is evidence that eating out is associated with excessive calorie intake (Urban et al., 2016), a less
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would be the following week. Productive time use was measured by asking whether they
spent more time studying, had time to relax and be with friends, and partied a lot. Time
efficiency was measured by whether they wasted less time, achieved more than usual, were
not late for class, were able to meet deadlines, were able to prevent distractions, discontinued
wasteful activities, and procrastinated less.40 Again, we use the procedure in Section 2.3.3 to
aggregate these four categories of questions into four indices: healthy daily activities, time
efficiency, time productivity and expected healthy daily activities.
Figure 2.7 reports the effects of the one week Facebook restriction on these four mea-
sures. Overall, we find evidence that people behave in a healthier manner. Healthy daily
activities increase by 0.86 standard deviations with respect to the baseline, significant at the
5 percent level. We find positive, but not statistically significant changes for the other indices.
There are no significant effects on the distributions (see Appendix Table A.5).
In summary, a one-week Facebook restriction decreased feelings of depression and in-
creased engagement in healthier activities. While we are not able to tease out the exact
mechanism, these results suggest that Facebook negatively affects components of daily live
beyond the benefits of social media.
2.3.3.4 Change in the Value of Facebook
Being off Facebook for one week decreases news awareness and consumption, improves
well-being by decreasing feelings of depression and promotes healthier behavior. If partici-
pants internalize these changes, we would expect a change in individuals’ value of Facebook.
Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of values for the restricted and unrestricted groups for those
who completed the pre and post-surveys (Phases 2 and 3). Experiencing a week-long Face-
book restriction increases the value of Facebook by 19.6 percent from $30.13 to $36.04,
healthy diet (Wolfson and Bleich, 2015), increased hypertension (Seow et al., 2015) and a higher exposure
to phthalates (Varshavsky et al., 2018), which have been linked to asthma, breast cancer, type 2 diabetes and
fertility issues. Diet is correlated with an individual’s mental health (O’Neil et al., 2014).
40Participants were asked on a scale 1-5 to what extent they agreed with a particular statement, where 1:
Strongly Agree, 5: Strongly Disagree. We adjust the coding so a higher value indicates a “healthier” response.
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of the Value of Facebook after Treatment
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Notes: This figure compares the distribution of the value of Facebook after a one-
week Facebook restriction for the participants who attended both Phase 2 and Phase
3.
however, this effect is marginally significant at the 10 percent level.41 We find no significant
distributional treatment effects (see Appendix Table A.5 ).
There are several potential explanations for this increase in value. First, the reduction
in access to news may simply not be compensated by a better mood and healthier activi-
ties. Individuals would then need a higher payment to be willing to be off of Facebook for
another week. Second, the increase in value is consistent with withdrawal effects of an ad-
dictive good.42 If being on Facebook creates addiction, then the week-long restriction should
increase the desire to be back on Facebook. This would also explain the rise in value of Face-
book. Finally, Facebook further affects other dimensions of daily live that were not captured
41Given our sample size we can detect effects up to 0.182 percentage points at the 5 percent level with a
power of 80 percent.
42A key characteristic of an addictive good is that its consumption exhibits “adjacent complementarity”
(Becker and Murphy, 1988, and Gruber and Köszegi, 2001), which means that past consumption increases the
marginal utility of present consumption.
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Table 2.1: Adjustments for Multiple Comparisons
Unadjusted P-value FDR Adjusted P-value
Facebook Use 0.000*** 0.000***
News Media Index - Traditional Media 0.785 1.000
News Media Index - Social Media 0.000*** 0.000***
News Consumption Index 0.004*** 0.027**
Probability Right Answer - Mainstream News 0.826 1.000
Probability Wrong Answer - Mainstream News 0.926 1.000
Probability Not Sure Answer - Mainstream News 0.885 1.000
Probability Right Answer - Skewed News 0.006*** 0.030**
Probability Wrong Answer - Skewed News 0.458 0.723
Probability Not Sure Answer - Skewed News 0.022** 0.052*
Overall Satisfaction 0.993 1.000
Life is Worthwhile 0.845 1.000
Feel Happy 0.893 1.000
Worry 0.139 0.228
Depressed 0.014** 0.048**
Consumption Index 0.020** 0.057*
Productive Time Index 0.302 0.499
Efficient Time Index 0.346 0.530
Expected Consumption Index 0.504 0.743
Value of Facebook 0.068* 0.125
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows how the significance of the main results changes when we control for multiple comparisons.
The table present the unadjusted p-values of our main estimates (Column 1) and their corresponding values adjusted for
multiple comparisons (Column 2). We apply a false discovery rate control as described in Anderson (2008).
in our study. For instance, we do not measure the effects of losing access to Facebook’s mes-
senger service. These aspects along with their interactions may be utility increasing, which
could explain the increase in value for an additional week off of Facebook.43
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2.4 Robustness Checks
2.4.1 Multiple Comparisons
Our analysis thus far tests for effects on a large number of outcomes. To check that
our main findings are not due to chance, we adjust the p-values to account for multiple
comparisons.44 We apply the procedure defined by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and
Benjamini et al. (2006), and the results are shown in Table 2.1. We see that all of our
results remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level or less, with the exception of the
probability of answering “Don’t Know” for skewed news, the healthy activities index and
the change in the value of Facebook.45
2.4.2 Sample Selection
Our approach of recruiting volunteers to log off Facebook may induce selection by over-
sampling low-value participants and potentially bias the results. To address this, we use the
distribution of the stated BDM value of Facebook to re-weight the sample using the inverse
probability of being eligible to participate in Phase 2 conditional on the value. Table 2.2
presents these results. Columns 1 and 2 show that the results pertaining to news awareness
and news consumption remain and are robust to sample selection. The point estimates are
robust to re-weighting the sample and retain statistical significance. The point estimate of
the effect on depression decreases from 0.57 (17 percent of baseline) to 0.39 (11 percent of
baseline) Likert points and loses statistical significance. The same happens to the effect on
daily activities. The point estimate decreases from 0.84 (17 percent of baseline) to 0.69 (11
percent of baseline) standard deviations.
43Appendix Figure A.3 shows that while the level of depression in the treatment group has decreased relative
to control group, there is no evidence that suggests that treated participants are internalizing this benefit by
lowering their value for Facebook.
44To do this involves a trade off between a Type I error and the power of the test (Anderson, 2008). We
control for the false discovery rate to adjust our p-values and achieve a balance between these two factors.
45We also do a more robust adjustment controlling for the family-wise error rate. When we use the free step-
down method described by Anderson (2008), only the effects on Facebook use, news access through social
media, news consumption and the correct answer of skewed news are statistically significant at conventional
levels.
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This analysis suggests that the results on news consumption and awareness are robust
to sample selection and representative of the broader population of college students. Con-
versely, the results on depression and daily activities speak to the population of college stu-
dents who report having a BDM value of Facebook up to $30 per week (84.4 percent of the
student population who uses Facebook).
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Table 2.2: Weighting Adjustments
Full Sample Men Women
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Facebook Use -1.73*** -1.88*** -1.27*** -1.34*** -2.09*** -2.22***
News Media Index - Traditional Media 0.07 -0.05 0.47 0.77 -0.17 -0.48
News Media Index - Social Media -0.66*** -0.61*** -0.81*** -0.68** -0.53*** -0.55**
News Consumption Index -0.64*** -0.59** -1.01** -0.59 -0.46* -0.62**
Probability Right Answer - Mainstream News 0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.05
Probability Wrong Answer - Mainstream News 0.002 0.005 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.02
Probability Not Sure Answer - Mainstream News -0.01 -0.04 0.10* 0.06 -0.05 -0.07
Probability Right Answer - Skewed News -0.16*** -0.14** -0.32*** -0.33** -0.09 -0.09
Probability Wrong Answer - Skewed News -0.06 -0.03 -0.27** -0.22** 0.06 0.06
Probability Not Sure Answer - Skewed News 0.22** 0.17* 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.03 0.03
Overall Satisfaction -0.002 -0.02 0.12 0.21 -0.07 -0.10
Life is Worthwhile 0.05 -0.12 0.51 0.80** -0.17 -0.42
Feel Happy 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
Worry 0.37 0.48* 0.42 0.28 0.37 0.57*
Depressed -0.57** -0.39 -0.82** -0.90** -0.44 -0.24
Healthy Daily Activities Index 0.84** 0.69 1.47** 1.16* 0.52 0.67
Productive Time Index 0.25 0.04 0.40 0.10 0.19 0.12
Efficient Time Index 0.33 -0.13 0.41 0.12 0.31 -0.18
Expected Healthy Daily Activities Consumption Index 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.32
Value of Facebook 0.20* 0.19** -0.16 0.10 0.33** 0.19*
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table compares the main results with the weight-adjusted estimates. We use the inverse probability of being eligible as weights.
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2.4.3 Gender differences
There is evidence to suggest that men and women use Facebook for different purposes
with different frequencies. According to the Pew Research Center (2018) report, more
women (74 percent) use Facebook than men (62 percent). Women are more likely to use
it daily (69 percent) than men (54 percent) (Statista, 2018), and they post more comments
and pictures and send more messages (Muscanell and Guadagno, 2012). This is also evident
in our sample.46 These differences in Facebook usage may imply heterogeneous responses
to the Facebook restriction.
Splitting our sample by gender, Table 2.2 shows that for men one week off Facebook
decreases feelings of depression by 0.82 Likert points, which increases to 0.90 after re-
weighting. Both are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. There are no significant
effects for women. While the point estimate of the effect on healthy daily activities decreases
from 0.84 to 0.69 standard deviations in the full sample, losing statistical significance, the
effect remains large and significant for men. Both the weighted and unweighted results show
that the group, in this case men, that is less depressed also engages in healthier activities,
confirming the influence of Facebook on other aspects of daily life.47 This is also consistent
with findings that men are more likely to feel depressed due to negative social comparisons
(Steers et al., 2014).
Our finding on the reduction in awareness of skewed news is supported by the behavior
of men. They are significantly less likely to be certain about the veracity of skewed news
both in the weighted and unweighted samples, and women are unaffected. Women reduce
their consumption of news via social media, as do men, but are otherwise not significantly
affected by the Facebook restriction.
46In our sample, about 43 percent of women post comments on Facebook at least once a week, compared
to 21 percent of men. Also, 23 percent of women post pictures at least once a week compared to 8 percent of
men.
47The magnitude of the effects suggest incremental power issues due to re-weighting.
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2.5 Conclusions
Social media and Facebook have become entities of global proportions. However, we
know little about their economic value to users, the effects on daily activities, consumption
behavior and news awareness. Using a randomized, and validated, Facebook restriction
in a large field experiment, we provide an estimate of an individual’s value of Facebook.
One week on Facebook is worth about $67 for our participants – a relatively large value
considering that it represents 30 percent of average weekly income. We also examine the
direct effect of being logged off Facebook for one week on five outcomes: social media
usage, news awareness, news consumption, subjective well-being, activities and the value of
Facebook.
While individuals facing a Facebook restriction did refrain from using Facebook, they
did not increase their usage of other social media. This is consistent with studies that find
low usage across social media platforms and suggests that there is a significant switching
cost between platforms.
In addition to not using other social media, participants did not look for news from other
sources, even when the substitution cost for accessing news from other sources is low (i.e.
turning on the television or radio or typing the web address of a news site instead of Face-
book). Overall, awareness of news in most categories was not affected, but being off of
Facebook resulted in more uncertainty about whether news from politically-skewed sources
was fake or not. Those who experienced a week without Facebook were 22.1 percentage
points more likely to be uncertain about a skewed news headline, and men’s news awareness
was most affected. These results imply that Facebook is an important source of news and
may especially be a source of skewed news for men.
Our study has further implications. News aggregators that remove biases from news
sources would better inform and educate the general public and could weaken the influence
of skewed news. Facebook features (i.e. Instant Article, Trending News, etc.) suggest
the company desired to serve as a news aggregation platform. However, recently Facebook
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eliminated these features out of concerns of propagating fake or skewed news, which goes in
line with our finding on news consumption and awareness. While a news aggregator has the
potential to provide an unbiased perspective of news and events (Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005), our findings suggest that Facebook, as currently constructed, may not be well suited
for this purpose.
Our results suggest that using Facebook induces feelings of depression, which plausibly
decreases an individual’s well-being. This effect is particularly pronounced for active Face-
book users, for those who experience negative emotions while on Facebook and for men.
Contrary to other studies (Tromholt, 2016; Valenzuela et al., 2009; Deters and Mehl, 2013),
we find no effect with respect to reported overall life satisfaction. The reduction in depres-
sion we find from being off of Facebook might be explained by two mechanisms. First, being
off Facebook encourages individuals to engage in more positive, healthy activities, such as
exercising and eating out less often, which could explain the improvement in mood. Second,
Facebook itself might be a channel for decreasing subjective well-being, and changes in ac-
tivities and consumption patterns could be a result of feeling better. Untangling the direction
of causality would be an important area for future research.
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3. VACCINES AT WORK
3.1 Introduction
Seasonal influenza causes substantial morbidity and mortality every year around the
world. The World Health Organization (WHO, 2018) estimates that the flu is associated with
three to five million cases of severe respiratory illnesses and between 290,000 to 600,000
deaths per year worldwide. Rothman (2017) estimates that the flu has an economic burden
of approximately $34.7 billion in the United States, most of it due to lives lost and foregone
work. Molinari et al. (2007) associate 16 million days of productivity lost due to influenza
in the United States. For both public health institutions and firms, flu vaccination has the
potential to be a cost-effective way to reduce the incidence of the disease and its costs. From
an immunological perspective, the flu vaccine increases the level of individual immunity by
generating antibodies (Gross et al., 1989; Cox et al., 2004), which promises to reduce the
transmission rate of the disease.
However, individual behavior can counter the potential benefits of vaccination in two
ways. First, according to the World Bank, the Center for Disease Control, and other public
health institutions, vaccination rates in most countries of the world are substantially below
recommended levels.1 Therefore, it is essential to understand the factors that affect vacci-
nation take-up, particularly of working adults who are the least likely to get the vaccine.
Second, economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the adoption of protective
technologies may induce individuals to behave riskier.2 Vaccinated individuals may over-
estimate the protection that the vaccine grants and engage in risky behaviors like waiting
1Public health institutions recommend that everybody over six months should vaccinate against the flu.
However, flu vaccination rates in European countries ranges from 2 percent to 70 percent (Mereckiene, 2015),
and only 38.5 percent of adults 18 and older were immunized in the United States during the 2017-2018 flu
season (Srivastav et al., 2018).
2There is a large literature that studies whether the adoption of any type of safety device leads individuals
to adopt riskier practices (Peltzman, 1975; Richens et al., 2000; Auld, 2003; Cohen and Einav, 2003; Klick
and Stratmann, 2007; Peltzman, 2011; Prasad and Jena, 2014; Talamàs and Vohra, 2018). There is a larger
literature that studies moral hazard in insurance. For studies on moral hazard in medical insurance see Einav
et al. (2013) and Einav and Finkelstein (2018).
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longer before going to the doctor when feeling sick and taking fewer protective measures
to prevent illnesses. Thus, moral hazard could counter the benefits of adopting a preventive
medical technology like the flu vaccine.
In this paper we study how economic factors affect working adults’ decision to vaccinate,
the effects of vaccination on health and whether flu vaccination can cause moral hazard. In
cooperation with a major bank in Ecuador that provides annual vaccination campaigns to
improve its employees’ health, we randomize incentives to get a flu shot. We follow the def-
inition of a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) closely by studying individual
behavior in an environment where subjects naturally make their decisions without knowing
that they are participants in an experiment. Our design allows us to analyze how economic
factors (price, opportunity costs, information, and peers) affect working adults’ decision to
vaccinate. In a second step, we use the exogenous variation on vaccination generated by
the random incentives to study its impact on employees’ health and their behavior. Thus,
we use a random encouragement design (List et al., 2017) in a health-related context, which
constitutes an ethical approach for evaluating the effects of adopting a medical technology
that in our view is superior to existing empirical approaches.
Much of the medical research on vaccines relies on evidence from observational studies
without randomization of the individual treatment. While reviews of the medical literature
document the positive health effects of flu vaccination, many of the medical studies could be
affected by selection and other biases, as pointed out by Jefferson et al. (2010), Osterholm
et al. (2012), Demicheli et al. (2014), Østerhus (2015). For instance, researchers describe the
problem of a “healthy vaccine recipient effect,” which implies that healthier individuals are
more likely to get vaccinated. Such positive selection bias could lead to an overestimation of
the health effects. Still, observational studies are often preferred because of ethical concerns
regarding experimental interventions in the context of health. This concern is also true for
randomized controlled trials on vaccines, which, if conducted, rarely make use of placebos
for ethical reasons (Sanson-Fisher et al., 2007; Baxter et al., 2010), but instead manipulate
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the type of vaccine across treatment and control groups. Besides these identification issues,
the medical research on vaccines focuses only on the medical effects, without considering
changes in behavior that may affect health. By design, participants of a randomized con-
trolled trial know that they are in an experiment but do not know if they received the vaccine
or not, which rules out changes in behavior. Since public institutions and companies are in-
terested in the total effect of health interventions, we believe that our random encouragement
design is superior in the sense that it captures both behavioral and medical effects from get-
ting vaccinated and it circumvents the ethical dilemma of withholding a potentially effective
medical treatment as in placebo-controlled interventions.
We introduced three modifications to the bank’s 2017 vaccination campaign to influ-
ence vaccination take-up: We changed the vaccine’s price at an income threshold, assigned
weekdays for on-site vaccinations randomly across employees, and varied the content of the
emails used to invite employees to vaccinate. Regarding price, employees who earned less
than $750 would receive a $2.48 price discount from the bank if they got vaccinated. To
implement the other encouragements, we randomly assigned all employees into four groups.
Employees assigned to the control group were informed of the campaign via email about
their assigned day during the workweek, time, and the vaccine’s price. The first treatment
group received the same information as the control, but employees were assigned to get
vaccinated on Saturday. Assigning employees for vaccination on Saturday increases the op-
portunity costs of vaccination compared to the workweek because these employees would
need to incur additional transportation costs and arrange their weekend schedule to get vac-
cinated. In contrast, assigning employees to the workweek minimizes their opportunity costs
because the bank allows them to take time off their duties to get vaccinated. The second and
third treatment groups received the same email as the control, plus an information nudge in
the form of a short message summarizing the altruistic and individual benefits of the vaccine,
respectively.
To investigate the determinants and consequences of vaccination, we have access to ad-
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ministrative data from the bank that we merge with information on treatment assignment at
the individual level. The firm’s data includes detailed medical diagnoses for each employee,
so we can precisely identify flu diagnoses and the resulting sick days. We check if getting
vaccinated affects these measures of health. Also, being able to distinguish flu-related sick-
ness from non-flu-related sickness allows us to study behavioral effects, assuming that flu
vaccination has no direct effect on non-flu-related sickness. Also, our empirical setting helps
us with the issue of health spill-overs, as in principle unvaccinated individuals could benefit
from vaccinated peers. First, general population flu vaccination rates in Ecuador fluctuate
around 2 percent (INEC, 2012), which is far below the levels that grant herd-immunity ef-
fects. Second, we can empirically check whether peer effects in health are an issue by using
the bank’s organizational data. In our setup, the bank’s units, which group the employees
that work directly together every day, are the relevant social groups.3 Given our intervention
at the employee level, by chance, there are some units which have more employees encour-
aged to get the vaccine than in other units. We exploit this variation to study peer effects in
take-up as well as potential health effects of having exogenously vaccinated peers. Finally,
employee surveys before and after the vaccination campaign complement our dataset and
allow inspection of possible mechanisms for the effects on employee health and behavior.
We find the following results on the factors that affect vaccination take-up. First, we
assess how price and opportunity costs affect vaccination take-up on working adults. Eco-
nomic theory identifies both monetary and opportunity costs as a relevant component in the
decision to adopt medical technologies like vaccination (Brito et al., 1991; Geoffard and
Philipson, 1997; Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Chen and Toxvaerd, 2014; Schaller et al., 2017).
We find that a $2.48 change in price did not affect take-up. Conversely, decreasing opportu-
nity costs by assigning employees to get vaccinated during the workweek increased take-up
by 14 percentage points, a 112 percent increase compared to Saturday. Thus, reducing op-
3Previous studies on peer effects in the adoption of medical technology rely on distance measures or on
self-reported (incentivized and non-incentivized) networks of friends (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Sato and
Takasaki, 2015; Rao et al., 2017).
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portunity costs has a significant effect on take-up for working adults. Other policy measures
directed to increase vaccination rates of adults, such as advertising or commitment devices,
have smaller effects than reducing these costs (Nowalk et al., 2010; Milkman et al., 2011).4
Thus, public health institutions and firms can cost-effectively increase take-up by minimizing
opportunity costs. Information on the altruistic or personal benefits of vaccination is another
factor that could affect take-up, but we find no effect from providing this information. The
coefficients are close to zero, negative and statistically insignificant, which is consistent with
previous studies (Bronchetti et al., 2015; Godinho et al., 2016). Given that reducing oppor-
tunity costs has a substantial effect on take-up, it is plausible that supplying a sentence of
additional information is not enough to further increase it.
Having found a significant determinant of vaccine take-up, we can use the random as-
signment to the workweek to identify both the effects of vaccination on health and potential
peer effects within units. First, we study the causal effect of randomly vaccinated coworkers
on individual take-up by exploiting exogenous variation in the proportion of peers who get
vaccinated. While previous empirical work has revealed mixed results of peer effects on
the adoption of medical technologies, we find a positive effect of peers on take-up.5 The
estimates indicate that if the proportion of peers that get vaccinated increases by ten percent-
age points, take-up increases by 7.9 percentage points. We explore potential mechanisms
and find that peers are not changing information and beliefs about vaccination. Instead, our
evidence suggests that employees react to social norms.
Next, we study the consequences of vaccine take-up by examining if flu vaccination is
effective to improve working adults’ health. If flu vaccination decreases flu cases, we expect
4Nowalk et al. (2010) find that increased advertising increases take-up by 29 percent in adults older than
50 years, with no effect on younger adults. Milkman et al. (2011) find that the use of commitment devices
increases take-up by 13 percent.
5Theoretically, peer vaccination can either increase (Kremer and Miguel, 2007) or decrease individual take-
up (Geoffard and Philipson, 1997; Chen and Toxvaerd, 2014). For flu vaccination, Rao et al. (2017) estimate a
positive peer effect on flu vaccination for college students in Harvard. Regarding other medical technologies,
Kremer and Miguel (2007) find that increased deworming of peers reduces deworming take-up in Kenya.
Conversely, Sato and Takasaki (2015) find that having at least one friend who got vaccinated against tetanus
increases the likelihood of tetanus vaccination of women in rural Nigeria.
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that offering employees the opportunity to get vaccinated during the workweek would reduce
the number of flu cases and thereby the incidence of sickness as well as absence from work
due to higher vaccine take-up. However, we find that assigning employees to the workweek
did not affect the probability of having a sick day or the incidence of a sickness per se.
Using detailed data on medical diagnoses, we find no evidence that exogenously triggered
vaccination decreased the probability of getting sick due to the flu. In particular, we can
rule out an effect of -2.4 percentage points that correspond to the CDC’s estimate of the
effectiveness of the 2017-2018 flu vaccine.6 Also, we explore whether peer vaccination
affects employees’ health. We find that peer vaccination does not affect the probability of
having a sick day due to the flu, which is consistent with low unit vaccination rates that do
not grant herd immunity.
We continue analyzing the consequences of vaccination by exploring if getting vacci-
nated can unintendingly cause moral hazard. As mentioned above, medical studies usually
do not consider if vaccination could induce risky behavior (Prasad and Jena, 2014), while
the few papers in economics that quasi-experimentally study moral hazard in the context
of medical interventions have mixed results (Margolis et al., 2014; Moghtaderi and Dor,
2016; Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018). We find several pieces of evidence suggesting that
getting vaccinated can indeed cause moral hazard. First, we test if getting vaccinated leads
to individuals to feel more protected and to react differently than the unvaccinated when
flu-like symptoms arise. Non-flu respiratory diseases have symptoms similar to the flu, but
the flu vaccine does not provide any immunity benefit to prevent them. Thus, flu vacci-
nation should not affect the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu disease, so any
effect on this probability would imply a change in how employees react when sick with a
respiratory disease. In particular, if vaccinated employees feel more protected, they might
6The CDC calculates the effectiveness of the vaccine by comparing hospitalization rates due to the flu of
vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. In the 2017-2018 flu season, the CDC estimates that getting vacci-
nated decreased the probability of being hospitalized due to the flu by 36 percentage points. Scaling up this
effect by the estimate of the effect of being assigned for vaccination in the workweek on vaccination take-up
(6.7 percentage points with the most conservative first stage) yields a reduced form effect of -2.4 percentage
points.
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be less likely to go to the doctor when they feel flu-like symptoms, and the probability of
being diagnosed with a non-flu disease would decrease. Consistent with this hypothesis, we
find that assigning individuals to get vaccinated on the workweek decreased the likelihood
of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory disease by 6.5 percentage points (20 percent
of the baseline). Consistent with moral hazard, we find that assigning individuals to the
workweek decreased the likelihood of going to the bank’s on-site doctor for any reason.7
Finally, we asked employees in the post-intervention survey about self-reported habits re-
lated to improving health. In line with the idea of riskier behavior among the vaccinated,
we find that assigning employees for vaccination on the workweek decreased the frequency
of people reporting to carry an umbrella by 18 percent of the baseline. As Ecuadorians and
many other cultures around the world believe that carrying an umbrella could help prevent
the flu and other respiratory diseases, this result suggests that vaccinated employees are less
likely to engage in practices believed to prevent the flu. In summary, the results from our
analyses suggest that getting vaccinated can create a moral hazard problem that could reduce
the effectiveness of flu vaccination.
The factors that affect vaccination take-up and the causal impacts of flu vaccination on
health have been of great interest to researchers in medicine and economics. In comparison
to previous work, our intervention quantifies large effects of opportunity costs on vaccination
of working adults and how peers affect take-up. Thus, we contribute to the ongoing research
on the determinants of vaccine take-up, as an example of the adoption of preventive medical
technology. According to previous studies, other factors that can affect vaccination take-up
include information, education, age, health status, health behavior, and lifestyle (Maurer,
2009; Schmitz and Wübker, 2011; Godinho et al., 2016; Chang, 2018). We also contribute
to the research on peer effects, which has important implications on workplace productiv-
ity (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Herbst and Mas, 2015) and has recently been recognized as
an important aspect in human behavior concerning health. Our findings on the health ef-
7The on-site doctor is a convenient feature the bank offers its employees. Before the intervention 77 percent
of all sick cases correspond to visits to these doctors.
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fects of vaccine take-up add to an ongoing discussion that predominantly takes place in the
medical literature, with few exceptions such as Ward (2014) and White (2018). Vaccination
campaigns are seen as a way to tackle sickness-related absence, which is a topic of high eco-
nomic relevance (Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010; Ager et al., 2017; Bütikofer and Skira, 2018).
Finally, with our investigation of a company-wide vaccination campaign, we contribute to
the literature of on-site health interventions (Just and Price, 2013; List and Samek, 2015; Be-
lot et al., 2016), whereas our findings may also inform the broader literature on public health
interventions (Evers et al., 1997; Cawley, 2010; Bütikofer and Salvanes, 2018). By showing
how preventive medical technologies can unintendingly cause moral hazard, we may offer a
partial explanation why health interventions may not always be as successful as expected in
improving people’s health.
3.2 Experimental Design
We ran the field experiment in cooperation with a bank in Ecuador. This bank focuses on
consumer credit and is one of the largest credit card issuers in the country. Its headquarters
is in Quito, Ecuador’s capital, and it has six branches across the country with over 1,300
employees, distributed in 31 divisions with 142 working units. The bank had run small vac-
cination campaigns in the past. These campaigns included only some employees in crowded
areas and ran during the workweek in the bank’s offices.8 In 2017, the bank decided to ex-
tend its annual campaign to all its employees and allowed us to experimentally modify it to
investigate how to increase take-up and the effects of vaccination. We implemented three
interventions: we changed the vaccine’s price for some employees using income-dependent
subsidies, we randomized assignments for on-site vaccinations across weekdays, and we im-
plemented information nudges by varying the content of the emails that were used to invite
employees to vaccinate.
The bank decided to give the vaccine for free to areas that participated in campaigns in
8These areas included the call center and the collections departments, which only have few employees.
We exclude the call center from our analysis of the 2017 campaign, as we have evidence that the call center
supervisors pushed their employees into taking the vaccine leading to a take-up of almost 100 percent.
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previous years and to partially subsidize it for new participants. We used the employees’
income to allocate this subsidy. Employees who earned less than $750 per month would pay
$4.95 to get vaccinated, while those who earned more than $750 would pay $7.43. Note that
the vaccine’s full price is $9.99. The payment was directly deducted from the employees’
paycheck if they opted to get vaccinated.
To examine the effects of opportunity costs and information, we randomly assigned all
employees into one of four groups.9 First, employees assigned to the control group (Control)
received an email informing them about the campaign, their assigned day, time, and the price
they would have to pay (see Figure B.3). These employees were assigned to get vaccinated
during the workweek (Wednesday, Thursday or Friday) and were allowed to take time off
their duties to get vaccinated. The specific day was selected randomly for each employee.
The first treatment increased the opportunity costs of vaccination by assigning employees
to get vaccinated on Saturday. The employees usually do not work during the weekend, so
they would incur extra transportation costs and would have to arrange their schedule to go
to the bank and get vaccinated.10 Otherwise, this group received the same information as
the Control (see Figure B.6). This treatment was only applied in Quito because all the other
branches are substantially smaller (82 percent of the employees work in Quito), and their
employees could get vaccinated in a single day, which was not possible in Quito.11
We also implemented two information nudges. The first nudge highlights the social bene-
fits of flu immunization (Altruistic Treatment). In addition to the information provided to the
control group, the email included the phrase: “Getting vaccinated also protects people around
you, including those who are more vulnerable to serious flu illness, like infants, young chil-
dren, the elderly and people with serious health conditions that cannot get vaccinated” (see
9The bank requested that we exclude the CEO and another high executive from the intervention. We also
excluded our counterpart in Human Resources and four employees who work in the local branches and did not
have a company email address to deliver the treatments.
10Based on data from the employees’ magnetic cards swipes to enter the bank, only 0.4 percent of the
employees work regularly on Saturdays.
11Branches in the coastlands were randomly assigned to get vaccinated on Wednesday, and branches in the
highlands were assigned to Thursday.
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Figure B.4). The second nudge highlights the individual benefits of flu immunization (Selfish
Treatment). In addition to the information provided to the control group, the email included
the phrase: “Vaccination can significantly reduce your risk of getting sick, according to both
health officials from the World Health Organization and numerous scientific studies” (see
Figure B.5). Employees in these two treatments were assigned to get vaccinated during the
workweek and the specific day was selected randomly.
Our intervention targeted the Ecuadorian flu season which usually covers the period from
November to the end of February (Ropero, 2011). The bank ran a pre-intervention survey
from October 25 to October 29, 2017. Human Resources sent the intervention emails on
November 1, 2017, using its official email account. Employees were not aware that this study
was taking place. For them, the campaign was just a regular activity organized by the Human
Resources department. Employees are used to receiving emails from Human Resources and
according to the Human Resources manager typically read these emails carefully. The bank
sent out a reminder using the same email account a week later. The vaccination campaign
ran from November 8 to November 11, 2017, at locations within the bank’s offices in each
branch. The bank hired an external medical team to supply and inject the vaccines. Finally,
the bank conducted a post-survey during March and April 2018.12
3.3 Data
This section describes the data used in our analyses for assessing how economic factors
can affect take-up and the effects of the flu vaccine on health. First, we have access to the
firm’s administrative records about its employees: gender, age, education level, and depen-
dents; job and its position within the bank’s organizational structure; tenure and income; and
sickness diagnoses and sick days. Second, we collected vaccination take-up data from the
bank’s campaign records. Third, we use data from pre- and post-intervention surveys. These
surveys asked employees about: previous illnesses and general health; knowledge and be-
12The geographic locations of the banks’ branches are displayed in Appendix Figure B.1 and a depiction of
the timeline is shown in Appendix Figure B.2. Appendix Figure B.7 provides information about the flu vaccine
used and Appendix Figure B.8 shows an individual getting vaccinated during the campaign.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Control Altruistic Selfish Saturday F-test (p-value)
Monthly Income ($) 1,766 1,860 1,701 1,681 1,827 0.316
Company Tenure (years) 7.9 8.3 7.7 8.1 7.5 0.761
Prop. Women 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.46 0.47 0.497
Age (year) 36.6 37.2 36.4 36.6 35.7 0.553
Prop. College Education 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.759
Pre Survey Participation 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.40 0.171
Post Survey Participation 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.519
Diagnosed Sick 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.892
Granted a Sick Day 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.344
Diagnosed Sick Flu 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.348
Granted a Flu Sick Day 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.195
Vaccination Take-up 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.08 0.001
N 1,164 344 294 310 216
Notes: This table presents characterizes the mean employee of the bank where we implemented our intervention. We present
statistics for the full sample and the four treatment groups. The last column presents the p-value of a joint significance test
to check whether there are significant differences across the treatment groups. The proportion of employees diagnosed sick
or granted a sick day corresponds to the period between January 1 and November 7, 2017, before the vaccination campaign.
liefs about vaccination and the flu vaccine; habits related to health; relations with coworkers;
opinions about the campaign; motivation; organizational attachment and work satisfaction;
and risk and time preferences.
Table 3.1 presents the mean characteristics of the bank’s employees (Column 1). On
average, employees earn a total monthly income of $1,760. As a reference, in 2017 the
average total income in Ecuador was $479, which implies that the bank’s employees are in
the three highest deciles of the Ecuadorian income distribution (INEC, 2017). The average
employee has been in the company for more than seven years and is around 36 years old. The
company employs roughly the same number of men and women, and more than 90 percent
of its employees have at least some college education, close to education levels in developed
countries. Almost 50 percent of the employees completed the pre-intervention survey, a high
completion rate compared to previous surveys from Human Resources. The completion rate
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decreased to 36 percent for the post-intervention survey.
The administrative data include two measures of health: medical diagnoses and sick
days. These measures come from two sources: the onsite doctors and medical certificates
from outside doctors. It is important to note that Ecuadorian law establishes that employees
must present a medical certificate to get a sick day.13 Consequently, the onsite doctors report
every visit they receive to Human Resources. The doctors report the diagnosis (the type of
disease), whether they granted a sick day or not, and the number of sick days granted. Also,
by law, if an employee takes time off work to go to an outside doctor, then she has to present
to Human Resources a medical certificate that indicates the diagnosis and number of sick
days granted if any.14 Hence, in addition to sick days, we can also observe employees being
diagnosed sick with no sick days granted for cases where a doctor did not consider the illness
severe enough. Thus, sick days are a measure of more severe illness. From January to early
November 2017, before the intervention, 14 percent of the employees were sick from any
disease, and 6 percent had at least one sick day.
Table 3.1 also shows evidence on the balance of treatment assignment. Columns 2 to 5
present the mean employee characteristics across the four groups. All variables have almost
identical means across groups. For each characteristic, Column 6 shows the p-value of a
joint significance test of differences of means. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
means are the same across the four treatments, which suggests that our randomization was
successful. The Kruskal-Wallis rank test shows the same result. Finally, we test whether
answering the pre and post surveys is different across treatments and find no statistically
significant difference.
13By law employees in Ecuador also have up to one year of paid leave due to sickness and employers are not
allowed to terminate employment during sick leave.
14Doctors diagnose their patient using a combination of a physical examination, blood tests and culture tests.
The specific procedure is part of individual medical records and we do not have access to that data.
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3.4 Analysis of Vaccination Take-up
In this section, we study how economic factors affect working adults’ decision to vac-
cinate. Specifically, we consider the effect of opportunity costs, altruistic and individual
information, and peers on take-up in detail. Regarding the income-dependent vaccine sub-
sidy, we do not find any effect of the $2.48 price difference on vaccination take-up.15 We
conclude that such price change may be too small to induce changes in take-up behavior.
The last row in Table 3.1 presents the flu immunization take-up rates for the different
treatments during the campaign. The Control group has a take-up rate of 22 percent, the
Altruistic treatment has a take-up of 17 percent, and the Selfish treatment has a take-up of 19
percent. Comparing across the three groups suggests that the information treatments were
not sufficient to increase take-up. In contrast, being assigned to get vaccinated during the
workweek increases take-up by 14 percentage points in contrast to Saturday (112 percent).16
We extend the analysis of these effects in the next section.
3.4.1 Effects of Opportunity Costs, Altruistic and Individual Information on Individ-
ual Take-up
We model the effect of opportunity costs, altruistic information and selfish information
on vaccination take-up for employee i in city c using the following equation:
Takeupic = α + γc + pi1Altruismic + pi2Selfishic + pi3Saturdayic + uic (3.1)
where Takeupic is an indicator of vaccination take-up. We include Quito fixed effects γc to
account for differences in implementation of the vaccination day assignment across cities,
as discussed in Section 3.2. Altruismic, Selfishic and Saturdayic are dummy variables
15Appendix Figure B.9 shows no visible discontinuity across the threshold. Regression discontinuity esti-
mates also do not indicate any significant change in take-up at the cutoff (see Appendix Table B.1), which is
robust to different bandwidths.
16In the post-intervention survey 59 employees report that they got vaccinated outside the campaign. Vacci-
nation outside the campaign is not significantly different by treatment status. Also note that between November
2017 and February 2018, 20 treated employees quit the bank. Attrition is not correlated with assignment to the
treatments.
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Table 3.2: Effects of Treatments on Vaccination Take-Up
Main With Controls Quito Non-Compliance Day of Week
Altruistic Information -0.0260 -0.0209 -0.0493 -0.0262
(0.0310) (0.0303) (0.0332) (0.0306)
Selfish Information -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.013 -0.0103
(0.0314) (0.0316) (0.0339) (0.0308)
Thursday 0.0002
(0.0346)
Friday -0.0356
(0.0331)
Saturday -0.0789*** -0.0791*** -0.0898*** -0.0671** -0.0818***
(0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0313) (0.0298) (0.0315)
Baseline take-up 0.1732
N 1,164 1,164 929 1,152 929
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of the different treatments on
vaccination take-up. All specifications control for city fixed effects. Column 1 presents our main estimates from equation (1)
without adding additional controls. In Column 2 we test the robustness of the main estimates controlling for the vaccine’s
price, income, tenure, division in the company, gender, age, and education level. Column 3 presents the estimates using only
employees in Quito, the city where we implemented our four treatments. In Column 4 we exclude 12 individuals who were
assigned to vaccinate in the workweek but went to vaccinate on Saturday. In Column 5 we test for different effects across the
different days of the week using only data from Quito that has all the treatments. Using clustered standard errors at the work
unit level (142 clusters) yields similar standard errors with no loss of statistical significance.
that indicate treatment assignment. Thus, we estimate the effect of the different treatments
relative to those individuals who were assigned to vaccination on the workweek and did not
receive any information nudge.
Table 3.2 presents the effects of the different treatments on take-up. Column 1 shows
baseline results of the effect of opportunity costs and information on vaccination take-up.
The estimates indicate that assigning employees to Saturday decreased take-up by 7.9 per-
centage points compared to the Control. This effect is approximately 46 percent of the
Control’s take-up and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, minimizing the
opportunity costs associated with vaccination is a useful measure to increase take-up.
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Conversely, we find that emphasizing either the altruistic or the selfish benefits of vacci-
nation does not affect take-up. The coefficients are close to zero, negative and statistically
insignificant. It is plausible that supplying a sentence of additional information is not enough
to further increase take-up given that reducing opportunity costs has a substantial effect on
it.17 One interpretation of these results is that information would have to be very salient to
accrue an effect on vaccine take-up in a company context such as this.
Columns 2-4 of Table 3.2 show the robustness of the results to the inclusion of controls, to
the use of a restricted sample, and to controlling for non-compliance. Specifically, Column
2 shows that controlling for the vaccine’s price, income, tenure, division in the company,
gender, age, and education level does not affect the estimates. Column 3 addresses the
fact that only employees who work in the bank’s headquarters in Quito were assigned to
vaccinate on Saturday. In this subsample, assigning employees to Saturday decreased take-
up by almost nine percentage points (51 percent of the control group take-up), significant
at the 1 percent level. This result is slightly larger than the main result, but we cannot
reject that they are statistically the same. Both information treatments have small, negative
and statistically insignificant effects. Column 4 shows the effect of controlling for non-
compliance.18 In this subsample, assigning employees to Saturday decreased take-up by 6.7
percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. We cannot reject that this estimate is
statistically the same as the baseline result. The estimates of the effect of the information
treatments are practically the same as the main estimates.
Lastly, in Column 5 we check whether assignment to different days in the week affects
take-up differentially. We exploit the fact that vaccination days are randomly assigned, and
17The post intervention survey asks if the employee recalls the altruistic and selfish information statements.
Appendix Table B.3 shows that neither employees assigned to the Altruistic treatment nor those assigned to the
Selfish treatment remember their respective statements better than the control. Another issue could be spillovers
of information, but this is unlikely given that our design provides information directly to the treated individuals
via email.
18We identified in the campaign records 12 people assigned to the workweek who vaccinated on Saturday.
The bank asked the medical team in charge of the vaccination campaign to enforce the day assigned to each
employee, but they failed to enforce this requirement on Saturday and were unable to send employees back
home if they showed up that day. In contrast, nobody of those assigned to Saturday got vaccinated during the
workweek.
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we regress our indicator of vaccination take-up on dummies for the assigned day (Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday or Saturday), using the Quito’s subsample.19 These estimates show that
take-up on Thursday and Friday is not statistically different from take-up on Wednesday,
while the effect of Saturday is substantially larger in magnitude and very close to the baseline
estimate in Column 1.20 These results do not support time-inconsistent preferences that
would induce procrastination as the mechanism behind the Saturday effect and are consistent
with increasing opportunity costs.21
3.4.2 Further Evidence on Opportunity Costs
We analyze heterogeneous treatment effects across different subgroups of our study pop-
ulation, which may yield further evidence that opportunity costs are driving the difference
in take-up between being assigned to vaccinate on the workweek and Saturday.22 We focus
on differences across gender, distance to work, and employees with and without children.23
Figure 3.1 shows that assignment to Saturday has larger effects for men than for women,
although the difference is not statistically significant.
Distance to work reflects the transportation costs that an individual regularly incurs. The
median employee lives 6.5 km away from work. Figure 3.1 shows that those who live further
away than the median are slightly less likely to get vaccinated when they were assigned
to Saturday than those who live closer to the bank, but this difference is not statistically
significant. This result is consistent with increasing travel costs, but the magnitude suggests
that travel costs are not the main factor driving the difference in take-up between employees
assigned to the workweek and Saturday.
19Of the bank’s employees in Quito, after excluding the call center, 23.4 percent where assigned to vaccina-
tion on Wednesday, 26.7 percent to Thursday, 26.5 percent to Friday, and 23.4 percent to Saturday.
20While the effect of assignment to Friday is not significant, it is 44 percent of the effect of Saturday and
two orders of magnitude larger than the effect of Thursday. Being assigned to Friday can slightly increase the
opportunity cost of vaccination because it is only a 6-hour workday if employees finish their tasks.
21Also, the Control includes people assigned to Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, so any effect of procras-
tination is included in the comparison made in the baseline estimates.
22We find that the information treatments have no differential effect across subgroups. These estimates are
small and statistically insignificant. See Appendix Table B.2.
23Distance to work was calculated with a geo-location service using employees’ home addresses.
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Figure 3.1: Heterogeneous Effects of Assignment to Vaccination on Saturday on Take-up
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Notes: This figure presents the intent-to-treat effect of assignment to the Saturday
on vaccination take-up for different subgroups in the sample. All specifications
control for city fixed effects. The figure presents the point estimate and the 95
percent heteroscedastic robust confidence interval for each subgroup.
Finally, we consider differences in the effect between employees with and without chil-
dren. Having children may imply higher opportunity costs at the weekend by increased
family obligations. Figure 3.1 shows that assignment to Saturday decreased take-up by 10.6
percentage points for employees with children, while the effect is smaller (5.3 percentage
points) and insignificant for employees without children. Although the difference between
these two effects is not significant, its magnitude is consistent with the idea that opportunity
costs increase for people assigned to Saturday.
In conclusion, these results suggest that the difference in take-up between employees
assigned to the workweek and Saturday correspond to a change in the opportunity costs of
vaccination. We use only this variation in take-up created by lowering opportunity costs as
an instrument in the rest of our analyses.
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3.4.3 Peer Effects on Vaccination Take-up
Peer effects may play an important role in vaccination behavior by either increasing or
decreasing take-up. When a person gets vaccinated, the prevalence of the disease may de-
crease, making it less likely for others to get sick. Thus, if getting vaccinated has costs,
then it may be optimal for some people not to do so if their peers got vaccinated. Theo-
retically, this free-rider problem can result in a Nash equilibrium where nobody takes the
vaccine (Chen and Toxvaerd, 2014). Conversely, peers may increase take-up by exchanging
information that affects individual beliefs about the flu and the vaccine. Also, individuals
may imitate the health care behavior of their peers to conform to social norms (Kremer and
Miguel, 2007).
The exogenous variation in take-up created by assigning people to get vaccinated in the
workweek allows us to estimate the effects of groups who work together every day on vac-
cination. The bank’s units define the social groups of employees that work directly together.
Thus, we can identify the effect of social groups with whom adults share a large portion of
their daily time on vaccine take-up. We will also use this approach to analyze peer effects in
health caused by vaccinated peers below (Section 3.5).
We model the effect of the proportion of peers in unit j who take the vaccine on employee
i’s decision as
Takeupijc = γc + β1Prop.Takeupjc + β2Xijc + β3X¯jc + pi3Workweekijc + uijc (3.2)
where Prop.Takeupjc is the proportion of peers in unit j who get vaccinated and X¯jc are
the average observable characteristics of peers j. Manski (1993) shows that if we estimate
equation (2) by OLS, self-selection, common environmental factors and reflection confound
the true peer effects β1 and β3. However, in our design employees are randomly assigned
to vaccination on the workweek independently of their unit. This creates an exogenous
variation that affects the proportion of peers who get vaccinated independently of employee
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i’s decision to get vaccinated because by chance some units have more employees assigned
to vaccinate in the workweek than other units. We can average equation 3.2 across unit j to
obtain the first stage equation:
Prop.Takeupjc =
γc
1− β1 +
β2 + β3
1− β1 X¯jc +
pi3
1− β1Prop.Workweekjc +
u¯jc
1− β1 (3.3)
where the proportion of peers in unit j who get vaccinated is a function of the proportion
of peers who were randomly assigned to the workweek (Prop.Workweekjc). Random as-
signment implies that Prop.Workweekjc is uncorrelated with both X¯jc and u¯jc. Hence, the
reduced form equation is
Takeupijc =
γc
1− β1 +
β1β2 + β3
1− β1 X¯jc+
β1pi3
1− β1Prop.Workweekjc+pi3Workweekijc+ u˜ijc
(3.4)
In our design, the exclusion restriction holds because the proportion of peers that got
vaccinated is the only channel through which the proportion of peers assigned to the work-
week can affect the individual’s vaccination decision. Hence, we can combine the estimates
from equations (3.3) and (3.4) to obtain an IV estimate of the effect of the proportion vac-
cinated peers on the employee’s take-up. The error term in equation (3.4) includes both the
individual error from equation (3.2) and the average error from equation (3.3), so we cluster
the standard errors at the unit level.
Panel A in Table 3.3 presents the main results. The first stage estimate in Column 1 in-
dicates that a ten-percentage-point increase in the proportion of peers assigned to the work-
week increased by 3.1 percentage points the proportion of peers that get vaccinated. The
F-statistic is 16.48, so according to the results of Stock and Yogo (2002), the instrument is
relevant. The estimates in columns 2-4 show that peer vaccination has a positive effect on
individual take-up and that not accounting for endogeneity biases the effect downwards. The
IV estimate in Column 4 indicates that a ten percentage points increase in the proportion of
peers that get vaccinated increased take-up by 7.9 percentage points. The results are robust
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Table 3.3: Effect of Peer Vaccination on Individual Take-up
First Stage Reduced Form OLS 2SLS
A. Main Effect
Proportion of Peers:
Assigned to the Workweek 0.3106*** 0.0025***
(0.0765) (0.0008)
Vaccinated 0.0051*** 0.0079***
(0.0007) (0.0018)
F-value 16.481
N 1138 1138 1138 1138
B. Heterogenous Effects
Proportion of Peers:
Same Gender Vaccinated 0.0041*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0019)
Different Gender Vaccinated 0.0038*** 0.0048*
(0.0009) (0.0025)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. The bank has 116 units with more than
one employee. This table presents the effect of peers’ vaccination take-up on the individual’s vaccination
decision. The estimates represent the effect of a one percentage point change in the proportion of peers.
All estimates control for Quito fixed effects and individual assignment to the workweek. Panel A presents
the main results. Column 1 presents the results for the first stage. Column 2 displays the results of the
reduced form. Column 3 presents OLS estimates of the effect of a change in the proportion of peers that
get vaccinated. Column 4 presents 2SLS estimates of the effect of a change in the proportion of peers that
get vaccinated. Panel B reports 2SLS estimates of heterogeneous effects. For each row the instrument is
the corresponding proportion of peers assigned to the workweek, the first stages have F-statistics greater
than 10.
to controlling for the total number of people in the unit and for mean age and gender of the
peers (Appendix Table B.4).24
24Mechanically, smaller units may have larger proportions. We also control for the proportion of peers in
the unit who have some managerial position. The point estimates are not affected by including this control
variable.
56
Table 3.4: Potential Mechanisms for Peer Effects
Effect on Baseline N
a. Beliefs about the Flu, its Vaccine, and Interactions with Coworkers
Vaccines Effective to Improve Health (1-5) -0.0017 3.87 378
(0.0049)
Talked with coworkers about getting vaccinated (pp) -0.0065*** 1.07 360
(0.0021)
Went with coworkers to get vaccinated (pp) 0.0009 0.06 360
(0.0014)
Probability of Getting Healthy Without the Vaccine (0-100) 0.0010 44.17 367
(0.0722)
Probability of Getting Healthy With the Vaccine (0-100) 0.0319 54.00 367
(0.0909)
Informed about the Flu (0-100) 0.0098 69.03 372
(0.0723)
Informed about the Flu Vaccine (0-100) 0.0079 63.09 372
(0.0977)
Afraid of the Flu (0-100) 0.0452 33.69 372
(0.1232)
Afraid of the Flu Vaccine (0-100) 0.0959 17.20 372
(0.1173)
Would Get Vaccinated out of the Workplace (pp) -0.0025 0.81 367
(0.0020)
Coworkers Convinced me to get Vaccinated (0-100) 0.0246 18.70 360
(0.1266)
I Convinced my Coworkers to get Vaccinated (0-100) -0.0622 33.18 360
(0.1343)
b. Heterogeneous Effects for Extrinsic and Intrisic Motivated Individuals
Vaccination of Extrinsic Motivated Individuals (pp) 0.0045*** 0.24 247
(0.0012)
Vaccination of Intrinsic Motivated Individuals (pp) 0.0006 0.16 262
(0.0017)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the reduced form effect
of peers assigned to the workweek on a series of outcomes identified by the row headers. The measurement
unit of each outcome is in parentheses next to the outcome’s name. The estimates represent the effect of a one
percentage point change in the proportion of peers. We define peers as all employees who work in the same unit.
All estimates control for Quito fixed effects and individual assignment to the workweek.
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The positive peer effect on individual take-up suggests that peers might be changing
personal beliefs about vaccination or that individuals follow behavior that they deem socially
acceptable. To disentangle these potential channels, we first explore how individual take-up
responds to peers of similar or different gender. There is evidence that individuals react
more to peers of similar characteristics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Hoffman et al., 1996;
Perkins, 2002). Thus, if peers with similar characteristics have a larger effect on take-up
than peers with different characteristics, this would suggest that following social norms may
be the mechanism behind the positive peer effect on take-up. Panel B in Table 3.3 shows
that ten percentage points increase in the proportion of peers of the same gender who get
vaccinated increased take-up by 7.6 percentage points. This effect is almost identical to the
main estimate and is driven by men. The effect of peers of a different gender is 37 percent
smaller and is not significant.
To study if peers might be changing personal beliefs about vaccination more directly,
we exploit the post-intervention survey questions on beliefs and knowledge of flu vaccines
and interactions with coworkers related to vaccination. Even though answering the post-
intervention survey is not correlated with treatment assignment (Table 3.1), the first stage
loses precision due to the smaller sample size in the survey. We focus on reduced form
analyses to prevent issues with finite sample bias in the IV estimate. Panel A in Table 3.4
shows the results on a set of 12 outcomes. The proportion of peers assigned to the workweek
only had a negative and significant effect on talking with coworkers about vaccination.25
This negative effect could be a consequence of the fact that employees expect that events
organized by the bank take place during the workweek, so they are less likely to mention
this to their coworkers.26 There is no significant effect on any of the questions regarding
information or beliefs about the vaccine, nor on questions that measure how much coworkers
influenced the vaccination decision. Moreover, the point estimates are small compared to
25This effect is robust to adjusting for the false discovery rate (FDR) as in Anderson (2008).
26Additionally, an employee who learns she is in a unit with a large proportion of assigned to Saturday might
feel lucky that she was assigned to the workweek and get vaccinated. This would bias downwards the estimate
of the effect of the proportion of vaccinated peers on take-up in Table 3.3.
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the baselines, which suggests that peer behavior did not affect beliefs nor supplied new
information about the vaccine and is not the driver of the positive peer effect we find.
To further test if employees following behavior that they deem socially acceptable is
the driver of the peer effects on vaccination take-up, we check if extrinsically motivated
employees are more likely to be affected by their peers. Intuitively, extrinsically motivated
individuals are more likely to respond to stimuli from their surrounding environment, which
implies that they should be more likely to follow their peers. The pre-intervention survey
has questions to determine if employees are intrinsically or extrinsically motivated.27 Panel
B in Table 3.4 shows the reduced form effect of the proportion of peers assigned to the
workweek on these subgroups. For extrinsically motivated employees, a ten percentage
points increase in the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek would increase take-up
by 4.5 percentage points, while intrinsically motivated employees’ take-up would increase
by only 0.6 percentage points. The difference between the subgroups is significant at the 5
percent level. These estimates suggest that the estimated peer effects are a consequence of
individuals conforming with the norms of their work group.
3.5 Analysis of the Effects of Vaccination on Health and Risky Behavior
In this section, we exploit random assignment to get vaccinated in the workweek as an
instrument to study if flu vaccination improved health by reducing cases of employees diag-
nosed sick days in our intervention. In order to shed light on one of the potential mechanisms
underlying the health results, we then use the same approach to explore if getting vaccinated
can induce moral hazard.
3.5.1 Effects of Flu Vaccination on Health
Flu vaccines may affect health through multiple avenues, direct and indirect. First and
foremost, getting vaccinated could have a direct effect on health by increasing immunity
27The intrinsic motivation measure is a dummy variable based on a median split of a summation of four
measures of motivation in the workplace where employees state how important is that they (i) learn something
interesting, (ii) get motivated to think about things, (iii) gain a thorough understanding of content and (iv) feel
that their opinions are considered.
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against four strands of the flu virus. Besides, the results in the previous section show that if
a person gets vaccinated, the likelihood that her close peers get vaccinated increases. This
effect would imply that an employee’s close peers are more protected against the flu, which
may decrease the transmission rate of the disease. Thus, positive peer effects on vaccination
take-up could create an indirect channel through which getting vaccinated might have a pos-
itive effect on health. While the overall vaccination rate in the firm’s 142 units is far too low
to provide herd immunity (see Table 3.1), the proportion of vaccinated peers by unit ranges
substantially between 0 and 67 percent.28 Thus, in some units, the proportion of vaccinated
peers may be high enough to provide some protection. Ideally, we could estimate the effect
of flu immunization on health outcomes (Yijc) - medical diagnoses and sick days- through
these two channels as:
Yijc = α + γc + θTakeupijc + δProp.Takeupjc + vijc (3.5)
However, vaccination take-up and the proportion of peers who get vaccinated are poten-
tially endogenous. For example, individuals with healthier lifestyles could be more likely
to vaccinate and less likely to need a sick day, so the estimates of equation (3.5) by OLS
would be biased downwards. Thus, we instrument take-up with an indicator of assignment
to vaccination during the workweek, and we instrument the proportion of vaccinated peers
in the unit with the proportion of peers assigned to the workweek. The first stage equations
have F-statistics of 6.6 and 8.9, respectively, implying that IV estimates of equation (3.5)
may have a problem of finite sample bias (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Thus, we focus on the re-
duced form estimates of regressing the health outcomes on the instruments, given that those
estimates are valid.
Panel A in Table 3.5 presents the effects of flu vaccination on the probability of having a
sick day between November 2017 and February 2018. The OLS estimate in Column 1 sug-
28Appendix Figure B.10 displays the number of employees by unit. The CDC and WHO indicate that
vaccination rates over 75 percent grant herd immunity.
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Table 3.5: Effects of Vaccination on Overall Sick Days
OLS Reduced Form 2SLS
a. Having a Sick Day
Assigned to the workweek 0.0132
(0.0361)
Prop. peers assigned to the workweek 0.00003
(0.0010)
Vaccinated -0.0407 0.2404
(0.0298) (0.7280)
Prop. peers vaccinated 0.0004 -0.0022
(0.0009) (0.0074)
Baseline (percentage points) 0.29
b. Number of sick days
Assigned to the workweek -0.2610
(0.6195)
Prop. peers assigned to the workweek -0.0140
(0.0147)
Vaccinated -0.5114* -3.9719
(0.2899) (12.2730)
Prop. peers vaccinated -0.0075 -0.0137
(0.0082) (0.1272)
Baseline (days) 1.29
N 1,120
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the effects
of flu vaccination on the probability of having a sick day in general between November 12, 2017,
and February 28, 2018. Column 1 presents OLS estimates. Column 2 presents the reduced form
estimates. Column 3 presents 2SLS estimates. The first panel presents the effect on the probability
of having a sick day, and the second panel presents the effect on the number of sick days. The
estimates include only units with two or more employees.
gests that getting vaccinated decreased the probability of having a sick day by 4.1 percentage
points (14 percent of the baseline), although the effect is insignificant. Conversely, the re-
duced form estimates in Column 2 imply that getting vaccinated did not affect the probability
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of having a sick day. Being randomly assigned to the workweek, which increases vaccination
take-up, increased the probability of having a sick day by 1.3 percentage points (5 percent
of the baseline), insignificantly at conventional levels. Additionally, the results in columns
1 and 2 indicate that the proportion of vaccinated peers does not affect the probability of
having a sick day. Panel B shows the effects of flu vaccination on the number of sick days.
The OLS correlation suggests that vaccination decreases sick days, which is significant at
the 10 percent level. However, the reduced form effect is no longer significant and sensitive
to the presence of outliers.29
Total sick days include many diseases over which the flu vaccine has no immunity benefit.
To address this issue, we exploit the data on medical diagnoses and estimate the effect of
vaccination on both the probability of being diagnosed with the flu (Table 3.6 Panel A) and
the probability of having a sick day because of the flu (Table 3.6 Panel B). The OLS estimates
in Column 1 suggest that getting vaccinated decreases the probability of being diagnosed
with the flu. However, the reduced form estimate in Column 2 indicates that being assigned
to the workweek increased the probability of being diagnosed with the flu by 0.4 percentage
points (9 percent of the baseline), not significant at conventional levels. This result further
suggests that getting vaccinated was ineffective to decrease the probability of having the flu.
Also, the estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that the proportion of vaccinated peers do not
affect the probability of being diagnosed with the flu, which suggests that vaccination rates
are too low to provide herd immunity. Thus, we drop the proportion of vaccinated peers in
the following analyses.
Panel B presents the effects of assignment to the workweek on the probability of having
a sick day because of the flu. These results are qualitatively the same as the effects on the
probability of being diagnosed with the flu. The confidence interval of the effect of being
assigned to the workweek rules out negative effects larger than 0.5 percentage points. In
29Sick days include severe illnesses, such as cancer, which leads to large numbers of sick days not related to
the flu. If we exclude these outliers, the coefficient of the reduced-form changes and becomes positive, in line
with our finding in panel A of Table 3.5 on the probability of having a sick day or not. Also, the effects do not
change if we take out the proportion of peers and estimate only the individual effect of vaccination.
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Table 3.6: Effects of Vaccination on Flu Diagnoses and Sick Days
OLS Reduced Form 2SLS
a. Being Diagnosed with the Flu
Assigned to the workweek 0.0044
(0.0155)
Prop. peers assigned to the workweek -0.0003
(0.0006)
Vaccinated -0.0254* 0.1103
(0.0151) (0.2978)
Prop. peers vaccinated -0.0001 -0.0020
(0.0004) (0.0033)
Baseline (percentage points) 0.05
b. Granted a Sick Day because of the Flu
Assigned to the workweek 0.0112
(0.0083)
Prop. peers assigned to the workweek -0.0002
(0.0003)
Vaccinated -0.0156 0.2309
(0.0110) (0.2194)
Prop. peers vaccinated 0.000003 -0.0026
(0.0002) (0.0025)
Baseline (days) 0.02
N 1,120
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. This table presents the effects of
flu vaccination on the probability of being diagnosed sick and being granted a sick day because
of the flu. Column 1 presents OLS estimates. Column 2 presents the reduced form estimates.
Column 3 presents 2SLS estimates. The estimates include only units with 2 or more employees.
particular, we can rule out a negative effect of 2.2 percentage points that correspond to the
CDC’s estimate of the effectiveness of the 2017-2018 flu vaccine.30
30In Appendix Table B.5 we check the robustness of these results to the inclusion of controls (gender, age,
tenure and income) and to using a broader definition of flu-related illness, thereby increasing case numbers.
The results are robust to these checks. Also, the results are robust to using a negative binomial or Poisson
regression.
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3.5.2 Can Getting Vaccinated Cause Moral Hazard?
The previous results imply that vaccinating employees against the flu appears to be inef-
fective. A simple explanation could be that the 2017-2018 vaccine did not match the prevail-
ing flu strains in that particular flu season. The flu vaccine grants protection against three or
four strands of the flu virus. If the vaccine does not match the prevailing strands of the flu
virus, then vaccination would be ineffective in improving health. Taking into account that
the quality of the flu vaccine could vary by year and by country, the bank and its employees
may have had just bad luck. While our design does not allow us to test if the flu vaccine
was immunologically effective, we can study if getting vaccinated induces people to engage
in riskier practices, which may separately contribute to decreasing the effectiveness of flu
vaccination.
As a first empirical test of the idea of behavioral changes due to flu vaccination, we
inspect effect heterogeneity. The medical effectiveness of the vaccine does not depend on
employee characteristics. Thus, if there is no change in behavior, assignment to the work-
week should not have different effects across subgroups defined by gender, age, or having
children. However, Appendix Table B.6 shows that assignment to the workweek increased
the probability of having a flu-related sick day among subgroups who are more likely to be
exposed to children, who are more likely to have the flu.
Vaccinated individuals could overestimate the protection of the vaccine and engage in
riskier behaviors. As a consequence, it is possible that vaccinated people avoid going to the
doctor or wait longer than unvaccinated people to do it when they feel flu-like symptoms.
Also, vaccinated individuals could take fewer protective measures, such as washing hands
less frequently, and these changes in behavior would expose individuals more to strands of
the flu virus that the vaccine might not cover.
To further explore if flu vaccination may cause a moral hazard problem, we test if getting
vaccinated makes people react differently than those unvaccinated when they feel flu-like
symptoms. The idea here is that non-flu respiratory diseases have symptoms similar to the
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flu, but the vaccine does not provide any immunity benefit to prevent them. Thus, flu vac-
cination should not affect the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu disease, so any
effect on this probability would imply a change in how individuals react when becoming sick
with a respiratory disease. In particular, if vaccinated employees felt more protected, they
might have been less likely to go to the doctor when they felt flu-like symptoms, decreasing
the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu disease. In particular, this would concern
cases of mild illnesses where it is up to the individual to decide to go to a doctor or not.
To implement this test, we exploit the richness of the data that differentiates between
flu and non-flu respiratory diagnoses by exploiting a policy intervention of the Ecuadorian
government that happened in our investigation period. In January 2018, as a result of a sig-
nificant increment of flu cases nationwide, the Ecuadorian government launched a massive
media campaign asking the population to go to the doctor if they felt any flu symptoms. If
vaccinated individuals felt protected, we argue that they may not have followed the govern-
ment’s recommendation, resulting in fewer visits to the doctor and fewer non-flu diagnoses
only in that month.
We estimate the reduced-form effects of vaccination by month during our investigation
period. Figure 3.2 presents the effects of being assigned to the workweek on flu and non-flu
diagnoses. As the main result, assigning employees to the workweek does not affect the
probability of being diagnosed with the flu in any month. The point estimates are smaller
than 0.7 percentage points in magnitude and insignificant at conventional levels. These re-
sults further confirm that vaccination was ineffective.
Regarding non-flu diagnoses, if vaccination did not induce people to feel more protected,
we would expect to find no effect on the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu res-
piratory disease. This is true in November, December, and February. However, in January
when the government asked people to go to the doctor, being assigned to the workweek
decreased the probability of being diagnosed with a non-flu respiratory disease by 7.2 per-
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Figure 3.2: Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of Vaccination on Diagnosed Sickness
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Notes: This figure presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to the workweek on the prob-
ability of being diagnosed sick by month. The left panel presents the effect of assignment to vac-
cination on the workweek on flu diagnoses, and the right panel presents the effect of assignment
to vaccination on the workweek on non-flu respiratory diagnoses. The figure presents the point es-
timate and the 95 percent heteroscedastic robust confidence interval. November includes cases of
diagnosed sickness detected since November 12, after the vaccination campaign.
centage points.31 This result suggests that employees assigned to the workweek, who were
more likely to get vaccinated, felt protected and went less to the doctor when they felt flu-
31We also estimate the effect of assignment to the workweek collapsing the data of the four months to a cross-
section. In this specification, being assigned to the workweek decreased the probability of being diagnosed with
a non-flu respiratory disease by 7.5 percentage points (Appendix Table B.7), almost identical to the effect in
January. Another check concerns the fact that the data on sickness diagnoses correspond to employees who
went to the onsite doctor or to an external doctor during working hours, while employees who went to an
external doctor outside working hours, who were diagnosed sick but were not granted a sick day, are coded
as healthy. This measurement error will not bias the previous estimates as long as it is uncorrelated with
assignment to the workweek. However, if employees assigned to get vaccinated during the workweek are more
likely to go to an external doctor after work, then this would overestimate the effect on non-flu respiratory
diagnoses. We bound the effect to address this potential concern (Lee, 2009). First, we calculate the treatment-
control difference in the proportion of healthy individuals. Then, we trim this difference from the control group
(assigned to vaccination on Saturday) to obtain an upper bound, and we trim this difference from the treatment
group (assigned to vaccination on the workweek) to obtain a lower bound. Appendix Table B.7 presents these
results. The effect of being assigned to the workweek is always negative and bounded between 5.4 and 9.8
percentage points.
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Figure 3.3: Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of Vaccination on Sick Days
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Notes: This figure presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to the workweek on the prob-
ability of being granted a sick day by month. The left panel presents the effect of assignment to
vaccination on the workweek on flu sick days, and the right panel presents the effect of assignment
to vaccination on the workweek on non-flu respiratory sick days. The figure presents the point es-
timate and the 95 percent heteroscedastic robust confidence interval. November includes sick days
granted since November 12, after the vaccination campaign.
like symptoms. These estimates are consistent with the hypothesis of riskier behavior among
vaccinated individuals, as they appeared to think that they are protected against the flu.
Figure 3.3 presents the reduced form effects of the assignment to the workweek on the
probability of having a sick day because of the flu and other non-flu respiratory diseases.
These results answer the question of whether cases of diagnosed sickness that we observe
in Figure 3.2 were severe enough also to get a sick day granted. The results in Figure 3.3
are qualitatively similar to the effects on the probability of being diagnosed with these ill-
nesses but less precise. Assigning employees to the workweek did not affect the probability
of having a flu-related sick day. Regarding non-flu respiratory diseases, the point estimates
are consistent with the results in Figure 3.2. While assigning employees to the workweek in-
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Figure 3.4: Reduced Form Estimates on the Probability of Going to the Onsite Doctor
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Notes: This figure presents the reduced form effect of being assigned to the workweek on the prob-
ability of going to the onsite doctor. The figure presents the point estimate and the 95 percent
heteroscedastic robust confidence interval. November includes sick days granted since November
12, after the vaccination campaign.
creased the probability of having a non-flu respiratory sick day in December, the probability
decreased in January by 2.9 percentage points. This reduction corresponds to the finding in
Figure 3.2 but suggests that the vaccinated are less likely to go to the doctor in the presence
of mild flu symptoms.
We can also check if vaccination affects the likelihood of going to the on-site doctor.
The bank’s on-site health center is a convenient feature for its employees because they do
not have to ask for time off to go to the doctor as they can take a few minutes of their work
time to go to the health center. Before the intervention, the on-site doctors account for 77
percent of all cases of diagnosed sickness. If vaccinated individuals felt more protected,
they may have been less likely to visit these doctors when the government launched its me-
dia campaign. Figure 3.4 presents the effects of assigning employees to the workweek on
the probability of going to the on-site doctor by month. There was no significant effect in
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November, December, and February. In January, being assigned to the workweek for vacci-
nation decreased the probability of going to the onsite doctor by 8.6 percentage points (21
percent of the baseline).
Table 3.7: Reduced Form Estimates on Health-Related Habits
Baseline Coefficient N
Responses on scale from 1 (“never”) to 10 (“all the time”)
How often do you exercise 5.93 -0.3145 359
(0.4026)
How often do you take dietary supplements 3.18 -0.6147 359
(0.4372)
How often do you carry an umbrella 6.85 -1.2190** 359
(0.4856)
How often do you wash your hands 9.25 0.0980 359
(0.1836)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the reduced form effects of being assigned
to the workweek on four daily habits and activities related to health and preventing the flu. Column 2 presents
the reduced form estimates. Column 3 presents the number of individuals who answered the survey.
In our final test for moral hazard, we look at self-reported habits and cultural beliefs re-
lated to preventing the flu. In the post-intervention survey, the bank asked its employees how
often they: (i) exercise; (ii) wash their hands; (iii) use an umbrella; and (iv) take nutritional
supplements. Washing hands is a proven measure against the flu, exercising and taking nu-
tritional supplement may improve overall health, and many people including Ecuadorians
believe that carrying an umbrella helps to prevent the flu or other respiratory illnesses. Psy-
chology research show that cultures across the world associate the fact that the flu virus
survives longer on a cold and wet environment with the belief that people catch the flu by
getting wet or cold (Au et al., 2008; Sigelman et al., 1993; Baer et al., 1999; Helman, 1978).32
32Also, since Quito is on the Equator Line, there are no marked seasons in the year. In Quito, temperatures
in a day can fluctuate between the upper forties (◦F) and the lower eighties (◦F), and there are no accurate
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Table 3.7 shows the effects of assigning employees to the workweek on these outcomes.
Assigning employees to the workweek did not affect how often employees wash their hands
(1 percent of the baseline), which is not surprising since they report that they wash their
hands very frequently. Assigning employees to the workweek had a negative but statistically
insignificant effect on how often employees exercise (5 percent of the baseline) and how
often they take nutritional supplements (19 percent of the baseline). The effect on how often
employees carry an umbrella is statistically significant. Being assigned to the workweek
decreases the frequency of carrying an umbrella by 1.22 points (18 percent of the baseline)
on a Likert scale where one means “never” and ten “all the time.”33 We can also investigate
heterogeneous effects across individual’s beliefs on the effectiveness of the vaccine using
the pre-intervention survey. We find that the effect is driven by individuals who believe
the vaccine is very effective to prevent the flu. Thus, this result suggests that vaccinated
individuals feel protected, so they neglect other measures that they believe to be helpful in
order to prevent respiratory illnesses.
3.5.3 Other Interpretations of the Results on Moral Hazard
In the previous section, we provide several pieces of evidence supporting the idea that
flu vaccination caused a moral hazard problem. In the following, we discuss other interpre-
tations of these findings focusing on whether other factors not related to moral hazard could
explain these results.
Misdiagnoses could be a competing explanation. If doctors are not able to distinguish
the flu from other non-flu respiratory diseases, then the non-flu cases could have been flu
cases. If this were true, the results in Figure 3.2 would indicate that the vaccine was effective
in January 2018 when the flu was prevalent in Ecuador. While we cannot directly observe
how doctors diagnose the flu in the data, we observe diagnoses from 72 different doctors
from different health centers and hospitals. It is unlikely that all doctors misdiagnosed the
forecasts for rain.
33This effect is significant at the 5 percent level (p-value=0.012) and robust to adjusting for multiple com-
parisons following Anderson (2008).
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flu. Also, the results are robust to using a broader definition of flu-related illness. Finally,
misdiagnoses do not explain why vaccinated individuals are less likely to carry an umbrella
as a cultural protective measure against the flu.
We could also think that doctors misdiagnose conditional on whether a person got vac-
cinated or not. When a doctor learns that a person who shows flu-like symptoms got vac-
cinated, the doctor might be more likely to misdiagnose those symptoms as a non-flu res-
piratory disease. However, the results in Figure 3.2 show that employees assigned to the
workweek, who are more likely to get vaccinated, were diagnosed less with non-flu respira-
tory diseases.
Finally, an alternative to moral hazard is the idea of adverse selection: employees with
higher risk tolerance regarding health are more likely to get vaccinated and to engage in risky
health behavior. However, adverse selection cannot be a driver of our results because we use
an exogenous source of variation on take-up. The marginal individual who gets vaccinated
is a person who would not have gotten vaccinated if assigned to Saturday. This variation is
uncorrelated with the underlying risk preferences of employees that could determine adverse
selection.
3.6 Conclusions
Individual behavior may threaten the success of health interventions in multiple ways.
First and foremost, individuals can decide not to participate. In this paper, we find that
reducing opportunity costs has a substantial effect on participation in a vaccination campaign
in the context of employees in working age who live in locations where access to vaccines
is not an issue, as in most major cities in both developing and developed countries, and who
are not affected by income constraints. Previous research finds effects of similar magnitudes
in rural areas in developing countries (Banerjee et al., 2010; Sato and Takasaki, 2018) or
populations with income constraints (Bronchetti et al., 2015). Regarding the health benefits
of the intervention in our study, flu vaccination did not have a significant effect on any of
our outcomes. While we cannot rule out that the flu vaccine was medically ineffective, we
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find evidence consistent with individuals adopting riskier behaviors after getting vaccinated.
Moral hazard constitutes a second way through which individual behavior could limit the
effectiveness of health interventions.
Our study provides several pieces of evidence that speak to the idea of riskier behaviors
regarding health among vaccinated individuals. We argue that getting the vaccine is not rel-
evant to determine the effects we find on diagnosed non-flu respiratory diseases, where the
vaccine has no immunity effect. It appears that employees made different decisions about
whether to go to the doctor or not, depending on being vaccinated. Furthermore, survey ev-
idence on differences in the likelihood of carrying an umbrella illustrates potential changes
in health-related behaviors following vaccination. These results suggest that getting vacci-
nated could cause moral hazard. Forgoing other protective measures and increasing risky
behaviors could partially explain the ineffectiveness of vaccination and could help under-
stand better why health interventions may sometimes fail. Regarding the interpretation of
the health effects in our study, moral hazard undermining the effectiveness of vaccination
is consistent with quasi-experimental evidence on the effectiveness of flu vaccination. For
example, Ward (2014) finds for Canada that: (i) flu vaccination increased sickness absences
in years when the flu vaccine had a bad match with the prevalent flu viruses; and (ii) flu
vaccination had no effect in years when the flu vaccine had a good match with the prevalent
flu viruses. The difference between these two results, which would control for moral hazard,
points to the immunological benefits of the vaccine.
To answer the question of whether the vaccination campaign was economically success-
ful for the company carrying out this health intervention, we can perform a back-of-the-
envelope calculation of the net benefit of this campaign. This analysis has the limitation
that we are not able to fully quantify all of the possible effects that vaccination may have on
outcomes relevant to the bank, like morale and productivity.34 Our calculation suggests that
34A channel pertaining to company morale is the perception of individuals that the company cares more
about their health when assigned to the work-week which leads them to behave differently. However, we
cannot find evidence for that channel using data on organizational perceptions from our post-survey. Appendix
Table B.8 presents imprecise estimates on self-reported productivity and the duration of the workday measured
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the net benefit of the campaign was negative regarding sick days. In the best-case scenario,
the treatment may result in a net gain of $0.17 regarding gains in work attendance during
the flu season, which is not enough to compensate the bank for its costs that include vaccine
subsidies of $2.57, $5.05 and $9.99 per vaccine.35
Our study allows us to draw practical implications for health interventions in at least
two regards. The presence of moral hazard in health-related behavior implies that firms and
policymakers should consider this phenomenon in the design of interventions like vaccina-
tion campaigns. A promising mechanism to mitigate it could be to increase awareness that
the proposed measure, such as flu vaccination, does not guarantee a 100 percent protection
against illnesses. It might be necessary to remind people to continue making use of other
protective measures against respiratory viruses and bacteria, instead of letting them rely only
on the protection potentially provided by medical technology.
Another lesson learned from our investigation is how to raise participation in health inter-
ventions. In this paper, we could find two cost-effective measures that increase vaccination
take-up in a workplace context where monetary aspects do not seem to play a significant role
in people’s willingness to participate in a health campaign. Decreasing opportunity costs is
one option to increase participation drastically, which suggests using mobile campaigns in
days and locations where people usually congregate. Also, since we find that peer behavior
has an important effect on vaccination take-up, and that following social norm is the potential
mechanism, employers can increase participation in health campaigns by using mechanisms
to incentivize groups of employees. Small rewards for the entire unit when the unit takes
by the employees’ magnetic cards swipes to enter and exit the bank. The point estimates suggest that assigning
employees to get vaccinated in the workweek increased their perception on their productivity, while decreased
the duration of their workday by about a third of an hour. Given that the bank pays a fixed salary, these effects
could suggest an increase in productivity. However, in the absence of more precise measures of productivity,
we cautiously conclude from this analysis that there is no sizable productivity premium. One could argue that
from the perspective of a company, sick days have higher economic relevance, given that this often goes along
with re-assignment of tasks, compared to when some employees are able to finish tasks and leave earlier than
others.
35The estimate’s confidence interval implies that at most assigning employees to the workweek could de-
crease the likelihood of having a flu sick day by 0.5 percentage points. We take the median wage of the bank
($750), divide it by the average number of work days in a month (22), and we multiply this value by 0.005.
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part could have significant effects on participation rates. Evaluating the role of such peer
incentives in health-related contexts is a promising area for future research.
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4. A BLESSING OR A CURSE? THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF RESOURCE
BOOMS ON HUMAN CAPITAL AND LIVING CONDITIONS
4.1 Introduction
Is resource abundance a blessing or a curse for a country? A priori, we would expect
that natural resources boost economic development, but, since the work of Sachs and Warner
(1999, 2001), there is ample suggestive evidence that resource-rich countries tend to under-
perform in several dimensions.1 Of particular concern is the possibility that resource booms
reduce human capital accumulation. These booms are the product of a combination of dis-
coveries, technological changes, and demand shocks that affect prices. These changes may
affect labor market conditions favoring low-skill occupations.2 Standard human capital ac-
cumulation models (Becker, 1964; Black et al., 2005b; Charles et al., 2015) show that an
increase in productivity in low-skill occupations increases the opportunity cost of going to
college and decreases the returns of education. Thus, during a resource boom, it might be
optimal for some individuals to drop out of high school/college and enter the workforce.
However, economic theory does not predict whether these effects are temporary or per-
manent. On the one hand, if individuals anticipate that the resource boom is temporary, they
could plan to return to school at a later date. On the other hand, as time passes, events such
as marriage or having children impose costs on returning to school. Also, the time hori-
zon for the returns of education to realize decreases. These two factors make it less likely
for individuals to resume their education. Hence, the decrease of human capital could be
1There is a large litearture that documents a negative cross-country correlation betwen resource abundance
and economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1999, 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Torvik, 2002; Papyrakis and Gerlagh,
2004, 2007; James and Aadland, 2011). More recent evidence suggests that the apparent negative correlation
between resources and economic growth was the product of endogenous measures of resource abundance (Sti-
jns, 2006; Smith, 2015). There is also country-level evidence that natural resource abundance is negatively
correlated with educational attainment (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004, 2007), although these
results are sensitive to different measures of resource abundance (Stijns, 2006). See Van der Ploeg (2011) for a
review of this literature.
2There is evidence that labor demand shocks from “fracking” favor the less educated (Bartik et al., 2017;
Kearney and Wilson, 2017). In cases where the state owns mineral rights, government policies can facilitate
the development of low-skill, labor-intensive occupations (De La Torre et al., 2015).
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permanent.
In this paper, I use proprietary individual-level data to causally estimate the long-term ef-
fect of the 1970s’ oil boom on educational attainment in the context of a developing country.
In 1973, Ecuador started major oil production and its price skyrocketed due to the Arab em-
bargo. In Ecuador, as in many countries, the state owns all mineral rights, so the government
received a large influx of funds that it targeted to infrastructure spending and subsidies that
affected the country uniformly (Acosta, 2006; World Bank, 1979a). Productivity in low-skill
occupations increased 93 percent because subsidies and price controls lowered the cost of
starting small businesses related to commerce and construction in the entire country (World
Bank, 1979a). I estimate the reduced form effects of exposure to this shock on college com-
pletion measured 40 years after the oil boom.
I use an intensity difference-in-differences design that compares changes in outcomes
across cohorts of individuals who turned 18 before and after 1973, to changes in outcomes
across geographic regions with different costs of college attendance.3 I focus on cohorts
who by 1973 had already decided to go to college or not and compare them to cohorts that
were still in high school and thinking about going or not to college. Specifically, I consider
the cohorts who turned 18 between 1966 and 1979. Also, I show that differences in costs
of attending college across regions imply that shocks that increase the opportunity cost of
education affect these regions differently. Theoretically, individuals go to college when its
benefits are greater than its costs. Lower costs allow students with lower ability and income
to go to college. Hence, the marginal student who attends college from regions with low costs
should have lower ability and lower income than the marginal student from regions with high
costs. This implies that regions with low costs should have higher college attendance, and
that its marginal student should be more sensitive to shocks that increase the productivity
of low-skill jobs. Thus, exposure to the oil boom should affect college completion more in
regions with low costs than in regions with high costs.
3Finkelstein (2007) uses a similar region-based approach to estimate the effect of the introduction of Medi-
care.
76
In Ecuador during the 1970s, differences in the costs of attending college stemmed from
the fact that universities were located only in five cities of the country, with the two largest
cities concentrating college supply.4 This fact, together with drastic altitude differences
across the country that increase transportation costs, implies that people born in regions
without universities faced higher costs of college attendance than people born in regions
with universities. I use regions without universities, which should be the least affected by
the boom, as the baseline group and assign individuals to their region of birth to account for
migration caused by the boom. Thus, this design recovers the change in college comple-
tion in the regions with universities in excess of the change of college completion in regions
without universities. Thus, as long as the oil boom negatively affects college completion in
the baseline regions, I recover a lower bound of the real effect.
I find that in the context of a developing country, exposure to a resource boom negatively
affected completed educational attainment. This represents a stark contrast with studies of
the effect of resource booms on educational attainment in the context of developed countries,
which find that exposure to resource booms decreased high school enrollment in resource-
rich areas in the short-term (Black et al., 2005b; Cascio and Narayan, 2017) but have no
effect on completed educational attainment (Emery et al., 2012).5 In contrast, I find that
exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 decreased college completion in the long-term.
Consistent with the previous theoretical predictions, exposure to the oil boom had heteroge-
neous effects across regions, and the decrease in college completion was driven by the cities
that concentrated the majority of universities at the time (Quito and Guayaquil). In these
cities, exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 decreased college completion by 2.9 per-
4No new universities opened around the time of the oil boom and most universities were public and free at
the time. I use the terms college and university interchangeably.
5There is a larger quasi-experimental literature that considers the effect of natural resource shocks on: (i)
non-resource economic activity (Black et al., 2005a; Michaels, 2011; Marchand, 2012; Allcott and Keniston,
2017); (ii) participation in disability programs (Black et al., 2002); (iii) family income and children education
(Løken, 2010; Løken et al., 2012), (iv) effect of income on health spending (Acemoglu et al., 2013); and
(v) public expenditure and corruption (Caselli and Michaels, 2013). A related literature studies the effects of
shocks that increase the productivity of low-skill occupations, such as housing booms (Charles et al., 2015),
large infrastructure projects (Carrington, 1996), technological changes (Fetzer, 2014; Bartik et al., 2017; Feyrer
et al., 2017), and recessions (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
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centage points, which represents 12.2 percent of baseline college completion for those who
turned 18 just before the oil boom.
The long-term reduction of college completion is consistent with a model of rational
individuals who reduce their educational attainment in response to lower returns of education
in the long-run. I provide four pieces of evidence that support this potential mechanism.
First, exposure to the oil boom increased college completion by 4.5 percentage points (58.5
percent of the baseline) in the Amazon region, where the boom had a direct positive effect
on connectivity and local income because the oil fields are located there. A new highway
connecting this region to the capital reduced the cost of attending college and spillovers from
the oil industry into the local economy contributed to increasing employment in high-skill
jobs from 25 percent in 1962 to 26.8 percent in 1982.
Second, consistent with higher productivity of low-skill jobs (World Bank, 1979a), em-
ployment in the country shifted towards these jobs after the oil boom and this change lasted
long after the boom. Employment in commerce, low-skill services (food preparations, re-
pairs, transportation, housekeeping), construction, and other low-skill occupations increased
from 25.2 percent in 1962 to 39.4 percent in 1982 and 55.5 percent in 2010, while em-
ployment in manufacturing industries decreased from 13.6 percent in 1962 to 12.6 percent in
1982 and 10.1 percent in 2010. Consistently with the shifts in employments and the effect on
education, I find that in the cities with full universities exposure to the oil boom before turn-
ing 18 increased the likelihood of working informally in 2012 by 0.8 percentage points (1.9
percent of the baseline) and decreased this probability by 1.7 percentage points (3 percent of
the baseline) in the Amazon region.
Finally, the literature on the returns of education implies that lower educational attain-
ment should have translated into lower wealth accumulation if the returns of education did
not decrease in the long run.6 However, I find that exposure to the oil boom before turning
18 did not affect two relevant measures of wealth: home ownership in 2010 and vehicle
6See Angrist and Krueger (1991), Card (1993), Harmon and Walker (1995), Card (1999), Card (2001),
Duflo (2001), and Lemieux and Card (2001) for estimates of the effects of education on income.
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ownership in 2013. The point estimates for home ownership in the cities with universities
are smaller than 0.6 percentage points (1 percent of the baseline), and the standard errors
rule out effects larger than two percentage points. Also, I find that exposure to the oil boom
before turning 18 decreased vehicle ownership in these cities by 0.5 percentage points (2.8
percent of the baseline). Together, these results indicate that negative effects on wealth were
limited, which suggests that the oil boom induced a long-term reduction of the returns of
education.
This paper contributes to the literature on factors that affect the growth potential of de-
veloping countries. I show that exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 decreased edu-
cational attainment in the long-run. The results suggest that it was optimal for the exposed
cohorts to interrupt their educational attainment. From an individual perspective, this does
not necessarily imply that the boom was a blessing because it does not account the positive
externalities of education. In particular, I find that exposure to the oil boom before turning
18 increased the number of children in the largest cities by 0.04 (1.7 percent of the baseline).
This estimate, together with no apparent effect on wealth, suggests fewer resources per chil-
dren that together with less educated parents may have affected their development. From the
country’s perspective, lower human capital levels may constrain the development of high-
skill industries (Becker et al., 2011; Becker and Woessmann, 2010), which may hamper the
country’s long-term growth potential.
4.2 Stylized Facts about the Ecuadorian Oil Boom
In the early 1970s, Ecuador found oil in its Amazon region and started major oil produc-
tion in 1972-1973. At the same time, Ecuador benefited from the rise of oil prices due to the
Arab embargo in 1973-1974. We can see the effects of this oil boom in Figure 4.1. Ecuador’s
oil output increased from 0 to 28.6 million barrels in 1972.7 In 1973, output more than dou-
bled to 76.2 million barrels, and it fluctuated around this level in the rest of the decade. Also,
7At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ecuador found small oil deposits in its coast lands. The govern-
ment leased this field to the Anglo-Ecuadorian Oil Company (now part of British Petroleum), who only paid
taxes on its profits. Official statistics do not include output nor revenue from this field.
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in 1974 oil’s price raised from $4.20 per barrel to $13 per barrel (a 210 percent increase),
and it remained at high levels until 1982.
These two shocks had profound implications for Ecuador’s economy. GDP per capita
increased from $503 in 1972 to $983 in 1974 (Figure 4.1, Panel e). Oil became a major
source of fiscal revenue (Figure 4.1 Panels c and d) because in Ecuador the state owns all
mineral rights and is the main actor in the oil industry. From 1973 to 1980, oil revenue
represented 34 percent of total fiscal revenue, up from almost zero in the previous decade.
Non-oil tax revenue continued to increase but at a slower rate. The World Bank (1979a)
estimates that its share decreased from 14.4 percent of non-oil GDP in 1972 to 12 percent in
1977.
The government channeled these funds to new expenditures. According to Ecuador’s
Central Bank, the government’s expenditures, mainly personnel expenses, increased 659
percent from 1972 to 1980. Capital expenditures grew 603 percent. These investments
were focused on expanding the country’s existing highway network and developing new
infrastructure for the oil, electricity, agriculture (irrigation and storage), education, and health
sectors (World Bank, 1979c). The government also financed interest rate subsidies for certain
sectors; price controls on wages and agricultural products; and subsidies on gasoline and
other fuels (World Bank, 1979a; Cisneros et al., 1988; Acosta, 2006). Trade policy included
tariffs on imports of finished products and subsidized imports of intermediate products and
capital goods (Larrea, 1989). All these transfers grew 851 percent from 1972 to 1980. Also,
the abundance of oil funds facilitated an implicit transfer in the form of lax tax collection
efforts.
Notably, the oil boom did not lead to an increase in the industrial sector’s share in the
economy. Until 1965, Ecuador’s economy relied heavily on agriculture, in particular growing
products for export. Ecuador was a major cacao exporter until 1917 and became the world’s
largest banana exporter since the 1950s (Acosta, 2006).
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Figure 4.1: Ecuador’s Oil Boom
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Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of Ecuador’s crude oil output, its price, the government’s rev-
enue from oil exports, and GDP per capita from 1965 to 1980. Oil output data, government’s oil revenue
and GDP per capita is reported by Ecuador’s Central Bank. Oil’s price from 1965 to 1971 is the average
price of OPEC, from 1972 onward it corresponds to the average price of Ecuador’s oil exports as reported
by Ecuador’s Central Bank.
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In 1965, the country followed the rest of Latin America and adopted a series of policies to
promote growth in the industrial sector by replacing imports of manufactured products with
local production. Ecuador maintained these policies throughout the 1970s. However, these
policies were not effective at expanding the manufacturing sector weight in the economy.
According to the World Bank (1979c), the manufacturing sector’s share of real GDP barely
increased from 17 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1977. At the same time, the share of
people working in manufacturing activities fell from 13.6 percent in 1962 to 12.6 percent by
1982 (Figure 4.2).8
We may think that employment in the manufacturing sector fell due to the adoption of
capital-intensive technologies that require fewer but more productive employees. However,
the World Bank (1979a) estimates that value added per worker remained practically constant
for the industrial sector between 1972 to 1975. At the same time, value added per worker
in low-skill non-agricultural sectors increased 93 percent, from $806 to $1,556. Labor pro-
ductivity of low-skill jobs increased after the oil boom because subsidies and price controls
lowered the relative cost of capital in these occupations. For instance, it was cheaper to
purchase small machinery (cooking appliances, drink dispensers, sewing machines) and ve-
hicles than before the oil boom. Higher productivity implied higher earnings for people who
worked in commerce, construction, and low-skill services. Consequently, individuals had
the incentive to work in occupations with lower skill requirements.
Figure 4.2 shows that after the oil boom employment shifted from agriculture to other
low-skill sectors, consistent with the increase in productivity mentioned above. Employment
in agriculture decreased 21.7 percentage points between 1962 and 1982, while employment
in low-skill occupations increased by 14.1 percentage points and employment in high-skill
jobs increased by only 7.5 percentage points.9 Commerce and services concentrated labor
8In 1965, Ecuador also started an agrarian reform with the objective of redistributing land from large
landowners to their workers. According to the World Bank (1979c), this reform was not effective. In 1975, it
distributed only 16 percent of the allocated land to 17 percent of the potential beneficiaries.
9Employment increased in “high-skill” jobs provided by the government (public administration, education,
and health). It is important to note that at that time teachers did not require a college degree, and there were
specialized high schools called normales that trained teachers.
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Figure 4.2: Employment by Sector Before and After the Oil Boom
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Notes: This Figure presents the proportion of the working population employed in each sector of the
economy for 1962 and 1982. Data comes from Ecuador’s 1962, 1982, 1990, 2001 and 2010 population
censuses.
in the country. These dynamics suggest that, at least in the short-run, some individuals
might have chosen to forgo a college education. Moreover, the fact that this change in
employment’s composition lasted until 2010 would be consistent with a long-term reduction
in educational attainment. I study this issue in the rest of the paper.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
4.3.1 The Decisions to Drop Out and Return to School
Human capital accumulation models predict that some individuals may stop their educa-
tion, at least in the short run, because of the large increase in productivity of low-skill jobs
due to the oil boom (Becker, 1964; Black et al., 2005b; Charles et al., 2015). As low skills
jobs become more appealing, particularly for young adults, the opportunity cost of finishing
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high school/going to college increases and the perceived returns of education decrease.
The long run effect of this type of shock is less clear from a theoretical perspective. It is
plausible that individuals take advantage of booms to save and return to school in the future.
This would imply zero long-run effect on educational attainment. However, age imposes
costs on the decision to return to school. First, the horizon to receive the earnings premium
of education decreases as we get older. Second, the cost of returning to school may increase
as time outside school passes. Life events, such as marriage or having children, make it more
difficult to go back to school. These costs imply that if the person has been out of school for
more than a threshold number of years, then the optimal decision is to keep working. This
threshold depends on the gap between high skills and low skills earnings. The smaller the
difference, the shorter the period when it is optimal to return to school. Also, if agents expect
that the natural resource boom will be a permanent shock, then the likelihood of returning
to school decreases. Limited information may induce agents to believe that the shock could
last for a long period.
In summary, the presence of long-term effects of natural resource booms on educational
attainment is an empirical question. It is important to note that a negative long-term effect
on education should imply a long-term increase in employment in low-skill occupations.
4.3.2 Heterogeneity Across Regions
A homogeneous shock that increases the opportunity cost of education or reduces the
returns of education in a country can have heterogeneous effects across its regions if they
have different costs of education. This result follows from the human capital accumulation
model of Charles et al. (2015), who define a model for young adults who differ in ability
θi that follows some distribution Φθ. In this setup, the authors define the lifetime payoff of
going to college in year t as
Rit(θi) =
L−αi∑
k=1
Et[Πt+k|Λt]− (1 + b)F − κ(1− θi)− Y 0t (4.1)
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where the first term (Et[Πt+k|Λt]) captures the expected returns of college attendance condi-
tional on all information available Λt, the second term ((1 + b)F ) is the direct cost of college
attendance (tuition, fees, living costs), the third term (κ(1− θi)) is the psychological cost of
education, and the last term (Y 0t ) is the opportunity cost of college attendance in the form
of lost wages. The authors assume that the lifetime value of going to college is increasing
in ability. This implies that there is an indifferent individual with ability θ∗ such that all
individuals with ability θi ≥ θ∗ choose to go to college.
With this model, I show that a homogeneous shock that increases the opportunity cost
of education or reduces the returns of education in a country can have heterogeneous effects
across its regions. Let us suppose that there are two regions in a country, A and B with
different direct costs of college attendance, FA < FB. This difference implies that for any
underlying distribution of ability, college attendance is larger in region A than in region B.
Now, suppose that both regions are affected by a shock that increases the opportunity cost of
college attendance (Y 0t ) or decreases the returns of education (Et[Πt+k|Λt]) homogeneously
across regions. College attendance will decrease in both regions, but unless the distribution
of ability in the country is uniform, which region is the most affected depends on the mag-
nitude of the difference in costs and the shape of Φθ. Given the shape of the distribution, the
larger the difference in costs, the more likely it is that the cheaper region will be the most
affected. Figure 4.3 presents this result assuming a linear lifetime value of college.
In developing countries, universities are concentrated in few cities increasing the costs
of attending college. In this setup, it is likely that differences in costs are large enough such
that the marginal student from high-cost regions has substantially higher ability and income
than the marginal student from low-cost regions. Thus, the marginal student from high-cost
regions should be less sensitive to shocks, like the oil boom, that increase the productivity
of low-skill jobs. Thus, exposure to the oil boom should affect college completion less in
regions with high costs than in regions with low costs. I use this result to define the base
region to estimate the effects of exposure to the 1973 oil boom with an intensity difference-
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Figure 4.3: Heterogeneity Across Regions with Different Costs of College Attendance
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Notes: This Figure shows how differences in costs of attending college between regions can lead to
differences in the proportion of the populations that discontinues their education in the presence of a
shock that increases the opportunity cost of college attendance homogeneously across regions. Figure
adapted from Charles et al. (2015).
in-differences design.
4.4 Data
I have access to proprietary data from a financial services company that works in Ecuador.
This company collects comprehensive demographic data of the adult population in the coun-
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try to develop credit scoring models.10 I observe gender, year of birth, marital status, number
of children, canton of birth,11 canton of residence, highest completed education level, type
of occupation, income for employees, and car ownership. Also, I use home ownership data
from Ecuador’s 2010 Population Census.12 I focus on the cohorts born in Ecuador between
1948 and 1961 (1,711,538 individuals) to estimate the long-term effects of exposure to the
oil boom before turning 18.
Ideally, to fully control for fluctuations from the life-cycle, we would be able to observe
these cohorts at different points in time when they have the same age. However, the de-
mographic information corresponds to 2014, car ownership to 2013, labor market data to
2012, and home ownership to 2010. This concern is not likely to alter the results because the
observed outcomes should be determined for these cohorts. For instance, the probability of
owning a house should not depend on age, since individuals in the sample were between 49
and 62 years old in 2010. We would expect that the decision of owning a house happened
for most individuals before they turn 49. Also, at 62 individuals are young enough to live
independently in their own home, even if they decided to downsize. Hence, the home own-
ership measure should not be affected by age for these cohorts.13 Similar reasoning applies
to the other outcomes in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the main sample. Women represent 51 percent
of these cohorts, and on average, these individuals were 57 years old in 2014. Table 4.1 also
splits the cohorts into two groups: those individuals who turned 18 years old before the oil
boom in 1973 (born in 1948-1954) and those individuals who turned 18 after the oil boom
(born in 1955-1961). There is no difference in the proportion of women between the two
10Sources include banks, other financial institutions, and web scrapping to fill gaps. Credit applications
collect demographic information from Ecuador’s national identification cards.
11A canton is an administrative division similar to a U.S. county.
12The complete census database is publicly available from Ecuador’s national statistics agency and it can
be downloaded from http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/base-de-datos-censo-de-poblacion-y-vivienda/. See
Rivadeneira and Zumarraga (2011) for the complete description of the Census and the information it collects. I
also use 10 percent random samples from Ecuador’s population censuses of 1962, 1974 and 1982 to construct
labor participation statistics reported in Section 4.2. These data are reported by Minnesota Population Center
(2017), which collected the data from Ecuador’s national statistics agency.
13Home value could be changing, but this variable is not present in the data.
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Table 4.1: Sample Means
Full Sample Born in 1948-1954 Born in 1955-1961
Women 0.51 0.51 0.51
Age 56.73 60.78 53.84
No Education 0.15 0.18 0.12
Primary Education 0.47 0.49 0.45
Secondary Education 0.26 0.21 0.28
College Education 0.13 0.12 0.14
Years of education 8.18 7.60 8.59
Informal Workers 2012 0.53 0.56 0.51
Employees 2012 0.15 0.13 0.17
Professional Workers 2012 0.32 0.31 0.33
Monthly Wage Employees 2012 974.90 1039.17 939.50
Vehicle Owners 2013 0.17 0.16 0.17
Average age of vehicle 2013 16.09 16.92 15.54
Home Owners 2010 0.78 0.81 0.76
Home Owners with More than 2 Rooms 2010 0.57 0.59 0.56
Home Owners with Home above Median Quality 2010 0.33 0.34 0.32
Notes: this Table presents sample means for a subset of variables that characterize the data. The data corresponds to 2014 unless otherwise
noted. Column 1 presents means for the full sample, that is individuals who were born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1961. Column 2
considers individuals born between 1948 and 1954, that is the cohorts who turned 18 years old before the oil boom in 1973. Column
3 considers individuals born between 1955 and 1961, that is the cohorts who turned 18 years old after the oil boom in 1973. Informal
workers are people who work in low skills occupations, often self-employed, and who are not fully declaring taxes. Employees are people
who work for a firm and receive a monthly wage. Professional workers are people who work independently and are registered with the
Ecuadorian tax office.
groups. The proportion of people with primary education or less is smaller for those cohorts
exposed to the oil boom before turning 18, while the proportion of people with secondary
education or more is larger.
Table 4.1 also presents labor participation indicators as of 2012 to ensure that the majority
of the sample is still active in the labor market.14 The data have three labor participation
categories: (i) informal workers, people who work in low skills occupations, often self-
employed, and who are not fully declaring taxes; (ii) employees, people who work for a firm
and receive a monthly wage; and (iii) professional workers, people who work independently
and are registered with the Ecuadorian tax office. More than 50 percent of these cohorts were
informal workers in 2012, with a slight drop for those who turned 18 after the oil boom.
14In 2012, those individuals born in 1948 were 64 years old, below the legal threshold for retirement.
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I use home and vehicle ownership as proxies of wealth. We can observe that only 17
percent of the individuals born between 1948 and 1961 own at least one vehicle. This pro-
portion is similar for the younger cohorts. Home ownership rate is close to 80 percent. It
is important to note that in developing countries the quality of housing is a relevant issue.
Hence, home ownership decreases to 57 percent if we consider owning a house with more
than two rooms. I also use principal components analysis to combine data from the Census
on the type of construction, materials used, water source, type of sewage and garbage dis-
posal into an index of housing quality. Home ownership of houses above the median of the
quality index is 33 percent. There are no substantial differences in home ownership between
individuals who turned 18 years old before and after the boom.
4.5 The Long-Term Effect of the Oil Boom on Human Capital Accumulation
4.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
While Table 4.1 is useful to characterize the sample, it hides the evolution of the different
variables across birth cohorts, which is important to identify the effect of being exposed to
the oil boom before turning 18. Figure 4.4 presents the evolution of the highest completed
schooling level for individuals born in Ecuador between 1940 and 1961.15 For example, if a
person dropped high school, then her highest completed education level is elementary school.
The Figure shows that the proportion of people with no education or elementary education
was decreasing, while the proportion of individuals with secondary education or college was
increasing for those born until 1955.16 These trends are expected for a developing country.17
However, there is a major kink in educational attainment for cohorts who turned 18 after
15Cohorts born in 1962 and after are affected by a series of additional shocks: a short war in 1981, the oil
bust and a declaration of default in 1982, and an earthquake in 1986 that destroyed the only oil pipeline in the
country. These shocks confound each other, so I focus on the effect of the oil boom.
16Elementary school includes grades 1 to 6, secondary school includes grades 7 to 12.
17Economic conditions were fairly stable until 1973, and the economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.4
percent from 1960 to 1973. It is important to note that a civilian dictator ruled Ecuador from June 1970 to
February 1972, who was replaced by a military dictatorship from February 1972 to August 1979. However,
this was a peaceful period in contrast with other dictatorships in Latin America. Also, there are no dips in
college completion in 1970, 1971 and 1972 which would have been consistent with repression at the beginning
of a dictatorship.
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Figure 4.4: Highest Level of Education Attainment by Birth Cohort
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Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the highest completed schooling level for the cohorts born in
Ecuador between 1940 and 1961. For example, if a person dropped high school before completing 12th grade,
then she completed elementary school. The cohorts born between 1955 and 1961 (red triangles) turned 18
during the oil boom in the 1970s.
the oil boom. College completion flattens and decreases for the cohorts born between 1955
and 1961 (red triangles in Figure 4.4). Naively, if we extend the pre-1955 trend, Figure 4.4
Panel (d) suggests that exposure to the oil boom at the end of high school decreased college
completion by around two percentage points. Consequently, the positive trend of secondary
education becomes steeper (Panel c), and the negative trend of elementary education flattens
(Panel b). These changes suggest that college completion drops due to a mix of people who
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choose not to enter/complete college and people who choose to drop out of high school.18
This abrupt change in college completion is consistent with the increase in productivity
of low-skill jobs induced by the oil boom. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, higher productivity
of low skill occupations increases the opportunity cost of education, which induces some
individuals to interrupt high school/college completion in the short term. However, if the
returns of education decreased in the long-run, the cost of returning to school were increasing
in age, or agents believed that the shock was going to last long, then some people could have
chosen not to return to school, leading to the observed drop in college completion in 2014.
Figure 4.4 also shows that there is no apparent change in the trend of people with no ed-
ucation for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. This lack of change suggests that there
were no other shocks that affected educational attainment of these cohorts when they were
younger that could explain the reduction in college education. Hence, the only difference
for cohorts who turned 18 years old around 1973, is that for some people the boom occurred
when they were already attending college, while for others it occurred when they were com-
pleting high school and thinking about going to college. In the next sections, I develop an
empirical strategy to estimate this effect more rigorously.
4.5.2 Regional Variation in the Costs of College Attendance
In Section 4.3.2, I show that if regions in a country have different costs of college at-
tendance, then we should expect that a shock that increases low-skill productivity affects
more regions with low costs than regions with high costs regarding college completion. In
Ecuador during the 1970s, geographic differences in these costs stem from the fact that uni-
versities were located only in five cities of the country with no new openings in that period
(Figure 4.5). Four universities where located in Quito, the capital, three in Guayaquil, three
in Cuenca, and one in Loja that also had a second campus in the north to the country. More-
over, only universities in Quito and Guayaquil offered majors in every field of study, the
18Formal child labor was illegal, but children were allowed to work informally in agriculture or other low-
skill jobs.
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Figure 4.5: Cities with Universities in Ecuador Before the Oil Boom
University
No data
Notes: This Figure shows the geographical distribution of the cities with universities in Ecuador before the oil
boom.
other cities only had access to majors related to law and the humanities (liberal arts). The
rest of the country only had agricultural technical schools.19
Attending college was cheaper for individuals who lived in the cities with universities
due to lower living, travel, and information costs (most universities were public and free at
that time). In Ecuador, it is very common for young adults to live with their parents until
their early 30s, specially while they are still studying.20 Thus, people born in a city with
universities could live with their parents while they studied, significantly lowering the cost
19Only one new technical school opened in 1973. These schools are coded as secondary in Figure 4.4.
Appendix Table C.2 lists all universities and technical school that functioned until 1989.
20In 1974, 36.5 percent of all adults between 18 and 30 years old lived with their parents. This share increases
to 46.5 percent if we consider people aged 18 to 24. For comparison, Vespa (2017) reports that in 1975, 26
percent of adults aged 18 to 34 lived with their parents or in college dorms in the United States.
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of education. These students did not have to rent a place to live (Ecuadorian universities do
not offer dorms).
Figure 4.6: Regions by Cost of College Attendance
(a) Altitude Map
(b) Regions by Cost of College Attendance
Notes: Panel (a) presents an altitude map for Ecuador. Roughly, the country can be divided into 4
regions by the mountain ranges that cross the country. In Panel (b) I combine geographic regions
with the location of universities before the oil boom to divide the country in 4 different areas.
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Altitude differences partly determined the distribution of universities in the country and
increased transportation costs, which lowered the cost of attending college for people who
lived in cities with universities. The Andes mountains split the country into four regions
(Figure 4.6 Panel a). Altitude fluctuates sharply across these regions. For example, in a
horizontal distance of 190 miles, altitude increases from sea level to 16,000 feet and drops to
800 feet. This last region corresponds to the Amazon jungle, which was sparsely populated
before the oil boom, had minimal agricultural activities, and had a deficient road network
within the region and with the rest of the country (World Bank, 1979b).21 The sharp dif-
ferences in altitude increased travel times and costs within relatively short distances. For
instance, travel between the two largest cities of the country in the 1970s took half an hour
by airplane or 10 hours by car.
I define four areas with different costs of college attendance combining the location of the
universities with the four geographic regions (Figure 4.6 Panel b). The first area corresponds
to regions without universities that had the highest costs of college attendance. The second
area corresponds to the Amazon region. While this region did not have universities at the
time, the oil fields were located there. The government built a new highway that connected
the Amazon region directly to the capital city of Quito to access the oil fields (Acosta, 2006).
Also, spillovers from the oil industry into the local economy and direct transfers from the
government to municipalities in this region contributed to increasing employment in high-
skill occupations from 25 percent in 1962 to 26.8 percent in 1982. These two factors suggest
that the cost of college attendance might have decreased in this region for the cohorts who
turned 18 after the oil boom compared to the rest of the country that did not have universities.
The third region in Figure 4.6 Panel (b) corresponds to areas of influence of the cities of
Cuenca, Loja, and Ibarra that had access to liberal arts colleges. The last region corresponds
to the cities of Quito and Guayaquil that had access to full universities and the lowest costs.
21Ecuador has an additional region, the Galapagos Islands that lie 1,000 kilometers of its coast. I do not
include this region in the analysis because these islands had almost no population and were isolated from the
continent at the time of the oil boom.
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4.5.3 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 on college comple-
tion, I use an intensity difference-in-differences design that compares changes in outcomes
across cohorts of individuals who turned 18 before and after 1973, to changes in outcomes
across geographic regions with different costs of college attendance.22
In line with higher costs of attending college and the theoretical discussion in Section
4.3.2, Appendix Figure C.2 shows that for cohorts who turned 18 before the oil boom, re-
gions without universities had substantially lower levels of college attendance than regions
with full universities. Almost seven percent of the cohort born in 1948 in regions with-
out universities completed college, while 16 percent of their peers born in the major cities
achieved this goal. This gap of eight percentage points increased to 12 percentage points
for the cohort of 1954. These magnitudes suggest that differences in the cost of attendance
were large enough such that the marginal student who attended college from regions without
universities had substantial higher ability and income than the marginal student from regions
with universities. As predicted by the theoretical model, this implies that regions without
universities should be the least affected by the oil boom. I use these regions as the baseline
group for the intensity difference-in-differences design.
This design estimates the change in college completion in the regions with universities
in excess of the change of college completion in regions without universities. Hence, as long
as the oil boom negatively affects college completion in the baseline region (suggested by
Appendix Figure C.2), I recover a lower bound of the real effect. Specifically, for individual
i, born in region r in year t, I estimate
college completionirt = αr + αt + λrt+
∑
r 6=NoU
1961∑
t>1948
θrtregionr · yeart + uirt (4.2)
22Finkelstein (2007) uses a similar design to evaluate the effects of the introduction of Medicare comparing
highly affected regions in the United States to less affected regions. For other applications of this type of design
see Acemoglu et al. (2004), Gregg et al. (2006), Baez (2011), and Felfe et al. (2015).
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where I include region and year of birth fixed effects, αr and αt. The coefficients θrt capture
the effect of exposure to the oil boom. We can interpret these estimates as the change in
college completion since 1948 in each region in excess of the change observed in the regions
without universities. Finally, I control for differential trends in outcomes for cohorts who
turned 18 before the oil boom, λrt.23 Appendix Figure C.2 shows that regions with full uni-
versities not only had a higher level of college completion but also had a steeper trend across
birth cohorts than regions without universities. These differences in trends are consistent
with the fact that regions with full universities had the lowest costs of college attendance
and were the richest cities in the country. Also, these trends capture any remaining variation
from age differences and the life cycle across cohorts.
The identification assumption is that if exposure to the oil boom had no effect, then any
difference in college completion across regions would have continued on the same trends.
Given this assumption, there are two main concerns to interpreting θrt as the causal effect of
exposure to the oil boom before turning 18. Migration across regions due to the oil boom
presents the first threat to identification. Velasco (1988) using data from the 1962, 1974 and
1982 population censuses shows that during the oil boom Quito and Guayaquil received an
influx of immigrants from the rest of the country. The author argues that increased earnings
for low-skill occupations drove migration, implying that cities with full universities have a
larger proportion of people who did not go to college and would not have gone regardless of
the oil boom. In this case, using the current place of residence would overestimate the effect.
To address this concern, I assign individuals to regions using their canton of birth.
The second identification challenge is that there could be other shocks that have different
effects across cohorts or regions. For example, an earlier shock that increased fertility after
1955 in areas without universities could have increased the proportion of people with no
education in this region, which mechanically decreases the proportion of people who com-
pleted college. This shock would bias the estimates downwards. Conversly, the estimates
23These trends capture the fact that in developing countries younger cohorts are increasingly more educated
than their older peers.
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would be biased upwards if college educated individuals born in cites with full universities
after 1955 were more likely to migrate to other countries than older cohorts. To asses if
shocks that affect the population’s composition are a concern, I apply a version of McCrary
(2008) population density test. This type of shocks would create discontinuities or kinks in
the distribution of the population who turned 18 years old around the oil boom. Appendix
Figure C.1 shows that there are no significant discontinuities nor changes in the trend of the
proportions of the population who turned 18 before the oil boom (born in 1948-1954) and
after the oil boom (1955-1961). The trends are almost identical across regions. These results
suggest that shocks related to changes in the population (fertility, migration) are not driving
the results.
I follow Abadie et al. (2017) to determine the appropriate way to calculate standard er-
rors. The data in this paper is a cross-section, where the outcomes for the different cohorts
are measured at the same point in time. In this case, Abadie et al. (2017) find that in models
that include fixed effects we should use cluster robust standard errors if either (i) there is
clustering in the sample and there are heterogeneous treatment effects; or (ii) there is cluster-
ing in treatment assignment, and there are heterogeneous treatment effects. In this research,
we can rule out (i) because the sample consists of the entire population born between 1948
and 1961. Concerning (ii), Abadie et al. (2017) define that there is clustering in treatment
assignment when the probability that individual i is assigned to treatment is correlated with
assignment to the treatment of other individuals in the same region. The extreme case would
be that all individuals in a region have the same treatment assignment. In this research,
treatment is turning 18 after 1973. Thus, in the absence of past regional shocks that affect
fertility, (Appendix Figure C.1), in any given region the probability that one individual turns
18 after the oil boom should not be not correlated with other individuals in the region turning
18 before or after the boom. Hence, heteroskedastic robust standard errors should be suffi-
cient since neither (i) nor (ii) hold. For robustness, I also report standard errors clustered at
the canton level (215 clusters) that would account for unobserved, local shocks to fertility.
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4.5.4 Results
Figure 4.7: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on College Completion
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the effect of exposure to the oil
boom before turning 18 on the probability of graduating from college. The region without universities is the
base region.
Figure 4.7 and Table 4.2 present the estimates of the effect of exposure to the oil boom
before turning 18 on college completion. Figure 4.7 confirms that college completion had
different trends across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. Regions with full
universities and liberal arts colleges had steeper trends than regions with no universities, and
the Amazon region had a lower trend than regions with no universities. These differences are
consistent with the different costs of college attendance across regions discussed in Section
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Table 4.2: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on College Completion
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full -0.0028 -0.0038 -0.0137 -0.0290 -0.0408 -0.0461 -0.0508 -0.0286
Universities (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0045)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0043)***
(0.0031) (0.0021)* (0.0034)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0047)***
Liberal 0.0029 0.0086 0.0068 0.0060 0.0090 0.0063 0.0048 0.0064
Arts (0.0034) (0.0037)** (0.0040)* (0.0043) (0.0047)* (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0037)*
(0.0027) (0.0038)** (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0095) (0.0112) (0.0064)
Amazon 0.0146 0.0318 0.0285 0.0469 0.0553 0.0603 0.0629 0.0450
Region (0.0083)* (0.0092)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0092)***
(0.0105) (0.0095)*** (0.0122)** (0.0137)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0203)*** (0.0194)*** (0.0133)***
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 on the probability of graduating from college for the cohorts born
in 1955-1961. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects across cohorts using using
population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The second
row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends across regions for the cohorts
who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (n = 1, 711, 538).
4.5.2 and disappear after controlling for linear trends in the regression. Thus, from this point
onward, I control for trends in all estimates.
Table 4.2 presents the estimates of the effect of exposure to the oil before turning 18.
The first seven columns show the coefficients plotted in Figure 4.7 for the cohorts born
between 1955 and 1961, and the last column averages these effect across cohorts weighting
the estimates by population. In all regions, the effects get larger for the youngest cohorts
in the sample. This pattern is consistent with longer exposure to the oil boom, which gives
younger individuals more time to see the shift in the labor market towards low-skill jobs and
perceive decreasing returns of education. A longer exposure may also bias their perception
regarding the expected duration of the boom. Thus, it is possible that younger individuals
were more likely to believe that the boom was a permanent change in the economy.
Table 4.2 shows that regions with full universities were the most affected by the oil boom,
which is consistent with the model in Section 4.3.2. On average, exposure to the oil boom
decreased college completion by 2.9 percentage points for the cohorts born in 1955-1961 in
these cities. This change represents 12.2 percent of the college completion rate of individuals
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who turned 18 in 1954.24 In contrast, college completion did not significantly change for the
region with liberal arts colleges.
The estimates in Table 4.2 also show that exposure to the oil boom increased college
completion in the Amazon region by 4.5 percentage points for the cohorts born in 1955-1961,
which represents 58.5 percent of the baseline. As mentioned above, in 1973, the government
built a new road connecting the Amazon region with Quito as part of the construction of an
oil pipeline. This road decreased the cost of attending universities located in the capital,
which could explain why education increased for people born in that region. Also, spillovers
from the oil industry into the local economy and direct transfers from the government to
municipalities in this region contributed to increasing employment in high-skill occupations,
which could also explain the increase in college completion, particularly for the younger
cohorts.
Appendix Table C.3 presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18
by gender. The point estimates for both regions with full universities and the Amazon re-
gion are larger for men than for women, although most of the differences are not statistically
significant. On average, for the cohorts born in 1955-1961, exposure to the oil boom de-
creased college completion by 1.8 percentage points (9.9 percent of the baseline) for women
in cities with universities and by 3.9 percentage points for men (13.7 percent of the baseline).
Exposure to the oil boom affected women in the younger cohorts (born in 1958 and after),
while affected almost all the men who turned 18 after the boom (born in 1956 and after).
This difference is consistent with men being affected first by the increase in infrastructure
spending and construction that followed the oil boom, while women were affected by the
increase in low-skill productivity that followed. In the Amazon region, exposure to the oil
boom increased college completion by 3.6 percentage points (56.3 percent of the baseline)
for women and by 5.4 percentage points for men (59.9 percent of the baseline). There is no
significant effect in the regions with liberal arts colleges for both genders.
24Throughout the paper I will refer to the 1954 cohort as the baseline for all comparisons
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4.5.5 Further Evidence for the Validity of the Research Design
This section reports the results from two additional tests on the validity on the previous
results.
4.5.5.1 Unobserved Shocks on Early Educational Attainment
Other shocks that had different effects across cohorts or regions could be the main threat
to identification. In Section 4.5.3, I present results that suggest that shocks associated with
fertility or migration outside Ecuador are not driving the results. However, changes that
directly affect early educational attainment could still be a concern. Specifically, two types
of shocks would prevent us from interpreting the estimates in Table 4.2 as the causal effect
of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18. First, if for some reason the proportion of
people with no education increased more in cities with full universities than in regions with
no universities, then the effects in Table 4.2 would be a consequence of this shock and not
of exposure to the oil boom. For instance, in 1965, Ecuador started an agrarian reform to
redistribute land from large landowners. In that year the cohorts born in 1955-1961 had ten
years or less, and their educational attainment may have stopped if their parents decided to
take advantage of this policy. Second, the same interpretation concern would arise if some
policy decreased the proportion of people with no education in the Amazon region more than
in regions with no universities. At that time, missionaries frequently visited the Amazon
region to improve education.
I check for effects of unobserved shocks on the probability of not completing any edu-
cational level for those individuals who turned 18 years old after 1973. Table 4.3, Appendix
Figure C.3, and Appendix Figure C.4 show these results. These estimates go in the opposite
direction of the hypothesized concerns. Compared to regions without universities, the pro-
portion of people with no education decreased in cities with full universities (1.3 percentage
points, 23.4 percent of the baseline) and increased in the Amazon region (5.1 percentage
points, 26.9 percent of the baseline). Thus, if there is any confounding effect, unobserved
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Table 4.3: Effects on the Probability of Not Completing Any Educational Level
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full -0.0111 -0.0085 -0.0116 -0.0151 -0.0128 -0.0155 -0.0119 -0.0125
Universities (0.0027)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0036)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0047)** (0.0033)***
(0.0028)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0034)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0048)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0058)** (0.0039)***
Liberal -0.0081 0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0077 -0.0036 -0.0035
Arts (0.0037)** (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0044)
(0.0044)* (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0058)
Amazon 0.0085 0.0252 0.0263 0.0416 0.0591 0.0813 0.0885 0.0508
Region (0.0118) (0.0128)** (0.0141)* (0.0156)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0208)*** (0.0147)***
(0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0169) (0.0213)* (0.0222)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0316)*** (0.0204)**
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effects of unobserved shocks on the probability of not completing any educational level for the cohorts born in 1955-1961. The
first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects across cohorts using using population as weights.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The second row of standard errors are
clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973.
The estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (n = 1, 711, 538).
shocks that affect early educational attainment are attenuating the effect of exposure to the
oil boom before turning 18 on college completion.
4.5.5.2 Are the Estimates a Lower Bound of the True Effect?
As mentioned above, the results in Section 4.5.4 are the change in college completion
in the different regions in excess of the change of college completion in the regions with
no universities. If exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 had a small, negative effect
on educational attainment in these regions, as suggested by Appendix Figure C.2, then the
estimates are a lower bound of the real effect. However, if exposure to the oil boom had
a positive effect on educational attainment in the regions without universities, then the es-
timates in Section 4.5.4 would overstate the effect. To address this concern, I re-estimate
Equation 4.2 using people who became Ecuadorian by naturalization as the control group.
According to Ecuador’s 2010 census, 82.3 percent of these individuals entered Ecuador af-
ter they turned 18 and 75.7 percent after they turned 24. While 18 percent of naturalized
Ecuadorians could have been exposed to the oil boom, Figure 4.8 shows that there is no
change in the level or trend of college completion between foreign-born individuals who
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Figure 4.8: College Completion for Native Born and Foreign Born
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Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of college completion for individuals born between 1940 and 1961.
Blue circles and red triangles represent people born in Ecuador. The cohorts born between 1955 and 1961
(red triangles) turned 18 years old during the oil boom in the 1970s. The black squares represent people born
outside of Ecuador, who became Ecuadorians later in life, most likely after the oil boom.
turned 18 years old before and after 1973. Thus, it is likely that for the majority of this group
the decision to go to college was not affected by Ecuador’s oil boom.25
Table 4.4 presents these results. The estimates follow the same pattern but are two to
four times larger than the estimates in Table 4.2. Cities with full universities are still the
most affected region. On average, exposure to the oil boom decreased college completion
by 7.7 percentage points for the cohorts born in 1955-1961 in these areas (32.9 percent of
the baseline). Additionally, these results indicate that exposure to the oil boom decreased
25However, it is also possible that these individuals became Ecuadorians because of the oil boom. Thus, it is
not valid to use naturalized Ecuadorians as a control for outcomes related to the labor market and wealth.
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Table 4.4: Effects on College Completion using Foreign-Born Ecuadorians as Control
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full -0.0218 -0.0392 -0.0357 -0.0776 -0.0950 -0.1215 -0.1224 -0.0772
Universities (0.0121)* (0.0132)*** (0.0144)** (0.0159)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0189)*** (0.0204)*** (0.0139)***
(0.0027)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0038)***
Liberal -0.0161 -0.0268 -0.0152 -0.0426 -0.0452 -0.0690 -0.0668 -0.0417
Arts (0.0119) (0.0131)** (0.0143) (0.0157)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0187)*** (0.0202)*** (0.0136)***
(0.0022)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0043)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0085)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0058)***
Amazon -0.0044 -0.0036 0.0065 -0.0017 0.0011 -0.0151 -0.0087 -0.0041
Region (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0219) (0.0236) (0.0162)
(0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0122) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0130)
No -0.0190 -0.0354 -0.0220 -0.0486 -0.0543 -0.0753 -0.0716 -0.0481
Universities (0.0117) (0.0128)*** (0.0140) (0.0154)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0183)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0133)***
(0.0016)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0042)*** (0.0027)***
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 on the probability of graduating from college for the cohorts born in 1955-
1961 using Foreign-Born Ecuadorians as control. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects
across cohorts using using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust
standard errors. The second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends across
regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (n = 1, 754, 059).
college completion by 4.8 percentage points for the cohorts born in 1955-1961 in regions
without universities (42.9 percent of the baseline). This effect is similar to that of regions
with liberal arts colleges, where exposure to the oil boom decreased college completion by
4.2 percentage points. The difference in the point estimates between these two regions is
not statistically significant for any cohort, consistent with the main results. These results
confirm that we can take the main estimates in in Table 4.2 as a conservative measure of the
true effect.
In this specification, exposure to the oil boom did not affect college completion in the
Amazon region. The fact that in this region there is no effect when compared to foreign-
born individuals while there is a positive effect when compared to the other regions without
universities in Ecuador suggests that the presence of the oil industry countered the increase
of low-skill productivity that affected the country. As mentioned above, the oil industry
may have unintentionally decreased the cost of college attendance in the Amazon region by
improving connectivity with Quito and enhancing the local economy.
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In conclusion, the previous results show that exposure to the 1973 oil boom before turn-
ing 18 caused a drop in educational attainment on those who turned 18 years old after the
oil boom. In the next Section, I discuss the potential mechanisms behind this long-term
reduction in human capital.
4.6 Potential Mechanisms Behind the Long-term Reduction in Educational Attain-
ment
The results in Section 4.5 provide quasi-experimental evidence that a natural resource
boom can cause a permanent decrease in completed educational attainment. However, the
theoretical models in Section 4.3.1 imply that there could be more than one mechanism
behind this effect and its long-term consequences on welfare. On the one hand, if the increase
of low-skill earnings is large enough, it may compensate for the loss of human capital over
a person’s lifetime. In the same line, the temporary resource boom could create a permanent
shift in the structure of the economy towards low-skill jobs, lowering the long-term returns of
education. In these cases, it would be optimal for rational individuals not to return to school,
and there would be no long-term effect on wealth. On the other hand, limited information
about the resource boom or time inconsistent preferences (Sutter et al., 2013; Castillo et al.,
2011; Cadena and Keys, 2015) can lead to a long-run reduction in educational attainment and
wealth. Lack of information or present-biased preferences can make individuals overstate the
expected duration of the boom. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, when myopic agents realize
that the boom ended, age related costs may prevent them from resuming their education.
In this case, we would observe a negative long-term effect on educational attainment, and
potentially a decrease in lifetime wealth, creating a “lost generation”.
To bring light on the mechanism, in this Section I discuss four pieces of evidence: (i) the
effects of college completion in the Amazon region, (ii) general shifts in employment from
1962 to 2010, (iii) the effect of exposure to the oil boom of working in low-skill occupations,
and (iv) the effect of exposure to the oil boom on wealth.
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4.6.1 College Completion Increased in the Amazon Region
In Section 4.5.4, I find that exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 increased college
completion in the Amazon region. This region is the only in Ecuador where the oil boom
plausibly had a positive effect on jobs that require higher skills. Thus, it is possible that the
returns of education increased after the oil boom in this region. If this is the case, rational
individuals would increase their educational attainment.
Before the oil boom, the Amazon region was sparsely populated before the oil boom and
poorly connected with the rest of the country. It only had one highway that connected it to
the rest of the country. Agriculture, commerce, and other low-skill services concentrated 70
percent of employment in the region. This situation changed dramatically after the oil boom.
The oil boom had a direct positive effect on connectivity and income in the Amazon region
because all the new oil fields that started production in 1973 are there. Hence, the government
built a new highway that connected the Amazon region directly to the capital city of Quito to
access the oil fields. It also passed a new law establishing that municipalities in the Amazon
region receive 10 percent of fiscal revenue from oil. This transfer plus spillovers from the oil
industry into the local economy (Bartik et al., 2017) contributed to increasing employment
in high-skill occupations from 25 percent in 1962 to 26.8 percent in 1982, the highest change
in the country.
4.6.2 The Structure of the Labor Market Shifted to Low-skill Occupations
As discussed in Section 4.2, the oil boom led to an increase in productivity of low-skill
occupations (93 percent between 1972 and 1975) because oil revenue enabled the govern-
ment to finance subsidies and price controls that lowered the cost of starting small busi-
nesses related to commerce and construction in the entire country (World Bank, 1979a). As
a consequence, Figure 4.2 shows that employment composition in Ecuador changed after the
oil boom. Employment in commerce, low-skill services (food preparations, repairs, trans-
portation, housekeeping), construction, and other low-skill occupations increased from 25.2
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percent in 1962 to 33.44 percent in 1982, while employment in manufacturing industries de-
creased from 13.6 percent in 1962 to 12.6 percent in 1982. More generally, Figure 4.2 shows
that after the oil boom employment mainly shifted from agriculture to low-skill services.
Employment in agriculture decreased 21.7 percentage points between 1962 and 1982, while
employment in low-skill occupations increased by 14.1 percentage points and employment
in high-skill jobs increased by only 7.5 percentage points in jobs provided by the government
(public administration, health, and education).
This composition change in employment did not revert nor switch to high-skill occupa-
tions after the oil boom. Low-skill jobs importance in the economy grew until 2010. Figure
4.2 shows that agriculture’s share in employment decreased until 2010, which is expected
for a developing country as it improves living conditions. However, employment shifted to
low-skill services and not to occupations that require higher skills. In particular, in 1982
the share of non-agriculture low-skill jobs was 39.4 percent and increased to 55.5 percent in
2010, while the share of high-skill occupations decreased from 25.8 percent to 22.8 percent
in the same period. These changes in employment’s composition suggest that the oil boom
changed the structure of the labor market by enhancing the importance of low-skill jobs.
This change would decrease the returns of education in the country in the long-run.
4.6.3 Are Long-term Labor Market Effects Consistent with the Changes in Educa-
tional Attainment?
The theoretical discussion in Section 4.3 implies that a long-term reduction in educational
attainment should come in hand with a long-term increase in the probability of working in
low-skill jobs. This response should be more marked if employment in the country shifted
towards these occupations. Ideally, I would estimate the effect of exposure to the oil boom
on the probability of working on these jobs, but the available data do not report specific
occupations. The data have an aggregate measure that classifies a person as an “informal”
worker if at least one of the three following conditions holds: (i) the person works in a low-
skill job (as an employee or self-employed); (ii) the person is retired; or (iii) the person has
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Table 4.5: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on Informal Employment
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full 0.0013 0.0042 -0.0020 0.0095 0.0092 0.0163 0.0151 0.0082
Universities (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0074)** (0.0081)* (0.0056)
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0094) (0.0178) (0.0170) (0.0094)
Liberal -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0024 0.0001 0.0037 0.0016 -0.0008
Arts (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0086) (0.0059)
(0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0117) (0.0074)
Amazon 0.0095 -0.0166 -0.0282 -0.0188 -0.0216 -0.0191 -0.0169 -0.0166
Region (0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0177) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0249) (0.0174)
(0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0232) (0.0239) (0.0262) (0.0362) (0.0351) (0.0240)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the probability of working informally informally in 2012
for the cohorts born in 1955-1961. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average
of these effects across cohorts using using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard
errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for
robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The
estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (n = 1, 711, 538).
working age but is not registered with the Ecuadorian tax office. I estimate the effect of
exposure to the oil boom on this measure of informality in 2012. Given the definition of
informality in the data, retired individuals would bias the estimates towards zero because
they are classified as informal workers. However, in 2012, the majority of the sample was
still active in the labor market. In that year, those individuals born in 1948 were 64 years
old, below the legal threshold for retirement.
For the cohorts born in 1955-1961, exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 increased
the probability of working informally by 0.8 percentage points (1.9 percent of the baseline)
in the cities with full universities and decreased this probability by 1.7 percentage points (3
percent of the baseline) in the Amazon region (Table 4.5, Appendix Figure C.5, and Appendix
Figure C.6). There is no statistically or economically significant change in the probability of
working informally in regions with liberal arts colleges, where there is no effect on college
completion.26 Overall, these results are consistent with the changes in educational attainment
26According to Ecuador’s Labor Survey of December 2012, informal workers earn on average $195 per
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in these regions and with a labor market oriented to low-skill jobs.
4.6.4 Long-term Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom on Wealth
If the returns of education did not decrease in the long run, the literature on the returns
of education implies that a reduction in educational attainment should have translated into
lower levels of wealth. However, if wealth is not affected in the long-run, this would be
consistent with rational individuals optimally choosing to stop their education. To analyze
the long-term effects of exposure to the oil boom, I proxy wealth through home ownership
in 2010 and vehicle ownership in 2013. As discussed in Section 4.4, fluctuations from the
life-cycle should not be an important concern, given these individuals’ age in 2010 and in
2013.
In Ecuador and other developing countries, the quality of housing is a relevant issue to
determine wealth. It is common that poor households split their land to give their children
a place to build a small house when they marry. Thus, home ownership rate is close to 80
percent for those born in 1948-1961, but it does not necessarily reflect wealth. To better
capture wealth, I follow two approaches. First, I estimate the effect of exposure to the oil
boom on the probability of owning a house with more than two rooms. Second, I construct
an index of housing quality combining data on the type of construction; materials used in
floors, walls, and ceilings; water source; type of sewage; and garbage disposal. In Ecuador,
brick and mortar houses are of higher quality than wood houses, and the type of water source
(tap/well/creek) and the type of waste disposal (sewage/septic tank/open) also signal higher
wealth.
Exposure to the oil boom did not affect home ownership in the regions with full univer-
month, while formal workers earn on average $470 per month. While there is a gap in earnings, I am not able
to estimate the reduced form effect of exposure to the oil boom on income because the labor survey does not
report place of birth and the data I use only reports earnings of individuals who work formally as employees
in companies. The fact that exposure to the oil boom increases the probability of working informally in some
regions implies that I would need to account for sample selection to estimate the effect of the oil boom on
earnings of employees. However, the fact that informal employment decreases for the Amazon region violates
monotonicity across regions. Hence, I cannot use bounding procedures as in Lee (2009) to account for selection
in the sample.
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Table 4.6: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on Home Ownership
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
a. Owning a house with more than two rooms
Full -0.0109 -0.0010 -0.0059 -0.0051 -0.0063 0.0033 -0.0072 -0.0045
Universities (0.0053)** (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0077) (0.0083) (0.0091) (0.0062)
(0.0037)*** (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0078) (0.0058) (0.0039)
Liberal -0.0036 -0.0058 -0.0086 -0.0022 0.00003 -0.0015 -0.0037 -0.0036
Arts (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0065)
(0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0060)
Amazon 0.0039 0.0208 0.0069 0.0120 0.0001 0.0268 -0.0004 0.0101
Region (0.0162) (0.0178) (0.0196) (0.0215) (0.0236) (0.0254) (0.0278) (0.0192)
(0.0149) (0.0126)* (0.0148) (0.0175) (0.0211) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0155)
b. Owning a house of quality above the median of the quality index
Full -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0062 -0.0042 -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0066 -0.0039
Universities (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0062)
(0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0029)** (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0049) (0.0035)
Liberal -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0078 -0.0041 0.0050 -0.0089 -0.0096 -0.0043
Arts (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0093) (0.0063)
(0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0104) (0.0061)
Amazon 0.0012 0.0289 0.0140 0.0324 0.0391 0.0611 0.0433 0.0332
Region (0.0128) (0.0144)** (0.0155) (0.0172)* (0.0189)** (0.0204)*** (0.0222)* (0.0154)**
(0.0154) (0.0162)* (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0209)* (0.0273)** (0.0281) (0.0198)*
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the probability of owning a home with more than two rooms (Panel a) and on
the probability of owning a home of quality above the median of the quality index for the cohorts born in 1955-1961. Home ownership is measured
in the 2010 census. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects across cohorts
using using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust standard
errors. The second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends
across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955
(n = 1, 711, 538).
sities (Table 4.6 and Appendix Figures C.7, C.8, C.9, and C.10). Panel (a) shows that for
the cohorts born in 1955-1961, exposure to the oil boom decreased the probability of own-
ing a home with more than two room by 0.4 percentage points (0.7 percent of the baseline),
insignificant at conventional levels. The standard errors rule out effects larger than two per-
centage points in any direction. In the Amazon region, where college completion increased,
exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 increased the likelihood of owning a house with
more than two rooms by one percentage point (1.8 percent of the baseline). The points esti-
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Table 4.7: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on Vehicle Ownership
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full -0.0011 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0111 -0.0120 -0.0075 -0.0059 -0.0055
Universities (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0049)** (0.0053)** (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0043)
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0024)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0032)*
Liberal 0.0010 0.0048 0.0067 -0.0010 0.0091 0.0061 0.0045 0.0046
Arts (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0046)
(0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0052)
Amazon 0.0044 0.0148 0.0121 0.0195 0.0289 0.0327 0.0260 0.0209
Region (0.0096) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0137)** (0.0148)** (0.0160) (0.0111)*
(0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0133) (0.0177) (0.0228) (0.0207) (0.0156)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the probability of owning at least one vehicle in 2013 for the
cohorts born in 1955-1961 The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects
across cohorts using using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to
heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters).
The estimates control for different trends across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all
individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (n = 1, 711, 538).
mates are imprecise and fluctuate across cohorts. There is no significant effect on the region
with liberal arts colleges.
Panel (b) in Table 4.6 presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the probability
of owning a house of quality above the median of the quality index. Again, exposure to the
oil boom did not affect home ownership in the regions with full universities and liberal arts
colleges. The point estimates have similar magnitudes to those in Panel (a). For the Amazon
region, exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 increased the probability of owning a
house of quality above the median by 3.3 percentage points (17 percent of the baseline).
This result is consistent with the increase in educational attainment in this region.
Table 4.7, Appendix Figure C.11, and Appendix Figure C.12 show that exposure to the
oil boom before turning 18 did not affect on the probability of owning at least one vehicle
in cities with full universities. For the cohorts born in 1955-1961, exposure to the oil boom
decreased the probability of owning a vehicle by 0.5 percentage points (2.8 percent of the
baseline). The point estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. For the
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Amazon region, the point estimates are imprecise but indicate that exposure to the oil boom
before turning 18 increased the likelihood of owning a car by 2.1 percentage points (17.8
percent of the baseline), which goes in line with the effects on educational attainment.
In summary, the four pieces of evidence together suggest that the long-term reduction in
educational attainment is consistent with a model of rational individuals who reduce their
educational attainment in response to lower returns of education in the long-run. The long-
term reduction in human capital together with no significant change in wealth is consistent
with the hypothesis that the oil boom changed the structure of the Ecuadorian labor market
by enhancing the importance of informal low-skill jobs.
4.7 Discussion
By analyzing the Ecuadorian oil boom of the 1970s, this paper provides some ground
work for understanding how natural resource boom can affect human capital accumulation
in developing countries. The results indicate that educational attainment decreased without
affecting wealth accumulation. This finding is consistent with a model of fully informed
rational individuals who reduce their educational attainment in response to a shock that de-
creases the returns of education by increasing the productivity of low skill jobs. Thus, that
rather than a “lost generation”, the cohorts exposed to the oil boom before turning 18 were
just busy at work.
The results suggest that fiscal policy has role in the propagation of natural resource
shocks in developing countries, in particular in cases where the state owns resource rights.
The long-term reduction in educational attainment in Ecuador is consistent with policies that
increased low-skills productivity at the time and were applied again in Latin America in the
last resource boom in the 2000s. De La Torre et al. (2015) find descriptive evidence that low-
skill productivity increased in resource-rich Latin American countries during the commodity
price boom in the 2000s, driven by public spending policies similar to the ones Ecuador
implemented in the 1970s.27 How the government spends the extra money can influence
27Additionally, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find that oil revenue increases budgeted spending for public
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the effects of the natural resource shock on the economy, particularly in the long term. The
case of the Amazon region suggests that if a government wants a natural resource boom to
increase educational attainment, it needs to invest to reduce costs of college attendance.
Also, it is plausible that policies that increase productivity in high-skill occupations pro-
duce a different effect. The case of Indonesia, another oil producing developing country,
gives suggestive evidence in this direction. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Indonesian gov-
ernment started promoting industrialization to increase exports of manufactured goods (Elias
et al., 2011). Appendix Figure C.15 shows that there is no drop in college completion after
the oil boom. There is an increase in the trend for those individuals who turned 18 years old
after the oil boom. More studies are needed to fully understand how fiscal spending can de-
termine the effects of natural resource booms. Evaluating the counterfactual of what would
have happened if the exposed cohorts completed more education and received the effects of
the oil boom is an important question for future research.
Given these results, can we tell if natural resources a blessing or a curse? The estimates
suggest that those individuals who turned 18 years old after the oil boom did not fare worse
than their older peers regarding wealth accumulation. However, the drop in educational at-
tainment caused by the oil boom could decrease social capital and civic engagement (McMa-
hon, 2010; Dee, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2009); have negative effects on
health (Silles, 2009; Brunello et al., 2016); affect safety in the country (Lochner and Moretti,
2004; Groot and van den Brink, 2010; Buonanno and Leonida, 2009); and negatively affect
the well-being of the next generation (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Currie and Moretti,
2003; Mine Günes¸, 2015). These factors can constrain a country’s long-term growth po-
tential. To preview these potential negative consequences, Appendix Table C.4, Appendix
Figure C.13 and Appendix Figure C.14 present the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the
number of children per person.28 Exposure to the oil boom increased the number of chil-
dren by 1.7 percent of the baseline in cities with full universities. This result and the fact
services in Brazil, but it does not affect living conditions, suggesting that corruption might be a problem.
28There is no effect on the extensive margin of having children nor on the probability of never marrying.
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that wealth did not decrease may imply fewer resources per children, which may lower their
educational attainment and other future outcomes. In the Amazon region, exposure to the oil
boom decreased the number of children by 4.5 percent of the baseline.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the results indicate that the oil boom decreased
Ecuador’s stock of human capital and may have affected its capacity to accumulate human
capital for the next generation, which constrains the country’s long-term growth potential.
There is evidence that the drop in educational attainment can constraint the development
of high-skill industries (Becker et al., 2011; Becker and Woessmann, 2010). Hence, a re-
source boom may not be a curse regarding individual wealth, but it can be a curse for society
regarding the next generation’s outcomes and lost growth potential.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The three essays in this dissertation use experimental and quasi-experimental methods
to study how institutions, technologies, and natural shocks can affect living conditions. In
Section 2, we find that people place a high value on Facebook. One week on Facebook is
worth about $67 for the participants in our intervention - a relatively large value considering
that it represents 30 percent of their average weekly income. We also find that Facebook
is an important source of news. When we logged participants off Facebook, they did not
look for news from other sources, even when the substitution cost for accessing news from
the radio, television or the internet is low. Notably, being off of Facebook resulted in more
uncertainty about whether news from politically-skewed sources was fake or not. Finally,
we find that using Facebook induces feelings of depression and that participants switch to
healthier activities when they cannot access Facebook.
In Section 3, we study how individual behavior may affect the effectiveness of medical
technologies, in the context of flu vaccination. We find that reducing opportunity costs in-
creases vaccination take-up substantially and that peer behavior can influence participation in
vaccination campaigns. These results suggest that decreasing opportunity costs is one option
to increase participation drastically and that employers and policymakers can increase par-
ticipation in health campaigns by using mechanisms to incentivize groups of people. We also
find evidence consistent with vaccination causing a moral hazard problem. Our study pro-
vides several pieces of evidence that speak to the idea of riskier behaviors regarding health
among vaccinated individuals. Forgoing other protective measures and increasing risky be-
haviors could partially explain the ineffectiveness of vaccination and could help understand
better why health interventions may sometimes fail.
In Section 4, I find that a natural resource boom can decrease human capital accumula-
tion in the long-run in developing countries. While the results show no effect on wealth ac-
cumulation, affected individuals are losing non-monetary benefits from education including
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social capital and civic engagement, health, safety, and the well-being of the next generation.
These factors, together with the fact that lower human capital constraints the development of
high-skill industries, can negatively affect a country’s long-term growth potential.
These analyses highlight the importance of understanding the unintended consequences
institutions, technologies, and shocks should have in policy design. The case of Facebook
highlights that causal knowledge on its adverse effects is a missing piece of information for
the ongoing policy debate on social media. Also, how individuals react to a policy, program
or shock can lead to outcomes unforeseen by policymakers and it is important to account
for these possibilities. For instance, in the context of flu vaccination, policymakers should
account for ways to counter riskier behaviors in the design of vaccination campaigns and
policies that reduce the cost of college attendance can be used to increase human capital
accumulation during resource booms.
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APPENDIX A
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FACEBOOK
A.1 Phase 1 Recruitment Email
137
A.2 Phase 1 Survey
If no, the next screen shows
If yes, the next screen shows
138
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140
† The screen above represents the WTP setting. Half of the subjects received this word-
ing while the other half were asked "How much money would you need to be given to stop
using Facebook for a week?", which reflects the WTA setting.
For the case where the counter offer is less than the valuation:
141
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A.3 News Quiz
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A.4 Survey Questionnaire
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A.5 Additional Results
Figure A.1: Facebook Negative Emotions
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Figure A.2: Facebook Negative Emotions Cont.
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Figure A.3: Change in Reported Depression and Change in the Value of Facebook
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics by Survey Phases
Ineligible Eligible P-value Eligible (Show) Eligible (No-Show) P-value
Value of Facebook 85.35 27.11 0.000 28.97 26.33 0.025
(119.88) (12.72) (12.98) (12.55)
Woman 0.60 0.59 0.720 0.65 0.57 0.089
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Age 20.77 20.55 0.009 20.59 20.53 0.693
(1.65) (1.68) (1.99) (1.53)
Income ($) 67,204 71,761 0.109 69,509 72,286 0.512
(55,192) (68,778) (63,207) (71,032)
N 1,207 562 167 395
Notes: This table presents the means for eligible and ineligible participants from the Phase 1 survey and for the eligible
participants that showed up to complete the Phase 2 survey and those that were eligible but did not show up for phase 2. The
p-values represents the difference of means for each group. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Facebook Restriction - Balance of Covari-
ates
Treatment Control P-value
Value of Facebook 28.42 29.43 0.618
(11.27) (14.33)
Woman 0.57 0.711 0.060
(0.50) (0.46)
Age 20.69 20.51 0.569
(2.41) (1.56)
Income($) 67,900 75,986 0.482
(55,988) (68,904)
N 77 90
Notes: The first two columns present the means of different
observables characteristics for the Facebook restriction treatment
group and the no restriction control group. Columns 3 presents the
p-values of the difference of means between these groups. Stan-
dard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.3: Phase 2 Survey - Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Daily Time Reading or Watching News (1-5)1 2.15 2 1.19
Frequency of Use (1-7)2
Cable TV 1.93 1 1.49
Paper News 1.31 1 0.67
Radio 2.46 2 1.66
Online News 4.55 5 1.73
Social Media 5.60 6 1.56
News Feed 4.14 4 1.99
Political Nature of Preferred News (1-5)3 2.81 3 0.97
Daily Social Media Usage (hours)4
Facebook 1.87 1 2.21
Instagram 1.28 1 1.60
Twitter 0.86 0 2.06
Tumblr 0.35 0 1.57
Snapchat 1.95 1 3.02
Vimeo 0.03 0 0.16
YouTube 1.85 1 2.65
Social Media Friends and Followers (number)5
Facebook 640.99 538 442.04
Instagram 452.36 350 511.77
Tumblr 87.32 0 571.74
Twitter 182.12 0 333.80
Subjective Well-Being (0-10)6
Satisfied with life 7.15 8 1.92
Things in life are worthwhile 7.37 8 1.88
How happy are you 7.17 8 2.12
How often do you worry 6.79 7 2.33
How often do you feel depressed 3.40 3 2.63
Notes: 1Responses to the question “How much time did you spend reading or
watching the news per day last week?” Response options: 1) Less than 15 min,
2) More than 15 minutes but less than 30 minutes, 3) More than 30 minutes but
less than 1 hour, 4) More than 1 hour but less than 2 hours, and 5) More than 2
hours. N=167 obs. 2Responses to the question “Please indicate how frequently you
used the following types of news media last week.” Scale was from 1 to 7 where
1 indicates “Not at all” and 7 indicates “All of the time.” N=167 obs. 3List top
news outlets/sources from the previous week. We categorized each 1st choice as
either being 1) Left, 2) Left-Center, 3) Center, 4) Right-Center, or 5) Right based
on www.allsides.com. N=57 obs. 4Time spent each say on various social media
platforms. 5How many friends and followers on various social media platforms.
6Subjective well-being questions, with 0 indicating “never and” 10 “very/always.”
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Table A.4: Correlations between the Value of Facebook and User’s Characteristics
Value of Facebook High Time High Engage Depressed High Negative High Friends in High Friends in
Facebook other Social Media
Value of Facebook 1.00
High Time 0.23*** 1.00
High Engage 0.20** 0.32*** 1.00
Depressed -0.11 0.23*** 0.05 1.00
High Negative -0.06 0.17** 0.09 0.32*** 1.00
High Friends on Facebook 0.06 0.10 0.21*** -0.02 0.01 1.00
High Friends on other Social Media 0.17** 0.18** 0.38*** -0.10 0.01 0.42*** 1.00
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the stated value of Facebook and characteristics of its users based on Phase 2 survey responses. High Time refers
to individuals who on average use Facebook for more than one hour per day; High Engage refers to individuals who post pictures and comments on Facebook at least once or twice per
month; Depressed refers to individuals who reported feeling depressed above the reported median value; High Negative refers to individuals who are above the median of the factor index
that combines measures of feeling envy, misery, lonely and annoyed while on Facebook; High Friends in Facebook refers to individuals who have more than 564 friends in Facebook (median
number of friends); and High Friends in other Social Media refers to individuals who have more than 529 friends in Facebook (median number of friends in other social media).
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Table A.5: Distribution Shift Tests
Equality FSD C-T SSD C-T FSD T-C SSD T-C
Facebook Use 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.93 1.00
News Media Index -Traditional Media 0.41 0.22 0.10* 0.60 0.57
News Media Index -Social Media 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.94 1.00
News Consumption Index 0.07* 0.04** 0.00*** 0.95 0.75
Probability Right Answer - Mainstream News 0.37 0.77 0.80 0.18 0.23
Probability Wrong Answer - Mainstream News 0.61 0.70 0.55 0.33 0.34
Probability Not Sure Answer - Mainstream News 0.55 0.29 0.21 0.58 0.51
Probability Right Answer - Skewed News 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.54 0.99
Probability Wrong Answer - Skewed News 0.46 0.50 0.75 0.23 0.23
Probability Not Sure Answer - Skewed News 0.37 0.51 0.81 0.19 0.19
Overall Satisfaction 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.58 0.76
Life is Worthwhile 0.28 0.14 0.09* 0.62 0.79
Feel Happy 0.17 0.09* 0.11 0.93 0.82
Worry 0.21 0.90 0.79 0.10* 0.11
Feel Depressed 0.32 0.16 0.22 0.91 0.98
Consumption Index 0.03** 0.97 0.89 0.01** 0.00***
Productive Time Index 0.10 0.97 0.90 0.05* 0.02**
Efficient Time Index 0.10* 0.98 0.90 0.05* 0.01***
Expected Consumption Index 0.07* 0.79 0.63 0.03** 0.01***
Value of Facebook 0.47 0.70 0.99 0.25 0.14
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
This table presents the bootstrap p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics that test for equality of distributions, first order stochas-
tic dominance and second order stochastic dominance between treatment and control after a one week Facebook restriction. In
column 1 the null hypothesis is that the distributions are the same, in column 2 the null hypothesis is that the treatment group first
order stochastic dominates the control group, in column 3 the null hypothesis is that the treatment group second order stochastic
dominates the control group, in column 4 the null hypothesis is that the control group first order stochastic dominates the treatment
group, and in column 5 the null hypothesis is that the control group first order stochastic dominates the treatment group.
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APPENDIX B
VACCINES AT WORK
B.1 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Locations of the Bank in Ecuador
Notes: The map contains the locations of the bank in Ecuador (orange) where we implemented our intervention.
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Figure B.2: Timeline of Experiment Implementation
Notes: The bank sent the pre-intervention survey on October 18. The bank sent emails with the different treat-
ments on November 1 using Human Resources mailing account. Furthermore, it sent a reminder on November
7. The vaccination campaign took place between November 8 and November 11. The post-treatment period
(Ecuadorian flu season) went from November 13 to March 1. The bank sent the post-intervention survey during
March and April 2018.
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Figure B.3: Treatment Message: Control
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the control group. Translation:
Dear Employee, Diners Club of Ecuador is running an influenza vaccination cam-
paign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, November 9 from
8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the price is
$4.95, that will be deducted from your payroll if you choose to get vaccinated. If
you have questions, please contact. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure B.4: Treatment Message: Altruism
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Altruistic Treatment” group.
Translation: Dear Employee, Diners Club of Ecuador is running an influenza vacci-
nation campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, Novem-
ber 9 from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you,
the price is $4.95, that will be deducted from your payroll if you choose to get
vaccinated. Getting vaccinated yourself also protects people around you, including
those who are more vulnerable to severe flu illness, like infants, young children, the
elderly and people with dangerous health conditions that cannot get vaccinated If
you have questions, please contact. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure B.5: Treatment Message: Selfish
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Selfish Treatment” group.
Translation: Dear Employee, Diners Club of Ecuador is running an influenza vacci-
nation campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Thursday, Novem-
ber 9 from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you, the
price is $4.95, that will be deducted from your payroll if you choose to get vacci-
nated. Vaccination can significantly reduce your risk of getting sick, according to
both health officials from the World Health Organization and numerous scientific
studies. If you have questions, please contact. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure B.6: Treatment Message: Opportunity Cost (Saturday)
Notes: The above image portrays the email sent to the “Saturday Treatment” group.
Translation: Dear Employee, Diners Club of Ecuador is running an influenza vacci-
nation campaign in November. You are eligible for a flu shot on Saturday, Novem-
ber 11 from 8:30 to 11:30. We obtain a discount on the vaccine’s price. For you,
the price is $4.95, that will be deducted from your payroll if you choose to get
vaccinated. If you have questions, please contact. Let’s get vaccinated!
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Figure B.7: Vaccination Campaign: Influenza Vaccine
Notes: The above package contains the influenza vaccine used in the campaign.
This vaccine protects against four strands of the flu, two from type A and two from
type B.
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Figure B.8: Vaccination Campaign: Flu Shot in Action
Notes: Immunization at the firm.
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Figure B.9: Vaccine Take-up around $750 Wage Threshold
Notes: This figure presents the evolution of vaccine take-up around the $750 thresh-
old with a bin size of $10. Individuals who earn more than $750 paid $7.49 for the
vaccine, while employees whose wage is below this threshold paid $4.99.
164
Figure B.10: Distribution of Employees in Units
Notes: This figure presents the number of employees in each of the 142 units.
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B.2 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Regression Discontinuity Effects of Higher Price on Vaccination
Take-Up
Baseline With Controls Quito Sample Non-Compliance
Threshold 0.0590 0.1603 0.0655 0.0400
(0.0730) (0.1514) (0.0786) (0.0722)
N 608 608 461 604
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the local average treatment
effects of a small price change on vaccination take-up. We report the normalized coefficient
at a wage of $750 and a bandwidth of $300. Individuals who earn more than $750 paid $7.49
for the vaccine, while employees whose wage is below this threshold paid $4.99. There is
no visible discontinuity across the threshold. All specifications control for city fixed effects.
Column 1 presents our main estimates without adding additional controls. In Column 2 we
test the robustness of the main estimates controlling for the vaccine’s price, income, tenure,
division in the company, gender, age, and education level. Column 3 presents the estimates
using only employees in Quito, the city where we implemented our four treatments. In
Column 4 we exclude 12 individuals who were assigned to vaccinate in the workweek but
went to vaccinate on Saturday. Reducing the bandwidth in steps of $50 to $150 does not
change the results.
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Table B.2: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Vaccination Take-up
Men Women Short Distance Long Distance No Children Children
Altruistic Information -0.0017 -0.0508 -0.0564 -0.0477 -0.0163 -0.0368
(0.0452) (0.0429) (0.0441) (0.0521) (0.0421) (0.0454)
Selfish Information 0.0098 -0.0166 -0.0074 -0.0291 0.0188 -0.0253
(0.0439) (0.0451) (0.0460) (0.0527) (0.0435) (0.0452)
Saturday -0.0883** -0.0677 -0.0825** -0.1047** -0.0531 -0.1056**
(0.0413) (0.0441) (0.0420) (0.0488) (0.0396) (0.0453)
N 593 571 446 449 556 608
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the effect of the different treatments on vaccination take-up for
different subgroups in the study’s population.
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Table B.3: Recall Information Statements
Heard Altruistic Statement Heard Selfish Statement
Altruistic Information -1.5050 -8.6603**
(4.9361) (4.1577)
Selfish Information -4.1349 -0.2413
(4.9398) (4.0169)
Saturday -3.9293 -2.8269
(6.2201) (5.0108)
Baseline 69.95 78.21
N 378 378
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the effects of the different treat-
ments on measurements of recalling the altruistic and selfish statements. The post-intervention
survey collects these measures on a scale from 0 to 100.
168
Table B.4: Robustness Check on Peer Effects Estimates
Unit Size Peer Characteristics
A. Main Effect
Proportion of peers:
Vaccinated 0.0079*** 0.0071***
(0.0018) (0.0019)
N 1138 1138
B. Heterogenous Effects
Proportion of peers:
Same Gender Vaccinated 0.0075*** 0.0072***
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Different Gender Vaccinated 0.0048** 0.0043*
(0.0024) (0.0025)
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the unit level in parentheses. The bank has
116 units with more than one employee. This table presents the effect of peer
vaccination take-up on the individual’s vaccination decision. We measure the
proportion of peers vaccinated and the proportion of peers assigned to the work-
week in percentage points. Thus, the estimates represent the effect of a one
percentage point change in the proportion of peers. We define peers as all em-
ployees who work in the same unit. All estimates control for Quito fixed effects
and individual assignment to the workweek. Column 1 controls for the number
of employees in each unit. Column 2 controls for the number of employees in
each unit, and peer age and gender.
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Table B.5: Robustness Check on Effects of Vaccination on the Flu
Controls Broader Definition of Flu
Reduced Form 2SLS Reduced Form 2SLS
a. Being Diagnosed with the Flu
Assigned to the workweek 0.0011 -0.0118
(0.0160) (0.0173)
Vaccinated 0.0183 -0.1729
(0.2434) (0.2922)
b. Granted a Sick Day because of the Flu
Assigned to the workweek 0.0095 0.0082
(0.0086) (0.0106)
Vaccinated 0.1458 0.1218
(0.1366) (0.1679)
N 1,148 1,148
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the robustness of the effects of flu
vaccination on the probability of being diagnosed sick and being granted a sick day because of the flu
to the addition of controls (gender, age, tenure, and income) and using a broader definition of the flu.
Column 1 presents the reduced form estimates. Column 2 presents 2SLS estimates.
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Table B.6: Reduced Form Heterogeneous Effects
Men Women 23-45 >45 No Children Children
A. Being Diagnosed with the Flu
Assigned to 0.0008 0.0049 0.0131 -0.0632 0.0089 -0.0021
the workweek (0.0177) (0.0271) (0.0167) (0.0517) (0.0235) (0.0216)
B. Granted a Sick Day because of the Flu
Assigned to -0.0041 0.0263*** 0.0176** -0.0370 0.0018 0.0198***
the workweek (0.0141) (0.0087) (0.0081) (0.0364) (0.0149) (0.0074)
N 585 563 982 166 544 604
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the robustness of the effects of flu vaccination
on the probability of being diagnosed sick and being granted a sick day because of the flu to the addition of
controls (gender, age, tenure, and income) and using a broader definition of the flu. Column 1 presents the
reduced form estimates. Column 2 presents 2SLS estimates.
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Table B.7: Bounds
Diagnosed with Flu Diagnosed with Non-flu
Main Lower Bound Upper Bound Main Lower Bound Upper Bound
Workweek 0.0032 0.0002 0.0023 -0.0748** -0.0982*** -0.0540
(0.0160) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0363) (0.0378) (0.0368)
N 913 899 860 913 899 860
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents bounds for the effect of being assigned to the workweek
on the probability of being diagnosed with the flu and other non-flu respiratory diseases. All specifications control for
Quito fixed effects.
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Table B.8: Reduced Form Effects on Productivity
Post-Survey Swipe-Cards
General Productivity
Entry to Work Exit from Work Duration at WorkProductivity Post-Intervention
Assigned to 0.1684 0.1534 -0.1492 -0.4879 -0.3387
the workweek (0.1357) (0.1718) (0.1945) (0.3487) (0.4004)
N 378 378 403 403 403
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the effect of the assignment to the workweek on self-reported
measures productivity and duration of the workday. The post-intervention survey collects these self-reported measures on a scale
from 0 to 10. The swipe card information corresponds to January and is measured in hours.
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APPENDIX C
A BLESSING OR A CURSE? THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF RESOURCE BOOMS
ON HUMAN CAPITAL AND LIVING CONDITIONS
C.1 Design tests
Figure C.1: Population Distribution by Birth Cohort and Region
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Notes: This Figure presents the distribution of the population in Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948
and 1961 by region of birth. The cohorts born between 1955 and 1961 (red triangles) experienced the effects
of the exploitation of oil in the Amazon region.
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C.2 Universities and Colleges during the 1970s
Table C.1: Young Adults Living with their
Parents in Ecuador
18-30 years old 18-24 years old
1962 33.8% 45.4%
1974 36.5% 46.5%
1982 37.4% 48.3%
1990 39.4% 51.0%
2001 40.6% 51.0%
2010 40.7% 51.5%
Notes: This Table presents the proportion of young
adults who live with their parents according to
Ecuador’s population censuses of 1962, 1974, 1982,
1990, 2001 and 2010.
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Table C.2: Universities and Colleges in Ecuador during the 1970s
Open since Province
Universidad de Cuenca 1867 Azuay
Universidad del Azuay 1968 Azuay
Universidad Catolica de Cuenca 1970 Azuay
ESPOCH* 1973 Chimborazo
Universidad Tecnica de Machala* 1969 El Oro
Universidad Tecnica Luis Vargas Torres de Esmeraldas* 1970 Esmeraldas
Universidad de Guayaquil 1883 Guayas
Escuela Superior Politecnica del Litoral 1958 Guayas
Universidad Laica Vicente Rocafuerte de Guayaquil 1966 Guayas
Universidad Nacional de Loja+ 1943 Loja
Universidad Tecnica Particular de Loja* 1971 Loja
Universidad Tecnica de Babahoyo* 1971 Los Rios
Universidad Tecnica de Manabi* 1959 Manabi
Universidad Central del Ecuador 1621 Pichincha
Escuela Politecnica Nacional 1869 Pichincha
Escuela Politecnica del Ejercito 1922 Pichincha
Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador 1946 Pichincha
Universidad Tecnica de Ambato* 1969 Tungurahua
*Technical school focused on agriculture during the 1970s
+ Had a second campus in the Imbabura province in the north of the country
Notes: This Table presents list of universities and technical colleges that functioned in Ecuador during
the 1970s. Technical colleges focused on agriculture at that time. The Table lists the institution’s name,
its opening date and the province where it is located.
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C.3 Additional Graphs and Tables
Figure C.2: College Completion by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population who graduated from college
in Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The horizontal axis plots the year of birth. The
country is divided into four regions depending on the geographic location and type of universities before
the oil boom. The cohorts born between were exposed to the oil boom before turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.3: Population with no Completed Education by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population with no completed education
in Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The horizontal axis plots the year of birth. The
country is divided into four regions depending on the geographic location and type of universities before
the oil boom. The cohorts born between were exposed to the oil boom before turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.4: Effects on the Probability of Not Completing Any Educational Level
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the effects of unobserved shocks
on the probability of not completing any educational level. Dashed lines present conventional difference in
difference estimates, and solid lines control for differential trends. These estimates take the the region without
universities as the base region.
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Figure C.5: Population Working Informally in 2012 by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population working informally in
Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The data correspond to 2012. The horizontal axis
plots the year of birth. The country is divided into four regions depending on the geographic location and
type of universities before the oil boom. The cohorts born between were exposed to the oil boom before
turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.6: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on Informal Employ-
ment
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the the effect of exposure to the oil
boom before turning 18 on the probability of working informally in 2012. Dashed lines present conventional
difference in difference estimates, and solid lines control for differential trends. These estimates take the the
region without universities as the base region.
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Figure C.7: Population Owning a Home with more than two Rooms in 2010 by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population who owns a home with more
than two rooms in Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The data correspond to 2010.
The horizontal axis plots the year of birth. The country is divided into four regions depending on the
geographic location and type of universities before the oil boom. The cohorts born between were exposed
to the oil boom before turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.8: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on the Probability of
Owning a Home with more than two Rooms
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the the effect of exposure to the oil
boom before turning 18 on the probability of owning a home with more than two rooms in 2010. Dashed lines
present conventional difference in difference estimates, and solid lines control for differential trends. These
estimates take the the region without universities as the base region.
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Figure C.9: Population Owning a Home of Quality above the Median in 2010 by Birth
Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population who owns a home of quality
above the median of the quality index in Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The data
correspond to 2010. The horizontal axis plots the year of birth. The country is divided into four regions
depending on the geographic location and type of universities before the oil boom. The cohorts born
between were exposed to the oil boom before turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.10: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on the Probability of
Owning a Home of Quality above the Median
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the the effect of exposure to the
oil boom before turning 18 on the probability of owning a home of quality above the median of the quality
index in 2010. Dashed lines present conventional difference in difference estimates, and solid lines control for
differential trends. These estimates take the the region without universities as the base region.
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Figure C.11: Population Owning a Vehicle in 2013 by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the proportion of the population who owns a vehicle in
Ecuador for the cohorts born between 1948 and 1961. The data correspond to 2013. The horizontal axis
plots the year of birth. The country is divided into four regions depending on the geographic location and
type of universities before the oil boom. The cohorts born between were exposed to the oil boom before
turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.12: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on the Probability of
Owning a Vehicle
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the the effect of exposure to the oil
boom before turning 18 on the probability of owning a vehicle in 2013. Dashed lines present conventional
difference in difference estimates, and solid lines control for differential trends. These estimates take the the
region without universities as the base region.
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Figure C.13: Number of Children by Birth Cohort
Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of the number of children for the cohorts born between 1948
and 1961. The data correspond to 2014. The horizontal axis plots the year of birth. The country is divided
into four regions depending on the geographic location and type of universities before the oil boom. The
cohorts born between were exposed to the oil boom before turning 18 years old.
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Figure C.14: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on the Number of
Children
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Notes: This Figure presents dynamic difference in difference estimates of the the effect of exposure to the oil
boom before turning 18 on the number of children in 2014. Dashed lines present conventional difference in
difference estimates, and solid lines control for differential trends. These estimates take the the region without
universities as the base region.
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Figure C.15: College Completion by Birth Cohort in Indonesia
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Notes: This Figure presents the evolution of college completion for the cohorts born in Indonesia between
1948 and 1961. The cohorts born between 1955 and 1961 (red triangles) turned 18 years old during the oil
boom in the 1970s. This Figure uses data from a 10 percent random sample of Indonesia’s 2010 population
census (Minnesota Population Center, 2017). The drops correspond to birth years that are multiples of five.
Apparently, individuals with low education round their age/year of birth to the closest multiple of five. I have
found evidence of this rounding in self-reported data sets from other developing countries.
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Table C.3: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on College Completion by Gender
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Women
Full 0.0014 0.0072 -0.0014 -0.0142 -0.0261 -0.0405 -0.0431 -0.0184
Universities (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0058) (0.0063)** (0.0068)*** (0.0073)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0055)***
(0.0024) (0.0039)* (0.0088) (0.0118) (0.0137)* (0.0171)** (0.0166)*** (0.0107)*
Liberal 0.0011 0.0006 0.0102 0.0092 0.0129 0.0116 0.0078 0.0078
Arts (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0051)** (0.0056) (0.0060)** (0.0064)* (0.0070) (0.0047)*
(0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0056)* (0.0070) (0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0073)
Amazon 0.0122 0.0159 0.0307 0.0313 0.0544 0.0408 0.0528 0.0357
Region (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0127)** (0.0135)** (0.0149)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0170)*** (0.0116)***
(0.0109) (0.0117) (0.0116)*** (0.0130)** (0.0145)*** (0.0187)** (0.0214)** (0.0124)***
Men
Full -0.0074 -0.0151 -0.0263 -0.0441 -0.0552 -0.0522 -0.0575 -0.0387
Universities (0.0057) (0.0062)** (0.0067)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0087)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0066)***
(0.0060) (0.0040)*** (0.0118)** (0.0097)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0076)***
Liberal 0.0053 0.0175 0.0034 0.0027 0.0054 0.0011 0.0023 0.0051
Arts (0.0052) (0.0057)*** (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0058)
(0.0036) (0.0058)*** (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0126) (0.0072)
Amazon 0.0172 0.0479 0.0261 0.0631 0.0561 0.0787 0.0744 0.0544
Region (0.0127) (0.0143)*** (0.0148)* (0.0166)*** (0.0177)*** (0.0193)*** (0.0209)*** (0.0144)***
(0.0161) (0.0147)*** (0.0168) (0.0178)*** (0.0195)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0243)*** (0.0179)***
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom before turning 18 on the probability of graduating from college for the cohorts born in
1955-1961 by gender. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of these effects across cohorts using
using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The
second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The estimates control for different trends across regions for the
cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all individuals born in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 (870,046 women and 841,492
men).
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Table C.4: Effects of Exposure to the Oil Boom Before Turning 18 on the Number of Children
Born in: 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1955-1961
Full 0.0139 0.0195 0.0295 0.0410 0.0533 0.0775 0.0643 0.0446
Universities (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0214) (0.0236)* (0.0259)** (0.0285)*** (0.0311)** (0.0216)**
(0.0116) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0348) (0.0502) (0.0447)* (0.0529) (0.0325)
Liberal -0.0029 -0.0208 -0.0396 -0.0874 -0.0841 -0.1051 -0.1072 -0.0662
Arts (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0250) (0.0277)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0330)*** (0.0359)*** (0.0247)***
(0.0194) (0.0224) (0.0251) (0.0333)*** (0.0333)** (0.0410)** (0.0432)** (0.0280)**
Amazon -0.0726 -0.0684 -0.0628 -0.1475 -0.1954 -0.3025 -0.3560 -0.1854
Region (0.0758) (0.0812) (0.0898) (0.0979) (0.1077)* (0.1167)*** (0.1268)*** (0.0890)**
(0.0613) (0.0762) (0.0805) (0.1019) (0.1064)* (0.1255)** (0.1351)*** (0.0869)**
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Notes: This Table presents the effect of exposure to the oil boom on the the number of children per adult for the cohorts born in 1955-1961.
The number of children is measured in 2014. The first seven columns present the effect for each cohort. The last column shows the average of
these effects across cohorts using using population as weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. The first row of standard errors corresponds
to heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The second row of standard errors are clustered at the canton level for robustness (215 clusters). The
estimates control for different trends across regions for the cohorts who turned 18 before 1973. The estimation sample includes all individuals born
in Ecuador between 1948 and 1955 with children (n = 1, 366, 190).
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